$6.50

ORBIS

A Journal of World Affairs

CIIA
JUL 10 1989

Summer 1989

Foreign Policy Research Institute

What China Can Learn from Taiwan

Algeria: The Other Uprising

Coping with Terrorism in the U.S.

Negotiating with Gorbachev's Team

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Founded in 1955, the Foreign Policy Research Institute is an independent, publicly supported, nonprofit organization devoted to the public dissemination of scholarly research affecting the national interests of the United States. As a catalyst for the exchange of ideas, FPRI seeks to influence the climate in which American foreign policy is made. Research is conducted by the FPRI staff, supplemented by the work of Fellows and Associate Scholars.

In addition to ORBIS, the Institute publishes *The Philadelphia Papers,* a series of monographs dealing with current issues. The *FPRI Book Series* includes volumes on the cutting edge of research.

FPRI administers the *Inter-University Seminar on Foreign Affairs,* which regularly brings together scholars and businessmen for lectures, seminars, and workshops on international issues. Each year the Institute sponsors a competition for the *Thornton D. Hooper Fellowship in International Affairs;* the Hooper Fellow spends a year in residence at FPRI conducting independent research. The FPRI *Internship Program* provides opportunities for students who are contemplating a career in international affairs.

All contributions to the Institute are tax-deductible.

President
Marvin Wachman

Director
Daniel Pipes

Board of Trustees
John Gilray Christy
Chairman
Bruce H. Hooper
Vice-Chairman
W. W. Keen Butcher
Treasurer
Ronald Ross Davenport
Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Robert A. Fox
Kenneth W. Gemmill
William L. Grala
Frederick S. Hammer
Harry A. Kalish
Leslie Lenkowsky
David Lucterhand
John A. McKesson
Thomas P. Melady
Martin Meyerson
Ronald J. Naples
Milton L. Rock
Edward M. Snider
George P. Steele
Marvin Wachman
David V. Wachs
Daniel W. Weil
Albert J. Wood

Board of Advisors
James Courter
Midge Decter
David Eisenhower
Samuel P. Huntington
John F. Lehman
Bernard Lewis
William H. McNeill
Martin Peretz
Donald H. Rumsfeld
Richard Thornburgh
R. James Woolsey

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS

A Journal of World Affairs

VOLUME 33 NUMBER 3 SUMMER 1989

What China Can Learn from Taiwan Shaomin Li 327

Coping with Terrorism in the United States Patrick Clawson 341

How to Negotiate with Gorbachev's Team David T. Jones 357

Should Indigenous Peoples Have Special Rights? Richard Mulgan 375

TWO MIDDLE EAST INTIFADAS

Islam in the Palestinian Uprising Robert Satloff 389

The Second Battle of Algiers Khalid Duran 403

Review Essay

Up from Serfdom Jeffrey Paul 423

Correspondence 427

Brief Reviews 441

World Politics 443

War Studies 446

International Economics 449

The United States 452

Europe 456

The Soviet Union 459

The Middle East 463

Africa 468

East Asia 472

Latin America 477

CIIA

JUL 10 1989

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS
A Journal of World Affairs

Editor
DANIEL PIPES

Managing Editor
ROGER S. DONWAY
Manuscript Editor
JOANN TOMAZINIS
Assistant Editors
MARK W. POWELL
JAMES F. SMITH

Contributing Editors
PATRICK CLAWSON
ADAM M. GARFINKLE
MICHAEL RADU
VLADIMIR TISMANEANU
ARTHUR WALDRON
Circulation Manager
LISA ANNE BRODY

BOARD OF EDITORS

KENNETH ADELMAN
Institute for Contemporary Studies

PAUL BALARAN
Ford Foundation

ALVIN H. BERNSTEIN
U.S. Naval War College

RICHARD K. BETTS
The Brookings Institution

HENRY S. BIENEN
Princeton University

ADDA B. BOZEMAN
Sarah Lawrence College, Emeritus

PAUL BRACKEN
Yale University

RICHARD V. L. COOPER
Coopers & Lybrand

ARTHUR CYR
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

PETER DUIGNAN
The Hoover Institution

MARK FALCOFF
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

ALTON FRYE
Council on Foreign Relations

ALEXANDER GEORGE
Stanford University

COLIN S. GRAY
National Institute for Public Policy

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

PAUL HOLLANDER
University of Massachusetts—Amherst

J. C. HUREWITZ
Columbia University

MARTIN INDYK
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

MORTON A. KAPLAN
University of Chicago

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER
The Washington Post

BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH
The Rand Corporation

WALTER A. McDOUGALL
University of Pennsylvania

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM
Council on Foreign Relations

KENNETH MAXWELL
Columbia University

STEPHANIE G. NEUMAN
Columbia University

RICHARD PIPES
Harvard University

STEVEN ROSEFIELDE
University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO
University of California–Berkeley

PAUL SEABURY
University of California–Berkeley

RICHARD F. STAAR
The Hoover Institution

MARC TRACHTENBERG
University of Pennsylvania

MARK UHLIG
The New York Times

IVAN VOLGYES
University of Nebraska

W. BRUCE WEINROD
The Heritage Foundation

SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR.
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Circulation Assistants: Adrienne Meisels; Lisa Riddell.

ORBIS (ISSN 0030-4387) is published quarterly by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3615 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

Submission of articles: The editors invite submission of articles (up to 7,000 words, including reference notes) bearing upon issues in world affairs. A brief summary should accompany the article. Manuscripts, including reference notes, should be double-spaced throughout and submitted in duplicate. Reference notes should only cite sources. A style sheet is available on request. Authors are requested to submit their articles on 3½- or 5¼-inch double-sided, IBM PC format diskettes, supported by MS-DOS in their own word processing program, plus a version in ASCII format. Diskettes must be accompanied with hard copy. Please submit articles to the Editor.

Books and publications for review: Materials should be sent to the Editor.

Subscriptions: Institutions-$50.00 per year, Individuals-$25.00 per year. Outside U.S.A., add $5.00 per year. Address correspondence regarding subscriptions and bulk orders to the Circulation Manager (please include ZIP). Postmaster: Send address changes to ORBIS, 3615 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, PA, and at additional mailing offices.

Advertising and Permissions: Correspondence should be addressed to the ORBIS Advertising Manager.

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute or the Editors of ORBIS. Reproduction of contents without permission is forbidden.

Copyright © 1989 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WHAT CHINA CAN LEARN FROM TAIWAN

by Shaomin Li

On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong watched the Chinese Communists' flag raised over Peking's Tiananmen Square. "The People's Republic of China is established," he declared. "The Chinese people are now standing up!" At the same time, members of China's defeated Nationalist or Kuomintang (KMT) faction retreated to the island of Taiwan to establish there the Republic of China (hereafter called Taiwan). Since that time, as a result of this dramatic division of the Chinese people, a vigorous competition has taken place: a competition to test the economic and political institutions of two Chinese societies.

Today, it is commonly recognized by both sides that Taiwan has won this competition. The leaders of the People's Republic of China (hereafter called the PRC or China) are now launching a comprehensive program of reforms, and searching for alternatives to their unsuccessful communist economic structures. Having reviewed the paths taken by both China and Taiwan, grappled with the problems of Chinese communism, and observed the close historic and cultural links between the two Chinese societies, many contemporary Chinese thinkers—including myself—have come to see Taiwan as a model for China's socioeconomic restructuring.

One People, Two Systems

In 1952, when both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT began to draft their first economic plans, per capita income was $50 in Taiwan; in the People's Republic of China, it was $47.

Almost forty years later, Taiwan and China have become significantly different societies. In the economic field, Taiwan has maintained a system of private ownership and a market economy. It has also experienced remarkable economic growth. In 1988, Taiwan's per capita income was about $5,275. On the other side of the Taiwan Strait, the CCP abolished private ownership of the means of production. It has experienced remarkable economic stagnation. In 1988, China's per capita income was about $280.

Shaomin Li, who studied economics at Peking University and recently received a Ph.D. from Princeton University, is a research analyst with AT&T's Corporate Strategy and Development division.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In political development as well, the paths of the two Chinese societies have been very different. Taiwan established a system of local elections in the early 1950s, has maintained political stability, and recently moved toward democracy at the national level by, for example, lifting the martial law that had long restricted newspapers and opposition parties. Politics in China during the same period were highly erratic. Mao's regime launched the Cultural Revolution, which decimated the ranks of intellectuals through purges, sought to destroy traditional Chinese culture, and attempted to hammer the PRC into a shape conforming to Marxist revolutionary ideology. Following the death of Mao, Deng Xiaoping announced reforms and opened a new era. But "the way of the reformer is hard," as Samuel P. Huntington has observed,[1] and no one would now confidently predict whether or how the PRC will change during the next few decades.

The two-China experiment seems to have had clear results. From capitalist institutions flowed prosperity and freedom; from communist institutions, poverty and chaos. The most interesting question facing China now is: will Peking learn from this experiment?

It may—in large part because the lesson is being brought home to the Chinese people through the growing influence of their fellow Chinese on Taiwan. Political and economic interactions between the two Chinese societies have recently increased both in volume and significance. Politically, for example, the general secretary of the CCP dispatched a telegram of condolence to Taipei upon the death of Taiwan's president Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988.[2] More recently still, the CCP has even begun paying homage to Chiang Kai-shek.[3] On the economic front, Taiwan announced on April 6, 1989, that it would send its first official delegation to the mainland in over forty years—a delegation headed by its Finance Minister.[4]

Perhaps even more importantly, contacts are increasing on the private level. The KMT has lifted a ban on its citizens' visiting China. According to *Renmin Ribao*, from November 2, 1987, when the ban was lifted, to January 2, 1988, there were some 162,000 Taiwanese visitors to China. The impact of these visits is manifold. First, to the people of Taiwan, seeing is believing. Many visitors who did not believe the KMT's propaganda about communism in China are now convinced that capitalism is the better system.[5] On the other hand, many mainlanders, having met their prosperous relatives, completely lost their faith in communism.[6]

[1] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 344.
[2] *Renmin Ribao*, January 15, 1988.
[3] *The New York Times*, December 6, 1988.
[4] *The New York Times*, April 7, 1989.
[5] *Zhongguo Luntan* (Taipei), May 25, 1988.
[6] Liang Zai, "Zai wenqing huaibao de beihou," *Zhongguo Zhichun*, January 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Such interaction has enabled many in China to learn that the much-damned capitalism of Taiwan seems to be a source of affluence and stability. This new awareness of Taiwan's success puts pressure on the CCP to emulate Taiwan. In fact, since the beginning of the reforms in the late seventies, the CCP has gradually adopted some measures that have worked well in Taiwan: establishing the Special Economic Zones in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces; changing its developmental strategy from a preoccupation with heavy industry to an emphasis on agriculture and light industry; promoting export-oriented industries; and encouraging private enterprise. The new interactions between the two Chinese societies, added to their strong social and cultural ties, will no doubt lead the CCP to learn more from Taiwan's experience.

With Taiwan as one of their models, a model sharing a similar culture, the Chinese of the PRC have a greater chance than the citizens of other communist countries to repudiate Marxist doctrine and succeed in attempts at reform. For these reasons, Milton Friedman commented:

> I'm more optimistic about China than I am about Russia . . . . [The Chinese] have, most important of all, this great resource in the overseas Chinese. The success of the overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, has produced within China a pressure which is not produced in Russia by Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, . . . which are colonies, and which are not of the same culture as Russia itself.[7]

Indeed, my own experience bears out the truth of this observation.

One Road to Capitalism

What led a student like me, born in China after the 1949 Revolution, and indoctrinated with Marxism, Leninism, and Maoist thought from the age of six, to reach this conclusion? The answer to this question involves the story of a conversion—the sort of conversion that is becoming increasingly commonplace among Chinese intellectuals of my generation.

I grew up with Mao's Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Like millions of other youths in China, I ardently admired Mao when he was in power. But this admiration was set against the backdrop of increasingly intense, violent political movements and steadily deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. Gradually, I came to realize there was something wrong with my society.

After Mao's death in 1976, I was one of many who asked why Chinese socialism was not succeeding. In my search for an answer, however, I could do no more than compare the reality of the Chinese socialism around me with what socialism was supposed to look like

[7] *Forbes*, December 12, 1988, p. 168.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Marxist theory. No alternative philosophies or accurate data about conditions in other societies were available. My conclusion, therefore, was that socialism in China must have failed because of abuses of power by the CCP and Mao, and that only because of these abuses had socialism not delivered what it promised. In my circumstances, this conclusion seemed to me bold and liberal.

From 1978 to 1982, while I was studying political economy at Peking University, the CCP began its post-Mao reforms. Books formerly forbidden began to circulate, albeit with restrictions. I managed to read a few of these: the *Memoirs* of CCP co-founder Zhang Guotao, which describes the evolution of the CCP from an idealistic group into a dictatorial party ruled by Mao; Milovan Djilas's *New Class*; and Raymond Aron's *In Defense of Decadent Europe*.[8]

After reading Aron, I began to question the very premises of communist society. I lacked first-hand experience of a capitalist society, but the logic and facts in Aron's book led me to suspect that capitalism might be superior to communism. Simultaneously, however, I decided that capitalism, with its individualistic and dynamic features, was not applicable to a country such as China, weighed down by a long history of feudalism and the burden of its traditional culture. I thought that China might adopt a few aspects of capitalism, thus finding a middle road between socialism and capitalism—perhaps something along the lines of the Yugoslav model.

Then, in August 1982, I came to America to study sociology. During the next four years I continued to believe that capitalism would not work in China. But the maintenance of this belief increasingly required that I resort to irrelevancies or evasion. To restore my pride about being a student from China, at least temporarily, I would mention the military and diplomatic achievements of socialist China, or the social problems of capitalist America. Above all, I avoided serious study of the Taiwanese example, for I found it extremely difficult to admit that Taiwan was more successful than China.

Nevertheless, during the period of late 1986 and early 1987, several developments prompted me to conclude that China can—and indeed must—learn from Taiwan. First, a few years of reading in political economy, political theory, and the history of social thought opened my mind to new ideas and enabled me to think more independently. Having been exposed to a variety of social philosophies, I could look at China from both an insider's and an outsider's perspective.

[8] Zhang Guotao, *Wo de Huiyi* (Hong Kong: Mingbao Yuekan Press, 1971); Raymond Aron, *In Defense of Decadent Europe* (South Bend, Indiana: Regnery/Gateway, 1979); and Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York: Praeger, 1957). The latter two volumes are available in Chinese translations. All three books, at the time when read, were classified *neibu faxing* (for internal circulation only), and were not accessible to the general public.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Second, Taiwan began to democratize. My appreciation of the island's successful political reform combined with my respect for its economic achievements to shake my previous view that capitalism is not suitable to China. Taiwan is no less a Chinese society than is the PRC. Why should the free market fit Taiwan? Why is Taiwan not fettered by Chinese legacies of feudalism and traditional cultural?

Third, the anti-bourgeois-liberalization campaign launched by the CCP in China at the end of 1986 completed my transformation into an advocate of private-property rights and the free market in China. During that campaign, three intellectuals were removed from their positions for voicing their opinions. One of those purged by the CCP was Fang Lizhi, a world-renowned astronomer and vice president of the Chinese University of Science and Technology in Anhui Province. His case made me realize that if universities and research institutes in China were private, scholars such as Fang would have employment alternatives, and their careers would not be at the mercy of the CCP.

Such thinking implied several conclusions. Private property and the free market are the foundations of political freedom. As long as China remains communist, political movements such as the anti-bourgeois-liberalization campaign will recur; so reform efforts within the communist system cannot succeed. Finally, I resolved that any form of collectivism, even welfare capitalism, sanctions encroachments upon the free market which then become the thin edge of the wedge for more and more socialism.

It is sometimes said that if one does not believe in socialism before thirty, one has no heart; if one still believes in socialism after thirty, one has no mind. Coincidentally, I had just passed my thirtieth birthday when I reached these capitalist conclusions.

Survey Results

Having become convinced that the PRC should learn from Taiwan's experience, I wanted to learn what others in China thought. Was my view typical of young Chinese intellectuals? Were other young Chinese intellectuals, the elite of China, going through the same process of reasoning?

To answer these questions, I undertook an opinion survey. In the summer of 1988, the New York office of the *United Daily News*, a Taipei daily, offered me a grant to carry out such a survey. I then invited three other Chinese students—Yan Yan, Dahai Yu (graduate students in sociology and economics, respectively, at Princeton), and Yingli Liu (a graduate student in business at Trenton State College)—to help me conduct the survey. We began by selecting fifty universities and colleges in the United States, representing different geographic locations, sizes, and academic aspirations. Then we obtained

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the names of all the PRC students on these campuses and sent each student a questionnaire, some 2,100 in all. Six hundred and seven students answered the questionnaire and returned it, giving a response rate of 29 percent.[9]

When asked "Should China learn from Taiwan's experience in economic development," 86 percent of our sample of PRC students in the United States answered positively. Of their counterparts still in China, 75 percent answered positively.

The survey shows a strong preference for democracy and political freedom. When asked whether the Four Cardinal Principles (leadership of the CCP, proletarian dictatorship, Marxist-Leninist-Mao Thought, and the socialist road) should remain in the Constitution, 89 percent said no, 10 percent did not answer, while only 1 percent said yes. Attitudes toward the Chinese Alliance for Democracy, a New York-based organization of Chinese dissidents advocating democracy, law, human rights, and freedom, reveal a similar outlook. The CCP has denounced the Chinese Alliance for Democracy as anti-revolutionary,[10] but 64 percent of our respondents supported or sympathized with the Alliance.

Many of China's young intellectuals in America recognized Taiwan's success. To the question "Is Taiwan's economic development in the past 40 years successful," 92 percent responded yes. When asked "Should China learn from Taiwan's experience in economic development," the percentage of positive responses declined somewhat but was still very high: 86 percent. To the question, "Should China adopt a private ownership system like Taiwan's," 60 percent answered positively, 17 percent negatively, and 22 percent did not know. Further, most respondents in the last category noted that they simply did not know enough about Taiwan to make a judgment. When respondents were asked to compare the CCP and the KMT, 41 percent thought that the KMT performed better, 35 percent thought the two parties were about the same, and only 4 percent believed the CCP had done better.

We also conducted a similar but smaller survey in China. Through informal channels, we passed out 800 questionnaires to

[9] A response rate above 25 percent on a mailed questionnaire without a follow-up is considered fairly good, and is adequate to draw inferences. To my knowledge, the only other survey to date on the opinions of Chinese students in the United States was conducted by Ting-yu Ting, a visiting professor at Kansas State University, whose survey had a response rate of 25 percent.

[10] *Renmin Ribao*, December 22, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

students at Peking University, the Chinese People's University, and the Peking College of Economics. Three hundred and fourteen students returned answers to us, a response rate of 39 percent.

The survey conducted in China also indicated that most young scholars acknowledge Taiwan's economic success and view the KMT positively. When asked about Taiwan's economic development in the past forty years, 76 percent of respondents in China agreed it was successful, 21 percent chose "don't know," and only 3 percent said it was not successful. Seventy-five percent of the students surveyed in China thought their country should learn from Taiwan's economic success, 10 percent disagreed, and 15 percent did not have an opinion. Evaluating the KMT's performance in Taiwan, 24 percent called it "very good" or "good"; 30 percent chose "fair"; 8 percent chose "very poor" or "poor"; and the remaining 38 percent chose either "don't know" or "no opinion." Compared with Chinese students abroad, these responses probably reflect both a lack of information about Taiwan and greater inhibitions about expressing opinions.

The Chinese people are no different from the people of other cultures: overwhelmingly, they want their liberty.

But perhaps the most important question asked of the students in China was: "Do you agree to let Taiwan's newspapers be sold in China and China's newspapers be sold in Taiwan?" Ninety percent answered in the affirmative, 7 percent had no opinion, and only 3 percent were against the idea. Here is solid evidence that the Chinese people are no different from the people of other cultures: overwhelmingly, they want their liberty.

These percentages become especially impressive when it is remembered how determined the CCP was, from the late 1940s until the late 1970s, to convince the Chinese people of the PRC's success. Only in the last ten years has there been an opportunity to observe the outside world. Chinese students have been allowed to study abroad for even less time. If liberalization continues, more young Chinese intellectuals will gain access to accurate information about China and the outside world, and they will also become more conversant with the social sciences. Inevitably, I believe, many of them will arrive at conclusions similar to mine. Not the least of those conclusions will be that China ought to learn from Taiwan.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What China Can Learn from Taiwan

In some respects, today's China resembles the Taiwan of twenty to thirty years ago. At that time, Taiwan's economy had a high inflation rate, its human needs far outstripped economic supply, and capital was in short supply. Official corruption was scandalous, individual freedom greatly restricted. Yet these problems were overcome. And how they were overcome could teach China a great deal.

The Taiwanese example might be followed in many ways. In economics, these include developing agriculture to support industrialization, deregulating markets to unleash the laws of supply and demand, and reducing the share of the economy owned and controlled by the state. In politics: establishing free elections at the local level, then gradually introducing elections at the national level; allowing political disagreement and competition, initially within the ruling party and eventually through contending parties. Education should be given high priority. And so forth—the list could go on.

Some of the economic measures have actually been adopted by China, in one form or another. But they have not worked as well as in Taiwan. The reason has to do with a vicious economic cycle peculiar to communist societies. The cycle begins with the communist doctrine that everyone should receive the same pay regardless of his contribution. Obviously, this eliminates the greatest tool managers have to increase productivity. The economy performs so poorly that the country is pushed to the brink of bankruptcy and political turmoil. At this point, economic reform becomes imperative.

Typically, economic reforms grant a measure of freedom to managers of the basic production unit (the factory or farm), but such half-measures just do not work. In a state-owned factory, after all, the assets do not belong to the manager, nor do they belong to anyone who might act as the manager's manager. They do not belong to a legal entity, but to an abstract concept: "the whole people." When the Communist party delegates autonomy to the manager, therefore, he invariably transforms the assets of the factory into personal gain whenever possible. This phenomenon is so common that even the communist reformers recognize its existence.[11]

The avarice of newly empowered managers in turn gives ammunition to those who want to attack the reformers and abort the reforms. Orthodox Marxists again take the reins of the economy, with predictable declines in productivity. Thus, it should come as no surprise that, in the PRC People's Congress session of March 1989, the government announced a retreat from the radical reforms of the past years, stressing the need for a return to more central control.[12] No

[11] "Qiqihaer gukai zhengsu dangji zhengji," *Renmin Ribao*, January 3, 1988; and "Taiyuan chahuo gangcai 'guandao' gongsi," *Renmin Ribao*, October 17, 1988.

[12] *The New York Times*, March 22, 1989; and ibid., March 23, 1989.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

doubt, when the deterioration in the economy becomes unbearable, a new round of reforms will be launched.

In short, as long as "the people" retain ownership of the economic apparatus, attempts to delegate power to managers bring no lasting improvement in the economy. Xiaokai Yang, a Chinese economist, puts it this way: "The private property system is the soul of a modern capitalist system, whereas efficient management methods and organizational forms are its body. A body cannot come to life if the soul is not in it."[13] In much the same way, private property is fundamental to reforms aimed at personal liberty and democracy. If there is no free market, the individual becomes dependent upon the state for fulfillment of his material and occupational needs, and there are few effective limits on what the state may demand or forbid.

This, unfortunately, is a realization that escapes Chinese advocates of democracy such as Fang Lizhi and the leadership of the Chinese Alliance for Democracy, who press zealously for political liberalization, but tend to overlook the economic dimension. But it is one of the most important lessons China can draw from Taiwan: private property must precede both economic and political progress.

From Administrator to Owner

For both economic and political reasons, then, a logical first step in revitalizing Chinese society would be to recognize private property and to privatize state-owned enterprises.

Unfortunately, as many have observed, millions of bureaucrats in both government and industry have a vested interest in the present system of state ownership. These cadres present a formidable obstacle to the movement toward a system of private ownership in China. They control almost all the country's resources, not because they have accumulated wealth but because they hold key positions in the power structure of the command economy. Peaceful reform seeking to establish a system of private ownership must make concessions to this class of individuals if it is to have any chance of success. Essentially, such reform must guarantee benefits to these bureaucratic cadres, allowing them to retire from their positions without losing anything in the process.

Here, Taiwan's experience with land reform sheds some light. In the 1950s, Taiwan's land reform aimed to redistribute land peacefully from landlords to tenants. The challenge to the KMT resembled the current predicament in China: how to guarantee benefits to the overlords sufficient to compensate for their loss. Instead of the class struggle and bloodshed that accompanied the CCP's draconian efforts

[13] Xiaokai Yang, "Policy options towards China's reform of economic system" (Unpublished 1988 manuscript in the author's possession).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at land reform, the KMT bought lands from the landlords with stock shares of government enterprises. This achieved two things. It redistributed lands, transforming landowners into capitalists and businessmen; and it privatized large segments of the productive apparatus by turning government enterprises into private enterprises.

In similar fashion, the Chinese government could design a pension fund program to transform its bureaucratic cadres from members of a privileged social class to ordinary—although relatively wealthy—stockholders. Rather than forcing these cadres to retire or enticing them out of their positions with cash, the government could issue them shares in state enterprises, symbolically representing their contribution to the development of the enterprises previously under their administrative control. (When cadres retire now, they continue to receive the same salary, but they lose the special privileges of their positions; no wonder they resist retirement.) Such a move would be facilitated by China's current issuance of stock in state-owned firms.[14]

As holders of such stock, the elite cadres would remain powerful after the transformation, but with a difference: before, they were administrators of an industry supposedly owned by "the people." After the transformation, they would be shareholders with a tangible personal stake in the productivity of specific enterprises, with the power to choose managers and make important decisions—as capitalist owners, not public administrators.

This transformation of the cadres from official to shareholder would be the first and the most important step toward privatization and economic renaissance. It would preserve the cadres' economic power and personal benefits while removing the unearned privileges associated with the state ownership system. Furthermore, once the cadres have become shareholders and businessmen, most would change from detractors of reform into its advocates. They would demand laws to protect their shares and their investment. With the enactment of such laws, the transformation from a state ownership system to a private ownership system would be soundly based.

The Need for Constitutional Reform

Even so, a private property system and the liberties that flow from it are precariously situated unless freedom is written into the constitution. Here again, China can learn from Taiwan. Taiwan's successes result in part from a constitution that guarantees human rights, property rights, freedom of belief, and democratic institutions. China needs to adopt a similar document and, furthermore, must make the CCP subject to this constitution.

[14] *The New York Times*, December 5, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

According to Taiwan's constitution, fair and open elections of public officials, freedom of the press, and freedom to form political parties are guaranteed. To be sure, before 1986, freedom of the press and the freedom to form parties were restricted by the "Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion" and the "National General Mobilization Law," usually referred to as martial law. But the fundamental law was never repealed, and lately there has been a strong movement to "Return to the Constitution,"[15] aimed at bringing Taiwan's political system back to its principles. In this way, even the dramatic changes embodied in Taiwan's 1986-87 political reforms, which lifted martial law, resulted from the steady pull exercised by permanent legal principles, not the whims of those in power.

By contrast, the CCP has never taken China's constitutions seriously. On the eve of founding the People's Republic, Mao wrote "On People's Democratic Dictatorship,"[16] an important document about the future political system of China. But, unlike the founders of Western democractic systems, who were concerned to control the state's power through a system of checks and balances, Mao concentrated on the identification and suppression of the state's enemies. He found an effective euphemism for this tyranny: a people's democratic dictatorship. Because the good of the people as a whole was the ultimate goal, an individual seen to be an enemy of the people could be silenced or liquidated for the good of the whole. Nor was there any particular need for legal procedure. The good of the people might or might not require such legalism. Of course, the power to identify enemies remained in the hands of the people's party—the Communist party, which effectively meant in the hands of Mao himself.

In his whole statement, Mao never mentioned the word "constitution" at all. He mentioned "law" only once, when he conceded that persons accused of non-political crimes should be judged by some kind of law.[17]

Nonetheless, despite Mao's lack of concern with constitutions, China produced three in a relatively short period, none based on the democratic tradition. The latest version, adopted in 1982,[18] is still premised on the Marxist class struggle. Replete with political slogans, it reads more like a revolutionary pamphlet than a basic law defining

[15] Hu Foo, "Huigui xianzheng," in Hu Foo and Liang Shuang-lian, eds., *Xinxin Weiji* (Taipei: Dunli Press, 1986), pp. 5-9; and Wu Fengshan et al., "Huigui minzhu xianzheng," in *Xinxin Weiji*, pp. 223-271.

[16] Mao Zedong, "Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng," *Mao Zedong Xuanji*, vol. 4 (Peking: Renmin Chubanshe, 1970), pp. 1357-71.

[17] Ibid., p. 1365.

[18] *The Constitution of the People's Republic of China* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1983; in English). This latest version of the Constitution was adopted by the Fifth National People's Congress of the PRC at its Fifth Session.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the citizen's rights and duties. In the first paragraph of the Preamble, it emphasizes the "glorious revolutionary tradition." Later in the Preamble it states that the ruling force of the People's Republic is "the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants, which is in essence the dictatorship of the proletariat," an arrangement reaffirmed in Article 1. It is also announced in the Preamble that "class struggle will continue to exist . . . for a long time to come. The Chinese people must fight against those forces and elements [of exploiting classes]."

Property rights are ill-defined, and many other fundamental rights and duties of citizens are vague and meaningless. Article 6 holds that "the basis of the socialist economic system of the People's Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working people." The socialist dogma of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work" is also enshrined in Article 6. Article 12 declares that "Socialist public property is sacred and inviolable." And Article 42 says that citizens "have the right as well as the duty to work," and "work is the glorious duty of every able-bodied citizen."

Tellingly, if anyone were to accept this constitution as significant, some of the current reforms in China—such as leasing and transferring land and issuing shares of stocks of the state-owned enterprises—would be unconstitutional. Clearly, this is not a condition under which any significant progress can be made. A new, seriously accepted constitution is needed.

U.S. Policy

All of this has relevance for American policy makers. The United States could now play a very important role in encouraging reforms in China by providing economic aid to prod privatization and the establishment of a market-oriented economy.[19] Properly, American policy makers should be skeptical about the notion of providing aid to the economy of a communist nation, especially one such as China with a history of drastic reversals. Therefore, economic aid should be strictly earmarked for supporting not the government of China, but the intellectual and institutional foundations of capitalism. In this way, the United States could use its economic power to accelerate and consolidate China's reforms.

U.S. funds targeted at strengthening the intellectual foundation of capitalism in China could take the form of grants to private social science research institutions in China that advocate free markets and

[19] Ping Cheng, Yingyi Qian, and Dahai Yu, "A Preliminary Proposal for U.S. to Extend Economic Aid to China" (Unpublished manuscript informally circulated among U.S. and Chinese officials, 1988).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

democracy. Such institutions must be independent of the Chinese government and could be staffed by Chinese scholars educated in the West. Short-term funds could also be given to Chinese social scientists studying such issues as the privatization of state enterprise.

U.S. funds could also foster the institutional bases by providing low-interest or interest-free loans to China on condition that these loans go only to private enterprises, and the receipt of such loans be preceded by changes in China's economic institutions (such as revisions of Chinese law for the purpose of legitimizing private property and reducing unfair bureaucratic treatment of private enterprise). Also, such funds could be used to establish financial institutions that aim to help transfer state-run enterprises to private ownership.

Conclusions

In the early 1950s, the Chinese people welcomed communism as an antidote to the KMT's corruption and high inflation. But today it is the CCP that has lost credibility. Inflation is high, demonstrations by students and minorities are common, and strikes by workers in state-owned-factories—previously unheard of—are now spreading from the larger cities even to some remote places. Political upheavals and economic disasters have left the party vulnerable. Yu Yingshih, an acclaimed Chinese historian, has noted that the PRC today is reminiscent of China on the eve of the 1949 Revolution—except the CCP's corruption is worse than that of the KMT.[20]

The whole situation in the PRC is reminiscent of the eve of the 1949 Revolution—except the CCP's corruption is worse than that of the KMT.

But if the CCP is now following the disastrous path of the KMT in China, it also can follow the successful path of the KMT in Taiwan. Although many potential models are currently being considered by the leadership and citizens of the PRC, the best model may well be the closest—closest not only geographically but culturally.

The possibility of such a development, unthinkable only a few years ago, is now suggested by many things, such as the increasing interaction between Taiwan and China, and the acknowledgement of Taiwan's success.

Above all, the recent student demonstrations for freedom have at last made it realistic to hope that the Chinese people's overwhelming desire for freedom will be realized. Though the students' peaceful protests were brutally suppressed by the authorities, they will in the

[20] Personal communication to the author, September 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

long run serve to make the commitment to freedom all the more enduring. The massacre at Tiananmen Square will confirm the younger generation of intellectuals in its thorough disillusionment with the Communist party and with socialism generally.

But while this transformation in spirit is important, it is not sufficient to effect long-lasting change. It will be necessary to go beyond disillusionment; to establish the economic freedom that is the basis of personal independence; to build political freedom on that base; and then to adopt a constitution that institutionalizes both. In these practical endeavors, Taiwan may well serve as China's foremost model.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COPING WITH TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES

by Patrick Clawson

The United States has been relatively fortunate in avoiding spectacular terrorist attacks within its borders, and the impression is spreading that American terrorists and supporters of terrorism are fewer in number and less active than in the past. Americans outside law enforcement agencies rarely see a need for new policies aimed at reducing the probability of domestic terrorist attacks. In addition, many Americans do not want to confront the need for such policies, since vigorous counterterrorist action usually involves some intrusion on civil liberties.

Yet U.S. territory has not been as free from terrorist activity as many believe—particularly if one includes the provision of aid to foreign terrorists by American supporters. This prompts a question of policy: How should the law enforcement community handle U.S.-based supporters of terrorist groups, foreign or domestic? Because many of these supporters give only verbal backing to terrorist causes and do not themselves engage in illegal acts, the issue is especially complex.

Home-Grown Terrorism

Although the ideological range of home-grown terrorist groups is vast, remnants of the New Left attract the most media attention, partly because of their well-articulated views, and partly because the members of such organizations tend to be drawn from society's elites. New Left stragglers kept up their campaign of violence into the mid-eighties, planting eighteen bombs between December 1982 and February 1985.[1] Although such groups have been inactive recently, some hard-core members are still at large, and still committed to the use of violence to further their cause. Current trials of these self-styled revolutionaries include one in Springfield, Massachusetts, against three persons accused of seditious conspiracy and racketeering.[2]

[1] Oliver Revell, *Terrorism: A Law Enforcement Perspective* (FBI publication, January 1988), p. 37.

[2] *The New York Times*, January 12, 1989; and *The Washington Times*, January 11, 1989.

Patrick Clawson is a contributing editor of ORBIS. This paper was written for the Program for the Political Study of Terrorism of the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University's School for Advanced International Studies. A somewhat different version will appear in *Politics of Counter-Terrorism* (The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1989).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New Left groups stress solidarity with foreign "anti-imperialist" movements. In the 1970s, it appears, some New Leftists did receive assistance from the Cuban government,[3] but today their solidarity with foreign radicals is generally limited to the rhetorical dedication of actions. For instance, two bombings—one in close proximity to a demonstration by the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES)—were followed by statements of responsibility by individuals claiming solidarity with the peoples of Central America and the rebels in El Salvador.[4]

Despite the media prominence of the New Left, racist groups such as the Aryan Nations, the CSA (Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord), and Posse Comitatus are probably responsible for more terrorist activity. These organizations call for violent actions to spark a war against federal authorities, whom they call the Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG). In 1980-85, racist movements were the driving force behind a series of bank robberies and murders, including the deaths of five law-enforcement officials and Denver radio talk-show host Alan Berg.[5] About $2 million from this crime wave remains unaccounted for, and there is reason to believe it has been put at the disposal of violent racists.[6]

The racist groups were quiescent in 1986-87, but they may simply be regrouping. In 1988, remnants of the hard-core racist bands formed strong links to the several thousand "skinhead" youths loosely organized in local groups. Although skinheads are racist and ultra-nationalist, they are motivated less by clear ideology than by generalized anger, attraction to violence, and enjoyment of common social activities. In 1988, skinheads committed two unprovoked racist murders, and assaulted at least twenty-five nonwhites in Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.[7]

Puerto Rican separatists have engaged in a long campaign of violence, including the attempted assassination of President Truman. The contemporary campaign, which started in the 1970s, included over 100 bombings in the continental United States between 1974 and 1982, and thirty-four terrorist incidents in 1983-87.[8] Four Puerto Rican nationalists associated with the Ejercito Popular Boricua

[3] H. H. Tucker, ed., "Terrorism in the United States: Background and Prospects," in *Combating the Terrorists* (New York: Facts on File, 1988), pp. 33-37.

[4] The bombing campaign is discussed in Revell, *Terrorism*; the connection to CISPES is cited in the FBI's Interim Public Report on CISPES, February 22, 1988.

[5] A good summary of these groups' activities is provided by Joseph Melnichak, the Le Mars, Iowa police chief, in *Police Marksman*, September-October 1986, summarized in *The Washington Post*, January 11, 1987.

[6] *The Washington Post*, December 28, 1987.

[7] *Young and Violent* (B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League report, October 1988); also see Jerry Seper's two-part series in *The Washington Times*, December 26-27, 1988.

[8] *Terrorism in the United States 1987*, (FBI report, 1987) lists seven episodes in 1987, seventeen in 1986, two in 1985, five in 1984, and three in 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(Puerto Rican Popular Army, informally known as Los Macheteros—"the machete wielders") were convicted on charges stemming from the September 16, 1983, robbery of $7.2 million from a Wells Fargo terminal in West Hartford, Connecticut. There is little reason to believe the activities of such groups will cease in the near future.

A variety of home-grown groups have engaged in terrorist bombings to support specific causes rather than to overthrow the government or to bring about radical social change. Indeed, such issue-oriented groups present the gravest danger of future domestic terrorism. The most active today seem to be the anti-abortionists and animal rights activists. Jewish Defense League (JDL) terrorists—who have used pipe bombings, fire bombings, and smoke bombings against ex-Nazis, Soviet representatives, Arabs, and Arab-Americans—are an older example of issue-oriented terrorism. It was widely speculated that JDL fellow-travelers were probably behind the murder of Alex Odeh of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee in October 1985.[9] In May 1988, three former JDL members were arrested for a series of bombings, including the October 1987 fire bombing at a Lincoln Center performance of a Soviet dance company.

Immigrant and Foreign Terrorism

A wide variety of immigrant groups have supported foreign terrorist causes. In recent years, little has been heard from some of the most active groups of the 1970s and early 1980s, such as the anti-Castro group Omega 7, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), and the Croatian National Resistance.[10] Support for Irish terrorists remains high, but activities in the United States are largely confined to raising money and shipping weapons. An American with a Filipino wife, Steven Psinakis, awaits trial in San Francisco on charges of assembling bombs in the United States and smuggling them to Filipino rebels in 1981-82. Four Sikhs were arrested in May 1985 in New Orleans before they could carry out their plan to kill the visiting head of an Indian state; their associates then called off a plan to kill India's prime minister Rajiv Gandhi when he visited New York in June 1985. In May 1986, five Sikhs were arrested in Canada for planning to bomb an Air India plane leaving from New York.

A 1988 episode raises the possibility that hard-left foreign terrorists are actively cooperating with their American supporters. A member of the Japanese Red Army (JRA), Yu Kikumura, was arrested

[9] JDL Chairman Irv Rubin condoned Odeh's murder (*The New York Times*, November 14, 1985). Major Jewish groups all roundly condemned the action (*The New York Times*, October 13, 1985).

[10] The activities of these three groups in the United States are reviewed in Revell, *Terrorism*, pp. 78-87. He also describes the activities of Sikh terrorists in the United States, mentioned below, on pp. 72-75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in New Jersey on April 12, 1988, with three homemade bombs in his car, after traveling in the United States for several months. The otherwise inexplicable pattern of his movements suggests he may have been connecting with local contacts. Given the importance assigned by the JRA to "international solidarity," one would expect this group to seek out sympathizers in the United States.

But despite the wide ideological range among U.S.-based foreign and immigrant terrorists, the major source of concern remains terrorism linked to the Middle East, especially state-sponsored terrorism. On occasion, state-sponsored Middle East terror seems linked to incidents in the United States. Two such episodes were in the headlines in early 1989. First, the decree by Iran's ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini against author Salman Rushdie and his book *The Satanic Verses* undoubtedly inspired the bombings of two Berkeley bookstores and probably that of a small New York paper. Second, a bomb destroyed the car of Captain Will Rogers III, U.S. Navy, who had commanded the U.S.S. *Vincennes* when it mistakenly shot down an Iranian passenger plane. Mrs. Rogers, who was driving the car when the bomb went off, was able to escape uninjured. It is widely conjectured that the Iranian government was behind the bombing. FBI Executive Assistant Director Oliver ("Buck") Revell testified to Congress in March 1989 that some 200 to 300 pro-Khomeini Iranians in the United States would be willing to carry out terrorist acts. The July 1980 murder in Bethesda, Maryland, of 'Ali Akbar Tabataba'i, an Iranian exile leader, was carried out by David Belfield, an American Muslim who subsequently took refuge in Iran. Mohammad Rashid, a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, is under indictment for his role in bombing a 1982 Pan Am Honolulu-Tokyo flight in which one person died and a 1986 TWA Rome-Athens flight in which four were killed. He has been arrested in Greece, where a propaganda and terror campaign by Greek leftists (including the assassination of a Supreme Court judge) aims to block his extradition to the United States.

Middle East terrorists may be setting up networks among Arab immigrant communities in the United States. In October 1987, three members of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) were caught trying to smuggle a bomb across the U.S.-Canadian border. In recent years, the SSNP has been closely linked to the Syrian government, and Damascus has a record of putting terrorist agents in place long before they are used. Similarly, according to Revell, Abu Nidal has a network in the United States.[11] Unlike the SSNP, however, the Abu Nidal group would probably not seek contact with locals who might

[11] *The Wall Street Journal*, December 7, 1988; and Revell, *Terrorism*, p. 71.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

support their cause, as Abu Nidal's modus operandi displays a reliance on hard-core professionals who remain well-hidden.

The Libyan government has been involved in several terrorist incidents in the United States. In 1980, Eugene Tafoya, an ex-Green Beret recruited by Libyan diplomats to kill dissidents for money, shot Faisal Zagallai, a Libyan studying at Colorado State University. In 1984, two Libyans in Philadelphia bought handguns with silencers (the weapons of choice for Libyan hit squads) from an undercover FBI agent; they were convicted and sent to prison for violating the National Firearms Act.[12] In November 1987, seven members of the notorious Chicago street gang El Rukn were convicted of planning to conduct a terror campaign, including shooting down an airliner taking off from O'Hare Airport, in return for $2.5 million from the Libyan government. The initiative for this enterprise originated with El Rukn, which was never able to seriously interest the Libyans.

The CISPES Case

None of the activities described above involved many people, although only a few dedicated activists with access to funds, weapons, and training are required to create a serious terrorist problem.

By contrast, some terrorist groups have access to support networks and claim larger numbers of participants. Most of this support is legal; some of it comes from those who fully understand the nature and goals of the groups they support, but most comes from individuals not fully knowledgeable about the groups receiving their aid. After all, many terrorist groups claim they wish to correct situations that do in fact involve injustices.

There are numerous examples of aid from Americans to terrorists, including support for Palestinian movements, southern African groups, and Peru's Shining Path. Support for the Salvadoran guerrilla organization Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN) can stand as a paradigmatic example. The FMLN's activities included a 1985 attack on a cafe in San Salvador that killed six Americans—an attack that, as human rights activist Aryeh Neier pointed out, was carried out in a way that "made it almost inevitable that there would be a heavy civilian death toll."[13]

Support for the FMLN is organized in this country by CISPES, which describes itself as follows in each issue of its national publication, *Alert!*: "CISPES gives political and material support to the movement in El Salvador for self-determination and peace based on social justice, and politically supports the Farabundo Martí National

[12] Revell, *Terrorism*, pp. 66-67. On Libyan activities, see David Martin and John Walcott, *Best Laid Plans* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), pp. 74, 261.

[13] *The New York Times*, July 25, 1985.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Liberation Front/Democratic Revolutionary Front (FMLN/FDR)." (The FDR is an umbrella alliance that includes the FMLN.)

CISPES lobbies federal, state, and local governments to oppose U.S. aid to El Salvador. For instance, it campaigned against the U.S. governors' decision to send National Guard units to Central America for training. CISPES also provides material aid to the FMLN's political wing. According to two CISPES supporters, Barton Myers and Jean Weisman, "CISPES chapters and affiliates have raised more than $500,000 for material aid for El Salvador . . . aid [that] is distributed through opposition organizations such as the FMLN and the local popular government in the zones controlled by the FMLN."[14]

Yet this record of support for the terrorist FMLN was not the basis for the FBI's decision to investigate CISPES on two occasions. The first investigation, discussed below, was conducted to determine if CISPES was required to report under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. The second, a probe into CISPES's links to international terrorism, opened in March 1983 in Dallas because of information that some CISPES members were connected with a campaign of bombings, eighteen in all, then under way. The investigation continued until June 1985, without result.

Criticism of the investigation was widespread. Representative Don Edwards (Democrat of California), who was himself an FBI agent in 1940-41, held several hearings of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, which he chairs. Newspaper editorials were generally similar to *The New York Times* editorial of September 17, 1988, whose critical tone is suggested by its title: "The FBI Confesses." Columnists weighed in to suggest the FBI was returning to the excesses of the past,[15] and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sponsored a report entitled *The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES*.[16]

Critics read more into this investigation than was there. There is no evidence of any form of surveillance more aggressive than writing down the names and license plate numbers of those attending public CISPES meetings.[17] And to judge by the funding—under one million dollars to watch an organization with more than sixty-five chapters—the investigation was small. It certainly could not have looked in detail at "more than 100 other groups linked to CISPES," as claimed by *The New York Times*.[18]

[14] "The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States," in Marvin Gettleman et al., eds., *El Salvador: Central America in the New Cold War* (New York: Grove Press, 1987), pp. 382, 387.

[15] Nat Hentoff, *The Washington Post*, March 19, 1988; and Sanford Ungar, *The New York Times Magazine*, May 15, 1988.

[16] Gary Stern, *The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES*, Center for National Security Studies Report No. 111, June 1988.

[17] *The Washington Post*, January 20, 1988.

[18] *The New York Times*, June 14, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An internal investigation by the FBI showed that the CISPES investigation was badly mishandled. Problems included the following:

> Too much reliance was placed on a single informant, Frank Varelli, who told blatant lies, probably to ensure a continuing flow of payments for his services from the FBI.
>
> Daniel Flanigan, a key FBI agent in the investigation, evidently stole as much as $65,000 meant for Varelli.[19]
>
> Headquarters did not follow the matter closely, taking two years to shut down an investigation that showed few results.
>
> All field offices around the country were asked to contribute to the investigation, even though suspicions about CISPES activities were confined to a few locations. Field offices were evidently not given much guidance on what to look for, so some wasted their efforts following obviously innocent individuals.
>
> Some Bureau agents knew little about CISPES, and so made a number of elementary errors in identifying the groups involved. A review of several thousand pages from the FBI investigation files, released owing to a Freedom of Information Act suit, showed reliance on information out of date by as much as fifteen years. Consequently, the FBI did not focus its investigation on the most likely groups.

FBI documents indicate that headquarters did not want agents pursuing every opponent of U.S. policy, but tried to focus on possible criminals. For instance, guidelines of July 26, 1984, stressed that "it is imperative that these investigations are closely supervised and monitored to ensure our investigations do not infringe upon the rights of these individuals or groups protected by the Constitution."[20] Unfortunately, lack of adequate guidance and intelligence information led agents to waste resources simply trying to select the likely criminal suspects (as distinct from those who were merely vigorously exercising First Amendment rights).

If existing law provides few tools for monitoring domestic support of terrorism, it provides only a few more for preventing foreign terrorists from influencing fellow travelers in the United States. The Foreign Agents Registration Act is designed to regulate those who receive funding from abroad; it does not apply to those who only share the ideological outlook of a foreign movement, no matter how

[19] Christi Harlan, "The Informant Left Out in the Cold," *The Dallas Morning News*, April 6, 1986.

[20] William H. Webster, FBI director, telex to field offices, July 26, 1984, p. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

close the links. Thus, the first FBI investigation of CISPES was opened in 1981 to see if CISPES should be filing a report under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. The Bureau quickly determined that CISPES was not a foreign agent under U.S. law, even though the organization had been created and established with extensive assistance from the Communist Party of El Salvador, a partner in the FMLN's political movement (CISPES had been formed in the fall of 1980 at the urging of Farik Handal, the brother of the general secretary of the El Salvadoran Communist party, Shafik Handal).

It would present innumerable problems to attempt to broaden the Foreign Agents Registration Act to cover ideological ties with foreign movements, for this would seriously threaten civil liberties. Nearly every American political organization shares a specific policy position with some movement abroad, and could therefore be subject to surveillance under such regulations. For instance, both the Democratic and Republican parties have close relations with foreign political groups, and a variety of organizations lobbying for stronger defense were established with encouragement from politicians in other NATO countries. When someone complains about the foreign ties of a U.S. group, the root of the objection is usually not the foreign ties themselves, but the group's politics. And clearly it would be inappropriate to require registration of groups solely because their politics are unusual.

Just as the Foreign Agents Registration Act is a poor instrument to control ideologically motivated supporters of foreign terrorism, so too are the immigration laws. Various provisions in these laws are aimed at excluding foreigners with seditious views, but these provisions have been extremely difficult to enforce, in part because they lack broad public support. In recent years, neither Congress nor the courts have been sympathetic to the use of immigration laws to prevent aliens from expressing a viewpoint. Considerable negative publicity was generated by the 1987 arrest in Los Angeles of seven Jordanians and a Kenyan.[21] The government wished to deport them under the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act provisions against members of organizations that distribute literature advocating world communism—in this case, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In the end, the deportation was blocked, the provisions declared unconstitutional, and the law changed to reinforce aliens' rights to free speech.

Enforcement has on occasion been so broad as to block visits by friends of the United States. Thus, an Italian general was denied entrance because of membership in the Italian Communist party. At other times, enforcement has been so selective as to provoke loud

[21] *The New York Times*, February 17, 1987; and *The Washington Post*, February 7, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

outcries about limitations on free speech, as when Italian playwright Dario Fo was excluded for his writings even as many others just as sympathetic to terrorist causes were permitted entry into the United States.

Our concern here is with domestic terrorism; therefore, this is not the place for an in-depth discussion of the growing role of U.S. law enforcement agencies in countering terrorism outside the United States. It will suffice to say that the FBI has actively promoted cooperation among police agencies internationally; it has posted agents in several countries for this purpose. Aided by the 1984 and 1986 laws expanding U.S. jurisdiction over attacks on Americans abroad, the FBI seized a terrorist (Fawaz Yunis) who had been lured into international waters off Lebanon.

In addition to the FBI, several other Federal agencies are involved in efforts to counter domestic terrorism, including the Treasury Department (through the Secret Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms), and the Defense Department, which has the authority under Executive Order 12333 to collect information about "domestic terrorist or other groups committing illegal acts that pose a threat to the Department of Defense." These federal agencies have changed policies over the years more or less in tandem with the FBI. On the other hand, state and local police have at times moved in a different direction altogether. During the 1970s, the best information on domestic terrorists was probably to be found in the files of some major metropolitan police departments.

Four Models for Counterterrorism

The FBI is under great pressure from Congress and the White House to identify and stop terrorists before they act—rather than merely to arrest them after the fact. The trouble is, a pre-emptive (in FBI terminology, "pro-active") policy is expensive and requires vigorous investigations which may intrude on civil liberties.

Concern over infringement upon civil liberties finds support across the political spectrum. When President Reagan proposed a counterterrorism bill in 1984, conservative senators such as Jeremiah Denton (Republican of Alabama) and Orrin Hatch (Republican of Utah) joined liberals in criticizing the bill for its intrusions on civil liberties.[22] In the search for the optimum combination of freedom from the threat of terrorism and freedom from government scrutiny, it may help to look at alternate approaches to counterterrorism. Four models of counterterror law enforcement are worth considering.

The Bank Robbery Approach. This is the classic law enforcement technique: provide good security for the bank, but if this fails to

[22] *The New York Times,* June 6, 1984; and ibid., June 14, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deter, react to a robbery attempt with vigorous action. This is probably the most universal image of law enforcement among the public. Applied to terrorism, it means waiting until a group strikes, then moving as quickly and decisively as possible to prevent it from striking again.

The ACLU prefers this approach, which calls for investigating only those political groups that are certifiably engaged in violations of U.S. law. It was also the approach of the April 6, 1976, Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic Security Investigations and the May 1, 1980, Attorney General's Guidelines for Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (known, respectively, as the Levi and Civilleti Guidelines.)[23]

The FBI felt it could not even keep newspaper clippings about political groups unless those groups were under active investigation for criminal activities.

The approach is purely reactive, and renders efforts to pre-empt terrorists almost impossible. From 1976 to 1983, the FBI felt it did not have the authority to develop a comprehensive data base from which it could track the shifting radical groups. During these years, as Paul Nuget of the FBI testified before the House Intelligence Committee in June 1979, the FBI felt it could not even keep newspaper clippings about political groups unless those groups were under active investigation for criminal activities. Implicit in this approach was the judgment that FBI interference is a greater threat to society than is terrorism—a judgment that reflects a very high priority assigned to civil liberties relative to domestic security. Such a policy may be appropriate if the risk of terrorism is low, but it is inappropriate if the dangers of terrorist attack increase to the point that they become a realistic concern to the average person.

The Organized Crime Approach. Another approach is like the one investigators use when pursuing organized crime. This approach entails the gathering of intelligence about activities that appear to be part of a criminal enterprise. As in the recent Chicago Board of Trade case involving the manipulation of futures markets, the net may at first be cast wide and then drawn tighter around the few who appear to be engaging in illegal acts. Once a criminal group has been identified, intelligence is collected from public and confidential sources to form a general body of knowledge that is checked when-

[23] The Levi Guidelines are in Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Domestic Intelligence* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ever inquiries arise about a specific individual. This body of knowledge can include information on the criminal's associates (such as a restaurant frequented by the Mafia) and front groups (such as a social club).

An analogy could be drawn between the FBI's approach to investigating terrorism on one hand and court-approved intrusions into citizens' lives by the police on the other. The first step includes nonintrusive police interactions: questions that a citizen can ignore if he wishes. This was rather like the 1976-1983 Levi Guidelines. The next step is a brief detention, permitted on the basis of specific, demonstrable facts and reasonable inferences (not hunches).

An approach much like the one described here—which permits more extensive collection of intelligence, while maintaining the basic criminal approach to counterterrorism—was mandated by the March 7, 1983, Attorney General's Guidelines for General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprises, and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (the Smith Guidelines).[24] Indeed, under the Smith Guidelines, domestic terrorist groups are considered criminal enterprises. Investigations are opened only on the basis of firm predicates and kept open only for short periods unless something definite turns up. Thus, rather than acting as thought police, the FBI's counterterrorism effort since 1983 has applied the same investigative techniques used elsewhere in the Bureau to penetrate organized crime—learning about associates of possible criminals and the front groups that lend them respectability.

But if the Smith Guidelines did ease a number of earlier restrictions, the implications here are unclear. Perusal of the CISPES files suggests that the Bureau has not maintained intelligence files on some violent groups adequate for understanding the potential links between these groups and broader organizations like CISPES. The Bureau does not seem to keep detailed intelligence files on groups that have not been actively involved in recent violence.

While the Smith Guidelines apply to domestic terrorism, international terrorist investigations are currently conducted under the April 18, 1983, Attorney General's General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence, which allow a variety of techniques not permitted in domestic cases. For instance, the general guidelines permit intrusions on privacy authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Survey Act (FISA) and also allow the infiltration of groups. However, it does not appear that such authority has been widely used. Nevertheless, Bureau critics like the ACLU are concerned about this authority and suggest that interna-

[24] The Smith Guidelines are in Godson, *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Domestic Intelligence.* These guidelines were restated, with five slight modifications to accommodate new laws and court cases, by Attorney General Richard Thornburgh on March 21, 1989.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional terrorism investigations should be conducted under the same guidelines as domestic investigations.[25]

Courts have generally supported a broad interpretation of the FBI's authority to investigate proto-terrorists. In 1974, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago refused to bar FBI investigations of radical groups that advocate—but have not yet committed—violent acts; the FBI, according to the decision, "is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention." In 1984, the same court ruled that, even under the Levi Guidelines, the FBI "may investigate any group that advocates the commission, even if not immediately, of terrorist acts in violation of federal law. It need not wait until the bombs begin to go off, or even until the bomb factory is found."[26]

Whatever its authority, the FBI shies away from investigating individual members of groups in which terrorists are active, because of concerns that the agency could be accused of investigating the group as a whole. FBI Director William Sessions has requested the attorney general to provide the Bureau with more specific guidelines on this point:

> The [current] guidelines do not contain sufficient guidance and sufficient specificity regarding international terrorism investigations of groups that are primarily composed of persons in the United States. For example, the guidelines do not describe the extent to which leaders and rank-and-file members may be investigated during an international terrorism investigation of a group to which they belong. Nor is there specific guidance regarding international terrorism investigations of fairly broadly-based groups like CISPES.[27]

Thus, it is not clear whether the Bureau now fully and aggressively uses all the available legal avenues. It seems reluctant to try innovative approaches because of concerns about the reaction of civil libertarians. For instance, the FBI has been criticized for its expanded use of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in cases involving everything from labor racketeering to securities fraud. Among its other advantages, RICO permits a variety of means to seize assets, which could, for example, be useful against the racist groups that presumably control the unrecovered $2 million gained from the string of robberies mentioned above.

The Analytical Approach. A third approach seeks to augment restricted criminal investigations of suspected terrorists with the collection of background information on potentially violent groups—information collected primarily, if not exclusively, from public sources and kept separate from any criminal investigation. This method offers

[25] Stern, *The FBI's Misguided Probe*, pp. 26-28.

[26] *Alliance to End Repression v. the City of Chicago*, 742 F.2d 1007 (1984). The 1974 case was *Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General*, 510 F.2d 253, 256 (1974).

[27] Statement before the House Judiciary Committee Civil and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, September 16, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

law enforcement officers a ready source of information should questions arise about a group. Suspicious activist groups tend to be obscure. In many cases, groups with similar names have very different politics, and, without research, officers cannot be expected to sort out these groups and their activities with any degree of accuracy.

The collected information can be used to prepare regular reports about groups being investigated. The aim is not to judge the groups but to describe their beliefs and connections. Guenter Lewy has explained the usefulness of such a report, along the lines of the West German annual "Report on the Protection of the Constitution" (*Verfassungsschutzbericht*).[28] The report could alert the public to the true nature of organizations that mask their real agenda from all save an inner circle of trusted sympathizers. It could also aid in clearing the names of organizations falsely accused of affiliation with illegal activities or groups.

Such a report would be for analytical purposes, not necessarily for criminal investigation. One way to keep analysis separate from law enforcement activities might be to create a body of analysts who are separated by a rigid institutional barrier, a "Chinese wall," from criminal investigations. These analysts would maintain a separate set of files drawn from all available sources, but the files would be closed to criminal investigators unless agents demonstrated a compelling reason to see them. The analysts would provide continuity and institutional memory about potentially violent organizations, information the Bureau does not get from agents whose careers depend upon moving from area to area every few years.

The FBI already has analysts, of course, but they are few and their function differs from what is proposed here. They are essentially junior G-men, inferior in status and pay to agents. A body of researchers is needed that, with separate files and reasonable salaries, stands apart from the command structure of the agents.

The disadvantage of this approach is that the mere preparation of such reports could have a chilling effect on the groups under scrutiny. Perhaps, to counter this objection, the reports could be prepared outside the law enforcement community itself. They could be assembled by a more traditional analytical agency such as the Congressional Research Service—which, as a part of the legislative branch, is removed from law enforcement. The reports could even be prepared by a private organization, although reports so issued would probably be considered less authoritative, if not less accurate, and private researchers would not have ready access to investigators and classified information.

[28] Guenter Lewy, "Does America Need a *Verfassungsschutzbericht*?" ORBIS, Fall 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Investigative Approach. A final approach entails actively investigating groups and individuals considered likely to engage in violent crimes, even before they have a chance to act. Under this method, the Bureau's approach to groups advocating violence would include intrusive investigative techniques. The Bureau would also investigate support groups from which terrorists may recruit. This activist approach would put the Bureau in a better position to prevent terrorist attacks before they occur; but it could have a very adverse effect on expression of unpopular political opinions. At the extreme, the United States could adopt an approach similar to that used in Japan. The Japanese system of police surveillance and informants is so effective that factions of Japan's Red Army Group decided in 1969 that domestic terrorism was just too difficult, and turned instead to "international bases."[29] Not many Americans, however, would be comfortable with police who routinely note citizens' comings and goings at odd hours.

To many, this approach recalls the worst features of the FBI's domestic security investigations of the 1950s and 1960s, investigations that at times degenerated into harassment of dissidents, including individuals without direct connections to violence. Furthermore, as illustrated by files stolen from the Media, Pennsylvania, FBI office in 1970, and subsequently published, the information collected was sometimes considerably off-base or out of date.[30] By spreading its net so widely, the FBI was unable to catch the really valuable fish; its agents were too busy keeping tabs on legions of peaceful radicals to collect detailed information about the fringe New Leftists who turned to bombings in the early 1970s.

Of course, new guidelines could obviate many such abuses. Investigations could be confined to groups that advocate coercive tactics. Perhaps the most effective safeguard could be drawn from the French practice of placing a strict limit on the number of persons on whom files could be kept. The Bureau might be authorized to keep investigative files for counterterrorism on, say, one thousand people (other than convicted criminals)—but not one person more. Such a system would motivate the Bureau to review files regularly to insure it was concentrating on those most likely to commit criminal acts for political purposes. At the same time, a quantitative limit would allow the Bureau significant discretion about its techniques.

No matter what the guidelines, however, this investigative approach could still be quite chilling. Individuals might encounter serious personal problems if employers or associates learned that the

[29] Robert Angel, "International Terror: The Japanese Connection" (Paper presented to the Program for the Political Study of Terrorism of the Foreign Policy Institute Johns Hopkins University's School for Advanced International Studies).

[30] Sanford Ungar, *The F.B.I.: An Uncensored Look Behind the Walls* (Boston, Mass.: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1975).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bureau had files on organizations with which they were associated, even though most members of these organizations might be law-abiding citizens and the group itself may be essentially harmless, apart from its potential as a recruiting pool for terrorists. There would be considerable pressure to deny members of such groups security clearances, which are needed for many jobs in government and the defense industry. Fear of having an FBI file opened could intimidate those who would otherwise become active in dissident causes. The price of the investigative approach would, in short, be higher than the price of the other techniques discussed here. But the pay-off in terms of violence prevented would also probably be greater. Once again, we are faced with a trade-off between civil liberties and security.

Conclusion

Which of these four alternatives for law enforcement policy is best? The answer depends on the times. Formulating an approach that wins public support is more important than theoretical speculation about the pros and cons of various approaches. Before choosing among these alternatives, it is critical that something resembling a public consensus be reached. Law enforcement can be effective in a democracy only when it enjoys broad support from both the policy makers who must allocate resources to the effort, and the general public, whose cooperation is needed to provide information and support law enforcement efforts.

Analysts and experts therefore have an obligation to reach out to the public, to focus attention on the important issues in counterterrorism so that an informed consensus can be reached. Unfortunately, to date, the far left and extreme civil libertarians have dominated the public discussion. The FBI must make greater efforts to explain to the public the problems it faces in enforcing the law and preserving domestic tranquility.

Faced with the trade-off between civil liberties and active counterterrorism investigations, policy makers must carefully consider how to respond to the terrorist threat. Were that threat to fade, a return to the strict limits applied in 1976-1983 would be appropriate; but it is not appropriate now, given the public's justified concern about terrorist activities. If the threat grows, the appropriate response would be to increase analysis of radical groups and permit investigation of a limited number of prospective terrorists. Under present conditions, however, such intrusive measures would not command public support. Under all circumstances, counterterrorism should focus on the potentially violent, not necessarily the politically unpopular—tracking peaceful iconoclasts diverts resources that could be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

better spent following the truly dangerous, and opens the Bureau to charges of harassment.

In between the extremes lie counterterrorist actions that match the threat level today. Present policy and law would appear to permit more intrusive investigations of political groups suspected of terrorism than the FBI has actually used. On the other hand, there is a shortage of available intelligence about potential terrorist groups that have not yet turned to violence, or which may serve only as the spawning ground for criminal offshoots. It would be appropriate, then, to consider tighter limits on intrusive tactics while simultaneously permitting more analysis of groups with violent potential. We are presently at the organized-crime level of investigating terrorism, but we would do well to consider working to improve public awareness of the threat posed by terrorism, to generate the support needed for adopting the analytic approach to countering terrorism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HOW TO NEGOTIATE WITH GORBACHEV'S TEAM

by David T. Jones

To what extent does the United States confront a new diplomatic posture when negotiating with the Soviet Union of Mikhail Gorbachev? Without belaboring the issue of change versus continuity in Soviet negotiating style, it is possible to draw a few conclusions from the experience provided by the recently signed Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the first major U.S.-Soviet diplomatic engagement of the Gorbachev era.

Owing to personal interest and the vagaries of foreign service assignments, I was in the rare position of having been involved with the INF issue at its beginning and at its climax. I was at NATO during the December 1979 decision that simultaneously launched INF deployments and began the parallel negotiations to curb those weapons. Then I was in Geneva during the fall of 1987 for the final INF Treaty negotiations. Based on this experience, I offer the following observations as a few of the lessons that current and future U.S. negotiators might draw from the INF experience.

Soviet negotiating behavior under Gorbachev unquestionably illustrated new features, including:

- much sharper public diplomacy;
- definite effects from glasnost.

But these changes have not been extensive enough to warrant abandoning some time honored and basic guidelines for American diplomats negotiating with the Soviets. The old maxims remain valid:

- negotiate from a position of strength;
- remember that the Soviets watch U.S. election returns;
- establish clear guidelines and hold to them;
- make agreements stick in *writing*;
- exploit Soviet weakness at the delegation level;
- expect Soviet bureaucrats to drag their feet.

David T. Jones, a specialist in INF-related politico-military affairs, is a senior foreign service officer with the Department of State and a 1988-89 Una Chapman Cox Fellow. The views expressed here are those of the author alone.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Background

The INF Treaty had its roots in the mid-1970s when most European states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began to worry about the Alliance's ability to deter Soviet aggression against Western Europe. Specifically, Europeans were worried that Soviet weapons programs were tipping the nuclear balance in the USSR's favor. Because the Soviets already possessed huge conventional military advantages, it was NATO policy to use nuclear weapons first if necessary and the threat of doing so was assumed to deter a conventional attack. But such a threat was a credible deterrent only if NATO was perceived to have both the military tools and political will to escalate to nuclear weapons. Soviet nuclear weapons building programs during the 1970s made a successful escalation doubtful.

Throughout the early and mid-1970s, European anxiety levels rose. With the Soviets' deployment of modern mobile SS-20s in 1977, the Europeans began to insist on a NATO response.

To deter the new Soviet threat, NATO decided in December 1979 to station in Europe several hundred U.S. long-range INF missiles, Pershing II ballistic missile systems and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs). With deployment scheduled to begin in late 1983, these would be the first Europe-based missiles capable of reaching the Soviet homeland. Consequently, the Soviets could no longer threaten Europeans with the implication that a nuclear war could be restricted to Europe without significant danger to the Soviet territory. The presence of U.S. INF forces in Europe targeted against the Soviet Union would clearly commit the United States to a superpower war with all the deterrent effect on Soviet action that commitment implied. They would "couple" American strategic arms and the defense of Europe.

A corollary of such a coupling, however, would be the potential for Western defeat at the strategic level if America's central strategic forces were inferior to those of the Soviet Union. Consequently, a few analysts argued that it would be better to create a "Eurostrategic balance" in which U.S. nuclear forces in Western Europe could be viewed as matching comparable Soviet forces. In this view, nuclear deterrence would be more certain if the Soviets were aware that American resort to nuclear weapons did not quickly engage strategic systems. Such an approach appeared, however, to most Europeans to be a prescription for "war fighting" rather than deterrence which, in their view, should be a seamless web from riflemen to Minutemen with no distinct breaks. Ambiguity of stratetic response might serve U.S. interests, but Europeans argued that predictability was a more likely deterrent. Thus a weapon such as the Pershing II which would escalate the conflict in both violence and geography added credibility to deterrence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the very communiqué that announced the Alliance's deployment decision, however, NATO also declared: "Arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should . . . now include certain U.S. and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear weapons." In short, the Alliance said, it was "pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF [Theater Nuclear Forces] modernization and arms control." This became known as the "dual-track" decision.

Initially, NATO agreed that arms control should not entirely preclude NATO deployments in the belief that such deployments recoupled America's strategic deterrent to European defense, and were not designed merely to offset Soviet deployments of SS-20s. After the Reagan administration took office in January 1981, however, a new debate ensued within the American bureaucracy over the proper U.S. negotiating stance. The State Department sought negotiating flexibility with a formula proposing equal INF ceilings at the lowest possible level, including zero. The Defense Department, represented by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, favored the dramatic clarity of a zero option based on the minority assessment outlined above. For political reasons, the zero option had by now also become popular in West Germany. In the end, President Reagan supported the zero option, and serious negotiations on limiting INF missiles began in Geneva, in November 1981.

The negotiations made little progress, as the Soviet Union hoped that European publics would negate the deployment decision by ousting the governments that had agreed to them. This did not happen and, in November 1983, after the United States started to deploy its INF missiles as planned, the Soviets walked out of the negotiations.

In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and that same month the negotiations resumed. While the power of personality can no doubt be overdrawn, it is difficult to conceive of Brezhnev, Andropov, or Chernenko pressing as hard as did Gorbachev for an INF agreement acceptable to the United States. In the end, the United States got the zero option, and more besides. The Soviets' shorter range missiles (SS-12 and SS-23), which if left unconstrained could have threatened most of the same targets vulnerable to SS-20s, were eliminated, too. And by agreeing to zero weapons on both sides, Soviet concessions had the effect of eliminating worries about the transfer of SS-20s from the Far East, and of reducing problems with the verification regime designed to implement the treaty.

Of course, the Soviet Union remains capable of waging nuclear war in Europe, as does the United States. The INF Treaty has not eliminated the strategic nuclear and general military balance in Eu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rope but rather reshaped it. More important, the INF treaty has created a special cache of political problems for the Alliance, centered on the future role of West Germany. Some opponents of the treaty remain concerned over its military aspects, believing still that it decouples the United States from the security of Western Europe—and others over its political aspects—believing that it singularizes West Germany and undermines the political unity that is the sine qua non of NATO's effectiveness in any crisis.

These are not trivial concerns. What is important in this context, however, is not whether the United States got in the INF Treaty something that will stand the test of time, but more simply that, for the first time in the history of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations, the United States got precisely what it wanted in a long, complex, and protracted negotiation. Looking at the full arms control agenda before us, we need to review just how we did it. Maybe we can do it again. The key is to understand how much of the success is reasonably attributable to our skill, to Gorbachev's decisions, or to some combination of the two.

Even as Gorbachev's tenure has brought change within the Soviet Union, so has it brought some nuances to Soviet negotiating behavior.

Improved Public Relations

In his memorable summer 1985 interview with *Time*, Gorbachev denied the old saw that the Soviet Union wanted to drive a wedge into NATO, splitting the United States from its allies. Nothing could be further from the truth, he claimed. But his claim was disinformation. If anything, the Soviets accentuated their NATO-splitting tactics during the INF negotiations—and raised their public diplomacy efforts in Europe to new levels of sophistication.

Early in the resumed Geneva negotiations, the Soviets dispatched many ambassadors, led by the chief negotiators, Ambassadors Viktor Karpov and Aleksei Obukhov, to NATO capitals to hammer at U.S. arms control positions. It had been standard U.S. practice to provide comprehensive explanations to allies and adversaries alike, but this practice was new for the Soviets, who performed with greater sophistication than anticipated. Following each major meeting with the United States, Soviet "spin controllers" quickly circulated to ensure that the most convincing case for their positions was understood. The Soviets increasingly used Moscow press conferences, featuring hitherto anonymous Soviet generals, to stake out positions. Most remarkable, the Soviets generally made themselves far more accessible to the press than previously. Compared to the grilling usually accorded to U.S. military representatives, the Soviet spokesmen were

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not pressed for specifics; the media appeared more interested in the new phenomenon of relative openness itself than in pursuing the nuances of specific details in the Soviets' presentations.

The Soviet INF delegation played a special role, making themselves available to visiting dignitaries; they were especially attentive to lawmakers and staff from the U.S. Senate Observer Group during the latter's periodic Geneva visits. Dogmatic and ideological during negotiating sessions, the Soviets demonstrated flexibility and reason to outsiders. The Soviet INF delegation in Geneva also issued press releases more frequently than its counterpart from the United States, including a remarkably nervy press release on December 2, 1987, accusing the United States of delaying data exchange—this after it had spent days refusing to execute an already agreed exchange. (The maneuver was given the "chutzpah of the year" award by the U.S. delegation.)

The U.S. government is often puzzled as to why, with Madison Avenue in its territory, its side of the arms-control story is so poorly conveyed—or at least why its listeners so often remain unpersuaded. Public opinion polls in Europe prior to the INF Treaty suggested that Gorbachev was perceived as more popular and believable than the U.S. leadership. The INF lesson—subsequently reinforced by Gorbachev's unilateral commitments to reduce Soviet conventional and nuclear forces—suggests that there will be more of the same. Gorbachev's smile doubtless hides iron teeth, but he says what European publics want to hear: there is a new dawn in Moscow and the price of peace can be cheaper. Despite the assistance of the security-minded governments in Europe, the United States will be hard-pressed to ensure that the post-World War II generation understands the underpinnings of the military realities in Europe. Should the Soviets propose sweeping, attractive reductions at the scheduled Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations, the painstaking negotiations on technical issues may well tax the patience of European populations, to the disadvantage of the West. Indeed, the ostensibly attractive Soviet opening moves in CFE have already stimulated positive public reaction, even though the details have scarcely been examined.

At the same time, by entering the public relations sweepstakes, Gorbachev has committed Moscow to playing under new rules. No longer can the Soviets make wildly implausible proposals or simply stonewall reasonable U.S.-NATO positions, because now there is an international price to pay. On the other hand, the West can no longer expect axiomatic Soviet intransigence to save it from tactical errors, such as "anywhere, anytime" on-site inspections.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Glasnost

The INF talks were a major proving ground for Gorbachev's policy of glasnost or openness. The Americans wondered whether glasnost would lead to a greater Soviet willingness to accept intrusive verification, and to provide detailed information on Soviet forces.

Despite Gorbachev's statement in January 1986 that Moscow was prepared for all forms of verification including on-site inspection, and Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov's subsequent boast that "we will demand even more verification than the U.S.," the Soviet team in Geneva refused to go beyond the old platitudes. Glasnost was slow in coming to INF.

However, after introducing their April 1987 draft of the INF Treaty, the Soviet delegation became somewhat more willing to discuss specific verification measures in depth. But the turning point came only in October 1987—on the sixth of that month, to be exact—when the Soviets in the INF Elimination Protocol Working Group displayed photos and line drawings of Soviet intermediate-range missiles—an unprecedented action. The step reportedly had been personally authorized by Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev. With this step, the Soviets presented hard information never before seen in the West—albeit comparable to the information on U.S. armaments that Moscow can get in *Jane's Weapon Systems*.

Some Soviets appeared stunned by their own openness; one military representative commented that "if an enlisted man gave you this information, he would be shot."

This single act, more than any other, showed that the Soviets were seeking an early INF agreement. Thereafter, Soviet representatives were distinctly more responsive, especially in the technical working groups. Although high-level diplomatic efforts were still needed before the Soviets would present disaggregated data and site diagrams, the data they did provide were far more extensive than anything ever before made available. Although Soviet military leaders clearly resisted concessions every step of the way, eventually they resigned themselves to the highly intrusive verification regime advocated by the United States. Some Soviets appeared stunned by their own openness; one military representative commented that "if an enlisted man gave you this information, he would be shot."

Under the banner of glasnost, the West can anticipate greater Soviet flexibility on materials that are routinely unclassified here but that Moscow has considered state secrets for decades. For example,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a detailed conventional-forces data exchange, with each side responsible for the accuracy of its data, could clarify points in the CFE negotiations that remained at issue throughout the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations. Also, if the INF precedent holds, individual Soviet delegates will be more willing to reveal inside information and to explore unresolved issues. Moreover, the precedent has been set for extensive inspection of specific sites, continuous presence of inspectors at key production facilities, and "cooperative measures" to assist the effectiveness of national technical means of verification such as spy satellites.

In the past, Soviet negotiators have been inflexible, assuming that the United States must make the moves to generate progress. Stimulated perhaps by glasnost, the INF negotiations suggest that the Soviets will be more creative. And American negotiators should insist that they be.

The Soviets shifted ground many times during the course of the INF negotiations, particularly after Gorbachev entered the scene, but certain constants in their conduct reinforced old truths about negotiating with the Soviets.

Negotiate from Strength

The Soviets remain firm devotees of power politics. Indeed, the entire INF affair, from the Soviets' deployment of SS-20s in 1977 to the treaty banning them in 1987, serves as a vivid reminder that Moscow uses its nuclear arsenal to intimidate weaker states. The SS-20s were being deployed throughout much of the 1985-87 negotiations and were probably good for another ten to twenty years. Moreover, a modernized version of the SS-20 was also being tested, indicating that the Soviets were prepared to keep their SS-20 force indefinitely. Yet, in the end, the Soviets were willing to destroy the entire SS-20 force, suggesting that this force was originally deployed not for coherent military reasons, but as an instrument of political pressure and intimidation.

Likewise, negotiation of the INF Treaty demonstrated beyond doubt that the Soviets take you seriously only when you have battalions big enough to match their own. The proposal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization not to deploy INF missiles if the Soviets destroyed their intermediate-range missiles was risible—an attempt to trade "a bucket of ashes for a bucket of coal"—and the Soviets treated it with contempt. Only when NATO had absorbed the political and financial costs of INF missiles, proving that it could deploy them, did the Soviets seriously weigh U.S. proposals and Alliance supporting statements.

It is hard to over-stress this lesson and its implications. Effective negotiation with the Soviets is not possible without negotiating chips.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

They do not give you the time of day unless you are wearing a watch. This is not to suggest that U.S. INF deployments were sufficient for an INF agreement—but they certainly were necessary. Obviously, American actions did not force the Soviets to accede to a specific agreement, or indeed to any agreement at all. Even with U.S. INF deployed, the Soviets could have elected to maintain and modernize their INF missile force at maximum levels, or they could have accepted an agreement at equal levels above zero. Without U.S. deployments, however, the best possible agreement that the United States and NATO could have extracted would have been Soviet SS-20 reductions (perhaps to 1979 levels), but with the United States committed not to deploy any INF missiles. That, of course, would have meant conceding a Soviet monopoly in INF missiles.

This truth—that a U.S. counter is necessary for any Soviet system—must be kept in mind in the START negotiations, where the United States seeks objectives such as the elimination of Soviet mobile missiles even though the comparable U.S. missile is little better than a drawing-board construct. This is not to say, however, that the negotiating chip must appear in exactly the same form as its Soviet counterpart. Both U.S. mobile missiles (MX and Midgetman) are unpopular in different domestic quarters and so may never be deployed. But the media have recently been touting the B-2 "Stealth" bomber as a counter to Soviet mobile missiles. Because stealth technology enjoys a popular mystique, deployment of a Stealth bomber is far more credible than deployment of a mobile missile, and this may prepare the way for a trade-off between the B-2 and Soviet strategic mobile missiles.

Anticipate Soviet Electioneering

Certainly, the Soviets are no less dutiful about observing NATO's domestic electoral scene than the Alliance is about Kremlin-watching. This was clear following the Soviet walkout at the INF negotiations in November 1983 after U.S. INF deployments. The U.S. administration was facing a presidential election in which some candidates, such as Senator Alan Cranston (Democrat of California), opposed INF deployments by the United States. The alternative of a freeze in INF deployments by the United States was widely bruited, with the intimation that U.S. deployments would make an INF agreement impossible. And the Soviets had to ask themselves whether "President Mondale" might be more flexible. Indeed, Viktor Afanasiev, a member of the Soviet Central Committee and editor in chief of *Pravda*, has confirmed that "an unwillingness to help promote Reagan's re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

election was one reason for the Soviets' negative stance on arms control in 1984."[1]

Domestic critics had also made deployment an election issue in those countries that host NATO INF bases, namely the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In every one of them, the government fought an election focused in part on its commitment to INF deployment. Thus, the negotiating walkout on November 23, 1983, was a low-cost strategy for the Soviets. If the Allies or the United States had broken ranks or altered deployment commitments, the Soviets would have reversed a major NATO security decision. And if Western cohesion held, Moscow could always return to the negotiating table.

The latter proved, indeed, to be the case. Promptly after the 1984 presidential election in the United States, the Soviets renewed their interest in arms control negotiations. Other European elections were still to come, however; the United States obtained a fully reliable political endorsement of INF only in July 1986, when the Dutch government gave its final commitment to deploy missiles.

Again, the lesson verges on the obvious. The Soviets do not come to significant arms control agreements in the final year of a U.S. administration. In an election year, the American administration grinds into immobility as campaigning absorbs the energies of decision makers. Lacking pertinent guidance, negotiators march in place. Incumbents do not want to give their opponents anything as concrete as a finished treaty to criticize, and prefer to claim that "the process" is moving in a promising direction. "Better no agreement than a bad agreement" becomes the campaign slogan.

Further, the Soviets do not propose concessions that the current administration may not have time to act upon and the next administration can pocket as given. The temptation to see whether the next administration will be more flexible on neuralgic points is overwhelming. If the Soviet bureaucracy considered whether to press for a START agreement in 1988 or to see if "President Dukakis" would offer a better deal on "Star Wars," the proponents of delay clearly won.

Stick with the Guidelines

The U.S. delegation at the INF negotiating table had well-defined objectives, and these were critical in eventually reaching an agreement. Since 1981, NATO guidelines had been clear: equality of rights and limits; globality (no transfer of the threat from Europe to other regions); no negotiation on or compensation for the systems

[1] Jiri Valenta and John Cunningham, "How Moscow Votes in U.S. Presidential Elections," ORBIS, Winter 1989, p. 14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of third countries (meaning those of the United Kingdom and France); no adverse impact on NATO's conventional capabilities (that is, exclude nuclear-capable aircraft); and effective verification. In addition, the Alliance later decided that an INF Treaty must include collateral constraints on shorter-range systems (a detail that may have been overlooked initially, owing to the U.S. negotiators' single-minded focus on the SS-20 missile system). Most of the INF negotiations were devoted to convincing the Soviets that the United States would continue to support these principles.

Sound positions bear repeating to the Soviets—as many times as necessary. Repetition helps American messages get through to Moscow, even if the reporting by Soviet negotiators is spotty, distorted, and self-serving. Americans take some pride in approaching problems in a flexible and creative way ("if at first you don't succeed, try the outfield"); but in negotiations with the Soviets, flexibility is usually not a virtue. The Soviets are not very subtle in their presentations, preferring the sledgehammer to the rapier. They expect their interlocutors to hammer away at them in a similar fashion. They therefore tend to misinterpret a position as weakly held if it is not delivered repeatedly and vigorously.

For their part, the Soviets were less than clear about their own principles after having failed to prevent U.S. deployments. Although they accepted the initial position of total INF elimination in July 1987, it remains unclear whether—during the first year of resumed negotiations—they hoped to maintain Soviet INF preponderance or planned to use INF as a bargaining chip for U.S. concessions in START. Recalling how long it takes a new U.S. administration to conduct substantive reviews of major issues, some of the fits and starts of Soviet negotiating policy might have reflected a similar shakedown during Gorbachev's first year in office. Until the Dutch reaffirmation in July 1986, the Soviets also no doubt harbored hopes that one or another host country would falter and the entire deployment scheme would subsequently unravel.

It appears clear that Moscow's final decision to accept the zero option was prompted by recognition that a residual INF force based in the Asian portion of the Soviet Union would be militarily trivial. Such a force would accentuate verification problems while indefinitely troubling relations with Asian states. Clearly, prospective removal of SS-20s aimed at East Asia removed an irritant with the People's Republic of China, helping pave the way for a potential rapprochement with Peking.

In groping toward final acceptance of the basic U.S. zero proposal, however, the Soviets spun a series of maneuvers, playing shell games with their positions, sometimes demonstrating confusion within their own ranks. For example, they shifted their line innu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

merable times on the linkage between the INF negotiations on the one hand, and START/Defense and Space Negotiations on the other. At one point following the Reykjavik Summit in October 1986, Gorbachev and his chief negotiator, Ambassador Viktor Karpov, made contradictory statements on the issue of whether INF was part of the package or not.

The United States was well served by an initial negotiating position which was clearly articulated and comprehensively agreed upon within the Alliance. In retrospect, the protracted effort to reach agreement on such positions was worthwhile—if only to convince outside observers of the unlikelihood of significant changes in the U.S. position. Similar care would enhance the American position on START.

Get Written Agreements

American positions are fought out in interagency discussion, with decisions made at the highest level necessary to resolve debate. Working through the delaying mechanisms available to each powerful agency and personality until a decision or compromise is reached has frequently been a problem in this process, and advocates of policies not adopted often leak their positions to the media, giving the impression that the issue remains unsettled. Nevertheless, the results of these high-level discussions are usually treated as gospel in negotiations. U.S. negotiators can therefore speak with confidence that their positions will not be reversed.

In past negotiations there was an impression that, while it was often extremely hard to bring the Soviets to agreement on an issue, once they agreed on a point, they would hold to it. This was not true during the INF negotiations. Whether the issues were major (such as the INF-START-SDI linkage) or minor (timing the elements of data exchanges), there was a repeated need to revisit issues that ostensibly had been solved. American delegates characterized the process of reaching specific agreements with the Soviets on INF as comparable to "nailing jello to a wall."

Final Soviet decisions were only made at the very top. Soviets at the delegation level—presumably on instruction—reversed agreements reached at higher levels between ranking U.S. and Soviet officials and tried to sell the same horse twice, or as many times as they thought they could find a purchaser. For example, some of the technical commitments made by ranking members of the Soviet political-foreign affairs establishment following Summit discussions in Geneva with U.S. representatives in November 1987 simply did not hold up in subsequent negotiations. Consequently, we learned that, when we needed a definitive agreement, we had to ensure that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the highest levels of the Soviet military were clearly involved—otherwise, it was prudent to hold onto our positions.

The United States, then, must pin down agreements in unambiguous writing. Meetings that do not result in written agreements, even those at the highest level, can create serious difficulties. Soviet-American meetings are always held under great logistical and political pressures, and there is more to talk about than time permits; but the emphasis must be to secure solid written confirmation of what has been agreed upon (and clear identification of what is still unresolved). Even written language can be ambiguous and hence held hostage to bad faith, but a solid treaty text is the best protection negotiators can secure, both for establishing a clear national understanding of the rights and obligations enjoined by the treaty, and for maintaining the support of friends and allies in instances of disagreement between parties.

Exploit Soviet Weakness

In the course of the INF negotiations, thousands of substantive points were addressed—from large issues such as the exclusion of British and French nuclear systems, down to the most minute details, such as the question of whether verification inspectors should be allowed to carry tape measures. This process of negotiation was normally adversarial; at best, it was tedious and businesslike. In any case, it proved that Soviets at the negotiating table are not ten feet tall, even under Gorbachev. American negotiators have more flexible instructions, are less hamstrung by compartmentalization, and have greater in-depth expertise. During the weeks immediately after the September 1987 Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Washington, the Soviets in Geneva, although apparently under instructions to expedite the process, lacked the specific guidance to complete the treaty rapidly. The result was de facto filibustering by Soviet negotiators (privately labeled "numb-alogues" by the U.S. delegation) designed to fill time. At one point, when the Soviets advanced a time-filling reversal of a previous position, a U.S. negotiator recalled former senator Stephen Young's (Democrat of Ohio) classic response to crank letters: "Dear Sir, You should be aware that some madman is signing your name to letters."

Clearly the U.S. delegation benefited from internal cohesion with clear lines of communication and authority. Information was widely shared throughout the delegation, with judgments and decision making collegial rather than hierarchical. No one will ever pretend that powerful personalities representing agencies with diverging views will always agree, but momentary heat frequently forges solid conclusions. In contrast, Soviet working group members often seemed to lack information being communicated at other levels;

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more than once a senior Soviet negotiator was openly reversed by his ostensible subordinate.

For the last three months of the INF "end game," the United States was able to reinforce its negotiating team with key technical experts and others with years of INF experience. The Soviets either could not or would not reinforce their delegation to match the U.S. negotiating team and suffered because of it. Consequently, Soviet delegation members were even more pressed by overwork than were their U.S. counterparts. Full Soviet teams were not available for expert working sessions and the United States largely took control of the drafting process.

U.S. technical experts, for example, conclusively proved that missiles could be safely and quickly destroyed on the ground by a variety of methods, rather than eliminated only by launching as the Soviets originally argued. (In the end, however, a limited number of launches during the first six months of the treaty were permitted.) Likewise, faced with the requirement to devise parameters for a permanent facility to monitor Soviet missile production at Votkinsk, the United States could draw on past studies and career verification experts to quickly devise a system the Soviets accepted virtually *in toto*.

The Soviets are also remarkably deficient in the technology that supports modern diplomacy: word processors, high-speed photocopying equipment, and dedicated transportation. Sufficient copies of Soviet proposals were rarely available; reproduction equipment belonging to the Soviet team appeared to be limited to making three poor-quality copies. U.S. word-processing equipment at the Geneva negotiating-team level was hardly state of the art, but the Soviets had nothing to match the secure word processors and high-speed printers standard for the U.S. negotiating team. This capability permitted the United States greater flexibility in drafting, proposing, and integrating elements of the treaty into final text.

Virtually instantaneous communication with Washington enabled the United States to draw quickly on the skills of a range of technical experts to supplement the expertise of the negotiating team. The U.S. delegation also gained major advantages by repeatedly being the first to introduce treaty language, beginning with the March 4, 1987, U.S. draft INF Treaty, to which the Soviets were able to respond with a text of their own only six weeks later. While no one can force the Soviets to accept even the most logical argumentation, the Soviets were decidedly weaker in developing strong arguments and adducing facts to support their positions.

When returning to the United States for the treaty-signing ceremony, the U.S. negotiating team brought a few magnetic disks containing the entire treaty text. The Soviets, who returned on the same

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plane with the U.S. delegation, brought their text in an Italian-made word processor the size of a small refrigerator. Indeed, had the United States not offered to transport the Soviets, it is unclear how the Soviets would have gotten to Washington, for reproducing the treaty on official treaty paper in both languages was completed too late for scheduled commercial airlines to carry the Soviet delegation. Further, covering every possible—even catastrophic—contingency, the U.S. delegation sent additional copies of the treaty to Washington via Federal Express.

When returning to the United States for the treaty-signing ceremony, the U.S. negotiating team brought a few magnetic disks containing the entire treaty text. The Soviets brought their text in an Italian-made word processor the size of a small refrigerator.

Being technically more advanced gives the U.S. government a decided edge in information and argumentation against their Soviet counterparts. These American advantages need to be developed further in future negotiations. Negotiators should have access to extensive, detailed data bases and electronic-mail word-processing systems with easy retrieval capability for key documents and telegrams.

Expect Negotiating Delays

The U.S. government gives the Soviets considerable credit for being tough, clever, astute negotiators. The final days of the INF talks, however, provided Americans with a different picture. In retrospect, Soviet negotiating toughness owed more to inflexibility—either personal or Moscow-driven—than to diplomatic skills. Soviet negotiators needed constant guidance from Moscow, even for minor word changes, yet often did not use this guidance (or withheld it for extended periods), anticipating that the U.S. negotiators would unilaterally resolve issues for them.

Our understanding of Soviet motivation for specific moves remains murky. Glasnost has yet to produce any day-to-day media insight into Soviet bureaucratic infighting equivalent to *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* columns, let alone the books published by investigative journalists. Lacking such insights, we must assume that Soviet positions are shaped both by personality and by institutional interests.

Personality is important in any negotiating situation, at least on the tactical level. Negotiators frequently do not wish to change po-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sitions. They believe in them. Changing a position in which one has a vested interest can be viewed as a personal defeat rather than a tactical adjustment. The Soviets are certainly not immune to this problem. Another problem at the human level concerns uncertainty about intentions; for example, when an argument becomes technical, as many inspection-related issues are, one side often grows suspicious about the degree of intrusion necessary for monitoring treaty compliance. At what point does the desire for verification turn into lust for intelligence collection? Thus, any new idea will most likely be reflexively rejected. Any hope of agreement depends on patient repetition of technical explanations, in order to convince those on the other side of the table that there are no hidden traps, and that the proposal will indeed prove mutually beneficial.

On the strategic level, neither side will knowingly accept an agreement that does not meet its interests. Although many arguments may have led Moscow to accept a zero agreement, the road to the zero option was opened by the Reykjavik agreement that would have eliminated INF in Europe and limited INF warheads worldwide to one hundred for each side. Retaining such a militarily trivial force was ultimately seen as illogical and inefficient. Not only would a residual force have been expensive to maintain and modernize, it also would have aggravated relations with Asian states, while requiring a more stringent inspection regime.

While the U.S. delegation was willing to accept a Reykjavik-style residual force agreement, American negotiators continued to point out the advantages of a global zero agreement, including the ease of monitoring. For their part, the Soviets attempted to trade their remaining 100 warheads for U.S. nuclear forces in the Far East (land- and carrier-based aircraft and submarines). But when the U.S. team spurned such an offer, the Soviets announced adherence to global zero—while presenting their agreement as something they did out of concern for Asians.

The tendency for Soviet negotiators to be slowed down by constantly looking over their shoulders was also exhibited in their intense concern that the agreement give an appearance of perfect equity. Aware that they were to destroy many more systems than the United States, they sought an ostensible balance in every possible area—apparently anticipating that they would have to defend the agreement against internal critics.

Thus the eighty-four Soviet GLCMs (a "system tested but not deployed") had to be balanced against the largely hypothetical U.S. Pershing I-B, for which there was little more than a photograph.

A similar problem of appearances concerned elimination of SS-20 launchers. The Soviet launcher for the SS-20 is an inseparable combination of the prime mover and the mechanism to erect the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

missile—essentially a launcher on wheels. The U.S. Pershing II launcher, by contrast, is essentially a flatbed trailer; the prime mover is a separable truck employed to pull it. One way to eliminate the launchers would be to cut them in pieces. But this approach would also destroy the Soviet prime mover while leaving the U.S. prime mover—the truck—intact. The Soviets said frankly, "If you drive something away, we want to drive something away." The result was a careful negotiation to modify the SS-20 launcher irreversibly so it could never serve that purpose again. The erector mechanism was removed and cut up, and the rear end of the Soviet prime mover cut off so it could not support an SS-20 erector mechanism (although it could still be used for hauling ordinary loads). So, in the end, both sides drove something away.

Despite its preoccupation with clearing what was said and done with Moscow, the Soviet delegation did, toward the end of the negotiations, display a willingness to sacrifice ideology for solutions. Even arch-rhetorician Ambassador Aleksei Obukhov turned pragmatic. Presumably, the reward must be exceedingly attractive in order to justify the forfeit of ideology, but once that decision is made, the Soviets can move quickly. In Geneva, they dropped positions requiring destruction of U.S. INF systems and shelters, saving the United States hundreds of millions of dollars, and adopted verification proposals that an ideologue would have judged impossible.

Conclusion

Rhetoric surrounding the INF treaty tends to make the usual mistake of seeing each bend in the road as a major turning point. Valuable as it is, the INF agreement is more important as a precedent than for what it accomplishes in itself. It does, after all, address only 3-4 percent of the global nuclear arsenal—systems that one U.S. military officer characterized as "rubble bouncers." The INF Treaty is more a cornerstone of a structure yet to be built (the blueprints of which are now being vigorously debated) than it is a prototype for future agreements. It suggests a potential direction for U.S.-Soviet relations rather than firmly establishing such a direction itself.

Nevertheless, from the INF negotiations we have learned that:

Agreement can be reached to totally eliminate a weapon system, even a newly modernized one.

The Soviets are willing to accept asymmetrical weapons reductions to equal levels. Knowing this will serve U.S. negotiators in good stead in other arms control negotiations (START, chemical weapons, and conventional arms) where Soviet weapons and stockpiles significantly outnumber

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those of the West. (Asymmetrical reductions may some day prove a two-edged sword, however, should naval forces ever become a subject of negotiation.)

The Soviets are willing to be more flexible than outsiders previously imagined. The issue no longer is whether there will be inspection, but how to design effective inspection programs.

An agreement takes time to negotiate. Dealing with the Soviets is only one facet of the process, as negotiators must be simultaneously aware of congressional, media, domestic, and allied views. INF took a decade to complete and other agreements will not be much faster.

INF is a test agreement. The manner of its implementation and the scrupulousness of Soviet compliance will suggest whether we can go on to more ambitious agreements with Gorbachev's government. No doubt, a desire to see how INF is working out is one element in the Bush administration's review prior to resumption of the START negotiations. Moscow's response to the delay in Washington's review has been uncharacteristically reserved. Where Brezhnev could not have passed up the chance to rail against a U.S. "delay," Gorbachev has demonstrated a patient willingness to resume negotiations when U.S. decision making is finished. This restraint suggests a useful maturity that may be reflected in future negotiations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Foreign Policy Research Institute Book
...From Routledge



The Crisis of Marxist Ideology In Eastern Europe

The Poverty of Utopia

Vladimir Tismaneanu

"...displays an intimacy with the East European communist experience that is rare for its perspicacity and ability to see it as part of the larger evolution/revolution of Marxist doctrine and Soviet practice. This book is modest in size only. In insight it is immense—part of a new wave of truly critical scholarship in politics and society."—Irving Louis Horowitz, Rutgers University

"...vitriolic and challenging...fills the gap of the unwritten chapter in Kolakowski's narrative of Marxism. Mr. Tismaneanu recounts the story of the grandeur and decline of East European Marxism."—Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, New School for Social Research

"...an excellent, highly original study which gains strength not only from the author's command of an enormous literature but also his background and experience as a native of Eastern Europe....Highly recommended to all those interested in the deeper understanding of the connections between ideas and social realities in our times."—Paul Hollander, University of Massachusetts

208 pp. $35.00/cloth

Vladimir Tismaneanu, a resident scholar of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a lecturer in Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, writes regularly on Soviet and East European affairs. He is editor of two forthcoming volumes, ***Grassroots Pacifism: Independent Peace Movements in the Soviet Bloc*** *and* ***The Future of Communist States: Views From Within.***

Routledge

29 West 35th Street
New York, New York 10001-2291 • (212) 244-3336

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SHOULD INDIGENOUS PEOPLES HAVE SPECIAL RIGHTS?

by Richard Mulgan

The South Pacific, an area that long seemed a model of racial harmony, is now increasingly torn by conflicts between precolonial peoples and the descendants of colonial settlers. In New Caledonia, for example, the native Melanesian Kanaks and the descendants of French settlers have been locked in a long and bitter struggle to determine the political future of their common country, particularly its ties to France. In Fiji, two 1987 coups were carried out by the country's security forces to assure the political supremacy of native Fijians over members of the numerically larger Indian community, which was originally settled in Fiji by the colonial British.

Further south, two of the world's most democratic societies—Australia and New Zealand—also face protests by aboriginal minorities who deny the legitimacy of the original colonial settlement and claim recompense for historical injustices. In Australia, demonstrations by Aborigines took some of the shine off the country's 1988 bicentennial. In New Zealand, leaders of the Maori people have been pressing the government to recognize commitments made to their ancestors in 1840.

Nor are such clashes confined to the South Pacific. In the United States, grievances of Native Americans (commonly known as North American Indians) have been a persistent source of tension in a number of states. In Canada, lengthy negotiations have been going on since the country's new constitution and charter of rights were introduced in 1982, but all efforts have failed to resolve the constitutional position of various native peoples.

These disputes, and many more, are part of the "indigenous peoples" movement. Although the movement has generally focused on peoples whose lands were occupied by colonial settlement from Europe, the native-versus-settler issue has appeared in non-colonial contexts as well: in Asian countries such as India and Indonesia; in the Soviet Union; and in the Middle East, where the Arab-Israeli conflict centers on the conflicting claims of Israelis and Palestinians to a homeland.

Richard Mulgan is professor of political studies at the University of Auckland, New Zealand. His books include *Aristotle's Political Theory* and *Democracy and Power in New Zealand*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This is one reason leaders of the indigenous peoples movement have felt that their cause is not adequately addressed by programs set up to serve the largely ex-colonial Third World. In addition, many of their peoples—though suffering in conditions reminiscent of the Third World—are actually citizens of the industrialized Western world. But most tellingly, so leaders of the movement feel, their peoples uniquely suffer the handicap—which Third World peoples did not suffer in the postwar era—of being unrecognized by world opinion as the legitimate but dispossessed claimants of their territory. To denominate such paradoxical peoples, their leaders have therefore coined the term the "Fourth World."

But what does the term "indigenous" mean to those involved in the movement? What exactly are the special political rights claimed on behalf of the Fourth World? How are those rights supposed to be justified? And are those rights consistent with equality of fundamental human rights?

Origins of the Movement

The international movement on behalf of indigenous peoples is the offspring of two other international postwar trends: ethnicity and anti-colonialism.

The ethnic revival of the late 1960s and the 1970s was a reaction against the concept of a national melting pot: the assimilation of ethnic groups into a single culture. As a result, steps were taken to ensure the preservation of ethnic culture, including language and religion. In the United States, for instance, there was not only the rise of black consciousness, but also a growing appreciation of ethnicity among the descendants of immigrant peoples such as the Poles, Italians, Jews, and Chinese. In Britain, the ethnic revival showed itself in the Celtic nationalism of the Scots and Welsh, and in a greater awareness of the culture of immigrant groups from the West Indies and the Indian subcontinent.

The founders of the movement for indigenous peoples shared this concern for preserving ethnic identity, language, and culture. At the same time, however, they insisted on being seen as more than just another set of ethnic minorities. They sought to distinguish themselves from immigrants, claiming to be peoples who were dispossessed within their own countries. For this reason, they sought all the rights of other ethnic minorities, but something more as well.

A second basis lay in the postwar movement to end colonial rule. (The terms "colonial" and "imperial" are used in the diplomatic discourse of the postwar world only when referring to the subjugation of overseas territories by West European powers, and this usage is followed here.) The United Nations enshrined the principle of self-determination for all peoples in its charter, and this principle was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

used to support self-determination for peoples ruled by West European states.

By the 1970s, when the process of decolonization was nearly complete, international pressure focused on a few recalcitrant holdouts. In some of these, such as Rhodesia, the obvious problem was that peoples of settler origin were unwilling to hand over power to a native majority. South Africa, though previously recognized as an independent state and therefore not strictly an instance of colonial occupation, was co-opted into the ranks of illegitimate settler governments by analogy with Rhodesia. In these two cases, the wrong alleged was the regime's denial of majority rule. But some critics pointed to the colonial origin of the two regimes, rather than the absence of democracy, as perhaps their chief fault.

If this is the case, it could be claimed that all governments founded through colonial settlement are illegitimate, regardless of their demographic cast. Apart from the accident of numbers, after all, is there any relevant distinction between the settler peoples of South Africa and those of Australasia and North America? Might not the native peoples whose land the European settlers had occupied see themselves as living in essentially the same oppressed condition as the black majority of South Africa, regardless of the formal rights they enjoy?

As a consequence of these two arguments, the indigenous peoples movement began to take visible form in the early 1970s. George Manuel, the president of the National Indian Brotherhood of Canada, had a critical role in the emergence of this movement. He worked closely with the National Congress of American Indians in the United States and with precolonial peoples in other former colonial countries. In 1971, he visited Australia and New Zealand, meeting Aboriginal and Maori leaders as well as government officials. The inaugural meeting of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples was held in Port Alberni, British Columbia, in 1975, and was attended by a number of representatives from different parts of the world. A second meeting was held in Canberra in 1981.

At about the same time, disadvantaged precolonial minorities sought to make the United Nations a forum for their grievances. The International Labor Organization had been a pioneer in the field, undertaking studies of indigenous workers in the 1920s. In 1957, it adopted Convention No. 107 for the "protection and integration" of indigenous and tribal populations—goals that were later rejected as paternalist and are currently being revised.

In 1971, the Economic and Social Council's Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities set up an inquiry into discrimination against indigenous populations, conducted by Special Rapporteur José R. Martinez Cobo, a Mexican,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who eventually issued a report in 1982.[1] In 1974, the Council granted the status of Non-Governmental Organization to the National Indian Brotherhood of Canada, a status transferred to the World Council of Indigenous Peoples when it was officially formed the next year. In 1977, the international conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Peoples in the Americas took place in Geneva; another, also in Geneva, in 1981, was called Indigenous Peoples and the Land.

As a result of this momentum, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities established a Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which first met in 1982 and has met annually since. The Working Group has sought to collect information about the treatment of indigenous populations, and to develop positions concerning their rights. Since 1985, following the recommendation of the Martinez Cobo report, it has been seeking to develop a charter of "indigenous rights" which could eventually be adopted by the U.N. General Assembly.

A Question of Terminology

Among the many questions raised by this growing movement, the most fundamental may be: What is meant by "indigenous"?

The prime movers behind the World Council and the concept of the Fourth World are leaders of peoples whose countries were settled by European colonizers, the descendants of whom now form the dominant group. Their experience is thus indissolubly linked with the particular experience of colonial settlement; consequently, they tend to see the struggles of indigenous peoples as the unfinished part of a worldwide struggle against colonialism and its effects.

On the other hand, even as Western governments have tried to dub non-Western examples of subjugation as "colonialism," so too have they tried to point out that disadvantaged native minorities live in countries other than those settled by European powers. Examples often cited are the minority peoples of the Soviet Union and the tribal peoples of India. The recent unrest in Tibet provides another vivid example.

Within the Working Group, representatives of the communist countries naturally prefer to avoid definitions altogether, and are content to have the Working Group concentrate on the first of its two aims, the gathering of information about the treatment of indigenous peoples. Since most of this information comes from peoples in the West, it represents a handy and welcome means of embarrassing the West. As far as definitions are concerned, the non-Western states have tended to maintain that a sharp division exists between

[1] United Nations Economic and Social Council, Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, "Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations," U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cases of relatively recent subjugation of peoples, such as that conducted by the European colonial powers, and more long-standing situations like those in India and Indonesia.

As it turned out, however, the Working Group's interim definition of "indigenous peoples," adopted in 1983, includes more than pre-colonial peoples. The full definition holds that:

> Indigenous populations, communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sections of the societies now prevailing on those territories or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, further develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.[2]

Although the prime focus of the movement remains on precolonial peoples, and although colonial settlement is portrayed as the prime cause of the problems of indigenous peoples, the definition of an indigenous population admits, in principle, that injustice to native populations can be the result of invasion or conquest other than colonial settlement.

Nevertheless, this definition, and the general concept of "indigenousness" as used in the indigenous peoples movement, have two questionable implications.

Indigenous implies oppressed. First, according to this definition, indigenous peoples must be "non-dominant" and distinct from those segments prevailing in the country concerned. Dominant peoples, therefore, cannot be indigenous. For example, the European peoples themselves are not considered candidates for indigenous status in their own countries.

The reason for this restriction in the Working Group's definition is clear but not explicitly stated. Quite properly, the Working Group concentrates its attention on oppressed minorities. It is, after all, a part of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. European peoples would clearly be considered native inhabitants of their territories from the perspective of migrants to those territories—such as guest workers from Turkey or immigrants from former colonial territories. But the Europeans' dominance is not threatened by these new arrivals, and they are not in need of special protection. In concentrating on ameliorating the condition of minorities, the Working Group is asserting the claim of all individuals to equality, as affirmed in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and the various covenants on human rights.

Unfortunately, the U.N. Working Group tries to assert this limitation on its work by defining indigenous peoples in such a way as

[2] Ibid., par. 379.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to build a connotation of oppression into the very term "indigenous." This not only conflicts with the ordinary meaning of "indigenous," it also leads to highly paradoxical results. Consider the position of the so-called indigenous Fijians. Before the recent military coups, they had to share power with the majority Fiji-Indians; as a result, they could claim to be non-dominant in their country and therefore indigenous within the U.N. definition. By seizing power, however, they ceased being a non-dominant sector of society, as the definition requires, and forfeited their indigenous status.

One alternative to this absurdity, of course, would be to accept the ordinary meaning of "indigenous," but assert superior rights for native inhabitants per se. The Fourth World movement could assert that those who have a longer line of ancestors in a certain territory deserve special prerogatives in it, including the right to discriminate against later arrivals. Adolf Hitler was perhaps the most extreme proponent of this view, which runs deep in many peoples, European and non-European alike. In Fiji, it is being loudly proclaimed by Major General Sitiveni Rabuka and his supporters. Such views, of course, are incompatible with the concepts of universal rights and human equality upheld by the United Nations and the whole democratic tradition.

Obviously, however one defines rights for indigenous peoples, substantial drawbacks result. If international agencies do use the term "indigenous rights"—and they need not—they should do so only when speaking of rights belonging to oppressed aboriginal minorities.

Freezing time. Yet even if one thus restricts the term, a second problem arises: how can one accept that only those individuals whose ancestors lived in a country before the arrival of a specific group of settlers—the European settlers—have roots in that country and consequently special rights? The term "indigenous," as used, has its beginnings in the European colonial enterprise. It is a product of the so-called Age of Discovery, preceding the colonial settlement, when European explorers were first confronting the rest of the world for themselves and reporting what they found. Anything they found *in situ* was indigenous; what they introduced was foreign, exotic. The distinction was thus relative to a particular time and perspective, a snapshot from a European viewpoint, taken at the time of the explorations. It did not imply that anything found in these unfamiliar lands had been there for all time; nor did it imply that things newly introduced could not adapt and be regarded as indigenous in the future from other perspectives. And of course this is what has happened. Newer waves of immigrants, for example the Vietnamese boat people, consider the descendants of British settlers in Australia and New Zealand to be indigenous, in much the same sense that the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

first European explorers considered the precolonial natives indigenous.

Reserving the concept of indigenousness for precolonial peoples thus freezes time at the point of settlement. It makes the explorers' viewpoint paramount and implies, wrongly, that descendants of settlers can never put down roots in a new land, and that all subsequent settlement is but a continuation of the original colonization. This has major implications, for if colonialism is now deemed unjust, then so is all subsequent occupation. Thus, using the term "indigenous peoples" to mean only precolonial peoples implies that descendants of the colonial settlers can never legitimize their standing in the country, however long or benevolent it may become.

Reserving the concept of indigenousness for precolonial peoples implies, wrongly, that descendants of settlers can never put down roots in a new land.

In short, on at least two counts, "indigenous" is a loaded word. If a general term is needed, it should be one that acknowledges historical priority to a single group without suggesting the impermanence or illegitimacy of later inhabitants. The term "aboriginal," which means "from the beginning," meets this criterion. But this very reasoning makes "aboriginal" less acceptable than "indigenous" to those claiming special Fourth World rights. For example, it does not fit those peoples, such as Pacific Islanders, who are known to have migrated to their present territories relatively recently. Perhaps the most straightforward, and least tendentious, term for minorities descended from those whose territories were colonized is simply "precolonial minorities," remembering always that "colonial" refers only to West European occupation.

Self-Determination?

If the terminology of the indigenous peoples movement creates problems, so too does its demand for self-determination.

The concept of national self-determination was at first closely linked to nineteenth-century European nationalism. It reached the international stage only at the end of the First World War, when it was embraced by both Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin, for differing reasons and with differing degrees of sincerity. Thereafter, the principle of self-determination continued to have increasing political significance not only in Europe's affairs but also in the fight against colonialism. In 1945, the principle was enshrined in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

charter of the United Nations, which stated that one purpose of the new organization was to promote "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."

The use of "peoples" rather than "people" is significant here. Self-determination, despite its philosophical connection with autonomy and self-government, does not imply a commitment to democracy. Indeed, the principle is often interpreted as the right of independent governments to rule as they see fit without outside interference, regardless of what rights their citizens enjoy.

Yet even self-determination of peoples is fraught with difficulty. What is a people? Do all groups who share a culture and language have the right to a state of their own? Is every people a potential nation? From the beginning, the principle of self-determination has come up against the principle of national sovereignty. States have a right to defend the integrity of their own territories not only from external encroachment but from internal secession as well. Although a group within a state may consider itself ethnically and culturally distinct, attempts to secede from the larger state have usually led to warfare.

Zaire and Nigeria illustrate the ambiguous implications of self-determination. In colonial times, the leaders of these regions appealed to the principle of self-determination to secure independence from Belgium and Great Britain. Shortly after, they found themselves challenged by domestic groups—Katanga and Biafra—seeking their own self-determination. African states are careful not to allow the principle of self-determination to undermine the integrity of existing states; accordingly, recent U.N. statements about self-determination have often been linked with strong statements about the inviolability of existing states. National boundaries in Africa are especially arbitrary, to be sure, but the same issues arise even in Britain and France. Thus, in practice, the international community applies the principle of self-determination selectively. The only peoples said to be denied the right of self-determination are those peoples who are still under colonial or quasi-colonial occupation. The only moves supported by the right of self-determination are moves away from European imperial rule.

In this way, the significance of the right to self-determination for precolonial minorities, as understood by its advocates, becomes clear. It aligns them with the peoples who earlier sought independence from colonial rule. Indigenous peoples turn into minorities suffering occupation and oppression from an external colonizing power. Along these lines, one delegate told the first session of the Working Group:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Those peoples we call indigenous peoples are nothing more than colonial peoples who were missed by the great wave of global de-colonisation following the second world war, particularly where independence was granted, not to the oppressed inhabitants of a territory but to an intrusive and alien group newly arrived.[3]

The principle of self-determination is thus being used to make the point that indigenous peoples are the continuing victims of colonialism.

The principal policy conclusion, of course, is that the state from which greater autonomy is sought is a colonial power lacking legitimate authority, and precolonial minorities should be politically independent. If such minorities must accept the fact of living within a wider state, this acceptance is only a concession to brute reality; it does not accord the state any legitimate right to interfere in what are properly the affairs only of the native people themselves.

The term "indigenous," the goal of self-determination, and the claim to land deny the legitimacy of governments established by colonial settlers, or their right to require obedience from the descendants of those whose ancestors had been there earlier. This is the key issue that the current debate does not face.

The demand for self-determination, therefore, is closely tied to the idea of the independent sovereign state, and not easily adapted to degrees of autonomy less than full, autonomous self-government. Though we can talk readily of degrees of autonomy and devolution, there are no degrees of sovereign statehood. A people either has it or does not have it. Thus, the idea of "self-determination within a wider state" or "self-determination under a wider law" is in principle self-contradictory.

So it is not surprising that governments are reluctant to recognize a right to self-determination for any minority within their territories. One government spokesman told the 1988 meeting of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations that:

His Government did not recognize the right to self-determination of any group of people within his country. The right to self-determination was only applicable to colonial situations or foreign occupation. However, after obtaining independence, his country had enacted a constitution which prescribed protection and safeguards

[3] Quoted by R. L. Barsh, "Indigenous People: An Emerging Object of International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, 1986, pp. 375-76.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for the scheduled tribes and castes and aimed at the promotion of their educational and economic interests.[4]

Reports of these annual discussions show a constant tension between representatives of precolonial minorities urging the use of concepts such as "self-determination," "nation," and "treaty" (all of which imply political independence) and government representatives trying to accommodate legitimate grievances through less divisive concepts such as "protection" and "interests."

Similarly, the special land rights claimed by indigenous peoples have a de-legitimating effect on existing governments, because of the connection between sovereignty and territory. The Martinez Cobo report, for instance, states that "indigenous peoples have a natural and inalienable right to keep the territories they possess and claim the lands which have been taken from them."[5] But ultimate sovereignty over territory is the essential basis of political self-determination, and land claims that assert themselves to be superior to the system of property rights recognized and enforced by existing governments are thus a part of the claim for self-determination.

Can Existing States Defend Their Legitimacy?

Might it be true that the governments of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are illegitimate and have no claim to the allegiance of those descended from the peoples who were in those countries before the first European settlers arrived and set up these governments?

Much of the language and many of the arguments used by the precolonial minorities movement converge on the issue of legitimacy. The term "indigenous," the goal of self-determination, and the claim to land deny the legitimacy of governments established by colonial settlers, or their right to require obedience from the descendants of those whose ancestors had been there earlier. This is the key issue that the current debate does not face. Yet until it is settled, there can be no profitable discussion of measures to improve the present situation of precolonial peoples, or any hope that solutions will be acceptable to all sides.

Under European international law current at the time of colonial settlement, territory could be acquired by a number of different means. In response to the growing importance of consent in Western political thought, most occupied territory was acquired by cession—that is, by treaties with native peoples. Open conquest was not accepted as a legitimate basis in itself. Alternatively, as in the case of

[4] United Nations Economic and Social Council, Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, "Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations-Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its sixth session," U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/24/para.44.

[5] U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8, par. 513.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Australia, the territory could be seen as unoccupied *terra nullius*, or land belonging to no one. In this case, discovery backed up by proclamation and followed by effective occupation were the appropriate modes of acquiring territory and control.

Underpinning colonial settlement and transcending the technicalities of acquisition was a belief in its value, for colonizer and colonized alike. The settlers would put the land and other resources to better use. The indigenous peoples would benefit from abandoning heathen gods and practices in favor of Christianity, and from receiving the general material and moral advantages of civilization. Even if the natives did not fully understand the terms of the treaties and their effects, it was assumed that they would eventually realize the real benefits that had thereby been bestowed.

Such confidence in the moral superiority of Western values and the beneficial effects of Western civilization has fallen off greatly in recent decades. As a result, the benefits of the colonial enterprise are also widely doubted. Many Westerners, as well as the Western-educated elites of the precolonial populations, now argue that the original colonial settlements were not based on general consent, that the attempt to base settlement on something other than brute conquest—such as moral superiority—was illusory.

Furthermore, another argument says, if colonialism is now regarded as wrong, then colonialism has always been wrong. And certainly the attack on modern remnants of colonialism poses a challenge to the authority of governments whose origins lie in the colonial settlement. But must they, to establish their legitimacy, dispute the charge that their origin was unjust? Or can they claim to have acquired legitimacy regardless of their origins?

The short answer is that governments, even if they were initially illegitimate, can and do become legitimate. To answer the question of how de facto power becomes de jure, guidance can be sought from two disciplines: international law and political theory.

International law deals with the external recognition of states. At what point does a new government which has forcibly seized power become worthy of recognition by other states as the legitimate government and international representative of that country? This is often a pressing practical question, and usually there is no clear answer, only general criteria that must be considered. First among these criteria is effectiveness, or de facto power. Does the government have control? Secondly, does the former lawful government have any chance of being restored? Will the very act of recognizing the de facto regime lessen the chances that the former legal government may be restored?

In the end, after the passage of time and the extinction of hopes for restoring the old order, there is no point in refusing to recognize

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a new government as the lawful government. De facto becomes de jure. The process is rarely cut-and-dried, nor is it entirely consistent. This is recognized in the jurisprudence of international law, which is forced to admit two antagonistic maxims between which a course must be steered: first, *ex injuria jus non oritur* (law does not arise out of wrong, or might does not make right), and secondly, *ex factis jus oritur* (law arises out of the facts or, in effect, might does make right).

If international law tends to look on from the outside, political theory considers the legitimacy of states from within, concentrating on the relation between citizens and governments. Is obedience exacted through force and fear alone, or does a government have the right to require obedience and the citizen, the duty to obey? If there is such a duty, on what is it based? Different cultures provide different answers but a number of factors recur: original conquest, hereditary title, religious or moral sanction.

Within the modern Western tradition, since the eclipse of the divine right of kings, emphasis has been placed on the principle of consent. A government is legitimate if its citizens have chosen it for themselves, and if it has the form they want. This was the basis for attempting to found new colonies on agreement; it is now the basis for questioning the legitimacy of colonial settlement.

Consent also underlies the principle of self-determination—the idea that each people should choose the government it seeks. People generally (but not always) offer allegiance to a government that protects democratic rights, civil liberties, and social justice, and governments that maintain these rights usually retain their claim to citizens' obedience. Governments that do not usually forfeit their right to such obedience.

The emphasis, it should be noted, is on the present, not the past—on the current performance of governments rather than the legitimacy of their founding. If a democratic government may forfeit legitimacy by becoming undemocratic, so a government can acquire legitimacy by becoming democratic, regardless of its origins. It is not that the wrongs of the past cease to be wrongs; it is rather that they become less and less relevant. Given the passage of time, there is now no practical possibility of removing colonial settlement and the government it brought. The question of legitimacy now turns on whether the current government operates according to principles that confer legitimacy.

Thus, from this democratic perspective, there is no need to deny the legitimacy of the formerly colonial governments, provided that they now uphold fundamental democratic principles and individual rights. This is why the governments of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand are legitimate while that of South Africa is not. Their origins

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may not be dissimilar; but their present treatment of the descendants of precolonial peoples is fundamentally different.

Conclusions

Practically, of course, most leaders of indigenous peoples movements realize there is no escape: Decolonization is no longer possible in the countries typically targeted by the precolonial minorities movement: New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the United States. The original colonial powers cannot relinquish authority over their former colonies because they no longer have authority to relinquish. At the same time, the descendants of the original settlers no longer have a home in the former mother countries to which to return. The descendants of native inhabitants, being outnumbered by later arrivals, cannot turn the principles of democracy to their advantage. Nor is there any realistic chance of secession, of re-drawing boundaries so that indigenous peoples could found new states of their own. Indeed, this is the essence of their plight, and their claim to Fourth World status.

Almost by definition, then, indigenous peoples cannot attain full political independence but must find their future within a country where the descendants of the later arrivals are dominant. Full self-determination, in the sense of complete independence from the dominating people and government, is simply not possible. Most Fourth World leaders therefore talk of seeking a degree of self-determination within the existing state. The Martinez Cobo report stated that self-determination, which it recognized as a basic right for indigenous peoples, could be "expressed in various forms of autonomy within the state."[6] The much-quoted Dene Declaration, adopted by the Dene Indian tribes of Canada's Northwest Territories, typifies such an approach. It proclaims "independence and self-determination within the country of Canada."[7]

Obviously, groups in a state can attain varying degrees of control over their own lives. Some governments, particularly the Canadian, have shown themselves ready to encourage precolonial tribes to run their own affairs subject to the overall control of the state. Such self-management can help a people maintain a sense of ethnic or tribal identity.

But, as we have seen, the concept of a right to self-determination possessed by precolonial groups cannot be accepted as valid within the democratic tradition that underlies modern international forums. And the pressure by some members of the U.N. Working Group to

[6] Ibid., par. 581.

[7] Quoted in M. Watkins, ed., *Dene Nation: The Colony Within* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

include such rights in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights is therefore misconceived.

Of course, the position of the descendants of precolonial peoples in such countries can be improved on. Precolonial peoples have particular difficulties keeping themselves distinct from a culture that threatens to overwhelm them and in operating successfully within the wider society. Unique impediments may require degrees of special assistance, including reparations and compensation for past wrongs. But this should not be done in the name of special political rights for indigenous peoples as such.

Precolonial minorities may wish to reject the democratic tradition as Western in origin and therefore alien to their cultures, of course. But in doing so, they deny themselves the opportunity to criticize colonial settlement from the perspective of human rights or to claim the right to protection as members of disadvantaged minorities, for these rights make sense only within the democratic tradition. Outside that tradition, there are few, if any, principles of national legitimation that differing peoples and cultures commonly recognize, save the application of superior force.

For those who do accept the democratic tradition there can be no doubts: they must accept that the past is done. Some compensation for past wrongs may be necessary and desirable, but it is the present and future that count, and the guiding principles for the present and future must be justice and equality for all citizens.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ISLAM IN THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING

by Robert Satloff

When the U.S. government inaugurated a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) last December, it was doing more than rewarding Yasir 'Arafat for moderating his declared policies on terrorism, Israel, and the peace process. By opening direct talks with the PLO, Washington was also expressing exasperation with its own attempt to enlist in the peace process an "alternative local leadership"—Palestinian notables from the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, American policy makers were expressing a belief that 'Arafat and his supporters matter most among the array of Palestinian leaders and organizations. And, at least tacitly, the U.S.-PLO dialogue implied a confidence that 'Arafat could deliver the Palestinians in any future settlement with Israel.

On the surface, these beliefs appear reasonable. The main Palestinian factions that reject 'Arafat's leadership are fringe terrorist groups (like Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council); Syrian-sponsored Fatah rebels (such as Abu Musa); and long-time 'Arafat opponents (like Ahmad Jibril of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command). None of these has a substantial following among Palestinians. On the other hand, the radical PLO leaders who do claim significant support, such as George Habash and Nayif Hawatima, have lent verbal backing to the PLO's new political line.

But there is at least one segment of the Palestinian population that is outside the PLO umbrella and that is sure to stand in 'Arafat's way—the fundamentalist Muslims. The fundamentalists reject any talk of peaceful coexistence with Israel, and steadfastly believe that there is no room for Jewish sovereignty in Muslim lands. In the words of one of their leaders from Gaza, Shaykh Khalil Quqa, they remain adamantly opposed to "giving the Jews even one granule of sand."[1] They do not necessarily reject the policy of negotiating with Israel, but they accept it only if the goal is to negotiate Israel out of existence.

Accordingly, the fundamentalist Muslims care little about statehood as such; what is important is "repatriation," the right to return

[1] *Al-Anba'*, October 8, 1988; cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service: *Daily Report: Near East/South Asia* (hereafter FBIS: *NESA*), October 8, 1988.

Robert Satloff is a fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, on leave at St. Antony's College, Oxford University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KEY PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS

TYPE OF ORGANIZATION	NAME OF ORGANIZATION	PRINCIPAL PERSONALITIES
I. Islamic	a. Islamic Jihad	'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd ar-Rahman Odeh
	b. Hamas (Muslim Brethren)	Ahmad Yasin
II. Nationalist	Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)	
i. Pro-'Arafat	a. Fatah	Yasir 'Arafat, Salah Khalaf, and Faruq Kaddumi
	b. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	George Habash
	c. Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)	Nayif Hawatima
	d. Palestine Communist Party (PCP)	Bashir Barguti
	e. Arab Liberation Front	'Abd ar-Rahim Ahmad
	f. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)	Mahmud az-Zaydan (Abu 'Abbas)
ii. Anti-'Arafat	a. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command (PFLP-GC)	Ahmad Jibril
	b. Fatah Provisional Command (FPC)	Sa'id Musa Muragha'a (Abu Musa)
	c. As-Sa'iqa	'Isam al-Qadi
	d. Fatah Revolutionary Council	Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal)
	e. Palestine Popular Struggle Front	Bahjat Abu Gharbiya and Samir Ghusha
	f. PLF — Ghanim faction	'Abd al-Fatih al-Ghanim
	g. PLF — Ya'qub faction	Tal'at Ya'qub

NOTES: (1) Fatah, the DFLP, the PFLP, and the PCP constitute the Unified National Leadership of the uprising. (2) The PFLP, the DFLP, and the PLF are based in Damascus. (3) The anti-'Arafat organizations are pro-Syrian and/or pro-Libyan. (4) Most organizations within the PLO, even those listed here as pro-'Arafat, retain considerable independence in their operations. (5) Names in parentheses are aliases.

to homes and lands inside the Green Line (dividing pre-1967 Israel from the territories captured that year). This demand reflects the hopes of thousands of refugees, especially in Gaza, who have never given up the goal of returning to Haifa, Jaffa, and other places within pre-1967 Israel. For these refugees, the establishment of an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, coupled with the repudiation of irredentist claims to pre-1967 Israel, would represent no victory.

Fundamentalist Islam is now the fastest-growing political movement in the West Bank and Gaza. Indeed, in a sense, fundamentalist Islam was the spark that ignited the uprising, and it continues to be one of the principal engines that maintains the *intifada*. The rhetoric of fundamentalist Islam is simple and recognizable, appealing to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

masses of Palestinians who are untouched by the vocabulary and ideology of the nationalist groups. Through its rhetoric, fundamentalist Islam mobilizes large numbers of Palestinians who never previously participated in political activity. By pointing to the common Israeli enemy, the fundamentalists have bridged the enduring chasm between religion and nationalism that long hindered Palestinian political activity in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 (hereafter referred to as the territories). Any would-be peacemaker—including 'Arafat—will one day have to face the virulent opposition of this Palestinian mass movement, spearheaded by fundamentalist Muslims.

The fundamentalists do not necessarily reject the policy of negotiating with Israel, but they accept it only if the goal is to negotiate Israel out of existence.

Background

Although political Islam has long played a role in Palestinian history, the current wave of activism dates only from about 1980, when several factors combined to energize the fundamentalist Muslims who had stayed out of the Palestinian confrontation with Zionism. Those factors included the success of fundamentalist Islam elsewhere in the Middle East, the failures of the PLO, and Israeli acquiescence.

Islamic political successes. Ayatollah Khomeini's 1979 victory over the shah inspired many Palestinians. It provided a sharp contrast to the bitter inter-Arab differences occasioned by the Camp David accords, the lack of an Arab military option, and the spiraling strife in Lebanon. When Iran's Islamic revolution soured in the eyes of many Sunni Arabs, about 1982, the appeal of Islamic groups in the territories declined commensurately. But then the example of Lebanon's Shi'i Muslims, who drove Americans and Israelis out of their country, replaced the Iranians as a model for Islamic political activism. The victory by Lebanese Shi'is had an impact that traversed the Shi'i-Sunni divide; for many Palestinians, it was simply a victory of the "oppressed" over the "oppressors."

PLO failures. Palestinians felt acutely the fluctuations in the political fortunes of 'Arafat and the PLO. 'Arafat's expulsions from Lebanon and his cold war with Jordan, for example, had a negative impact on support for the PLO inside the territories. As a Muslim Brother from al-Bireh told the pro-Fatah newspaper *Al-Fajr* in 1984,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"After the decline of the military solution for the Palestinian cause in the 1970s, Muslim Brethren found the environment suitable for preaching Islam as a political and ideological alternative to the national forces."[2]

Israeli acquiescence. The Islamic movement received critical support from the Israeli authorities in the territories. The fundamentalists' visceral hatred for the leftist, secular tendencies of mainstream Palestinian organizations made them more interested in fighting against the nationalists than against the Israelis. Consequently, many Israelis saw Islam not as part of the problem of Palestinian opposition, but as part of the solution; successive Israeli administrators of the territories patronized the growth of these organizations. Since 1967, for example, the number of mosques in Gaza has grown by 140 percent, and two-fifths of all Gaza mosques are said to be controlled by the Muslim Brethren organization (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*) in that region.

Together, the above factors spurred the growth of fundamentalism. A 1984 survey of Palestinian social behavior confirmed the existence of a fundamentalist trend in the West Bank and Gaza.[3] Nearly 70 percent of those polled classified themselves as either strongly or moderately religious. Refugee camp residents were generally more devout than city dwellers, and Gazans more religious than West Bank residents. Polling in 1986 produced similar results, with more than half the population saying that an independent Palestinian state should be based on either Islamic law (26.5 percent) or some combination of Arab nationalism and Islam (29.6 percent).[4] Interestingly, youth and the college-educated were at the center of the revivalist trend.

Nevertheless, gauging the precise role of fundamentalist Islam in the Palestinian uprising is a tricky matter, for several reasons. First, not all Islamic organizations are directly connected with fundamentalist Muslim groups. Individuals and institutions tied to the Jordanian religious establishment (which continues to administer West Bank affairs despite King Husayn's formal disengagement from the territories in July 1988) tend to be traditional, conservative, and quietist. Nonetheless, even they have half-heartedly supported, or offered no opposition to, the more activist groups involved in the *intifada*.

Second, the territories host scores of quasi-political Islamic organizations, the large majority of which are legally functioning social, charitable, educational, and religious societies. All of these have been

[2] *Al-Fajr* in English, June 29, 1984. The Muslim Brethren are an international organization of fundamentalist Muslims.

[3] Muhammad Shadid, "The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza," *Third World Quarterly*, April 1988, pp. 662-64.

[4] Muhammad Shadid and Rick Seltzer, "Political Attitudes of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza," *Middle East Journal*, Winter 1988, p. 24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

touched by and played a role in the uprising, but on different levels. Third, the political dynamics and organizational structure of the *intifada* leadership, the "Unified National Leadership," are shrouded in mystery and even myth. The Leadership comprises Fatah (including its youth wing, Shabibah), Habash's PFLP, Hawatima's Democratic Front, and the Palestine Communist Party. But over time the relative influence of these groups within the Leadership has waxed and waned. The level of violence during the *intifada* apparently has reflected the ebb and flow of the influence of these various groups. Supporters of Habash and Hawatima seem most eager to escalate the confrontation, the Communists are most reticent, and the internally divided Fatah has no clear overall thrust.

Despite such difficulties in interpretation, it is clear that the participation of some Islamic groups helped shape the course of the Palestinian uprising. These groups have emerged as important political actors in the arena of Palestinian politics inside the territories. Three in particular have been critical to the development of the uprising and represent distinct streams of politically engaged Islam: Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and an Islamized Fatah.

Islamic Jihad

Islamic Jihad (*al-Jihad al-Islami*) is the most radical, violent, and innovative of the Islamic organizations. It is a secretive, shadowy organization, operating on a classic cell-based network of five-to-six-person "families." In late 1987, it claimed the active support of about 200 of the 4,500 students at Gaza's Islamic University, and a total of 2,000-4,000 adherents throughout the territories. Though its leadership and membership are primarily based in the Gaza Strip, the organization has employed West Bank residents and has been known to conduct operations in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Islamic Jihad's goal is a complete revamping of Islamic society; its means is violent revolution. The organization sees violence as an acceptable, even preferred, political tool for overthrowing corrupt Arab regimes, cleansing Muslim society of leftist and Marxist apostates, and ridding Muslim lands of non-Muslim forces. It urges *jihad* (holy war) against both Israel and most Arab regimes. Years after most Sunni fundamentalist Muslims abandoned the Khomeini revolution as a misguided adventure, many Jihadis continue to see in Tehran a beacon of inspiration.

Thus, while other groups also talk of *jihad*, the Islamic Jihad sees this as a continuous, violent, bloody, and divine battle against Zionism, world Jewry, and those Arabs in league with the Jewish infidels. Islamic Jihad had been equally contemptuous of nationalist Palestinian groups and other less-radical Islamic groups; both were considered only marginally less satanic than the Zionists themselves.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet by the eve of the *intifada*, direct Islamic Jihad criticism of the PLO had become muted. More recently, it has cooperated closely with the PLO as a matter of formal policy, tempering strategic dogmatism with tactical flexibility. In January 1988, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, who was once convicted of organizing an Islamic Jihad cell and is now the spiritual leader of Hamas, announced that the "occupation has united the entire Palestinian people. All Palestinians and all Muslims believe in God. The occupier must be ousted first and then we will solve the problems between us."[5] Islamic Jihad has even found common tactical ground with the leftist organizations loyal to George Habash, Nayif Hawatima, and (most especially) Ahmad Jibril—all groups but the beyond-the-pale Communists.

For nationalists, coordination with Islamic Jihad made tactical sense. It offered troops eager to take the battle directly to Israel when "armed struggle" was losing its viability, and even its appeal.

The new relationship between Islamic Jihad and Fatah was initiated soon after the first murmur of Islamic Jihad activity in the territories. From the outset, it was an operational, not a political, convergence of interests. At times, Fatah recruited Islamic Jihad members inside the territories and in Jordan for its own projects; at other times, it provided weapons, communications networks, training, and logistical support for Islamic Jihad undertakings. In September 1987, *Al-Fajr* reported that the head of Fatah's elite Force 17, which includes 'Arafat's personal bodyguard, had "expressed interest in recruiting" fundamentalist Muslims and that there have been "agreements between Fatah and Islamic Jihad for military training."[6] In October 1987, Israeli authorities reported that Fatah had supplied Jihad with an extensive supply of weapons, including Soviet AK-47 and U.S.-made M-16 rifles. Then, in November 1987, as if to symbolize the new relationship between Fatah and Islamic Jihad, one of Fatah's chief spokesmen in Gaza, the attorney Faiz Abu Rahme, represented Islamic Jihad's leader at his deportation appeal.

A series of clashes between Islamic Jihad and the Israeli authorities are one major but overlooked reason for the Palestinian uprising that began on December 9, 1987. This series began in May 1987 when six members of Islamic Jihad escaped from an Israeli prison in Gaza, leading to a large-scale Israeli manhunt. Tensions

[5] *Ma'ariv*, January 14, 1988; cited in FBIS: *NESA*, January 15, 1988.
[6] *Al-Fajr* in English, September 6, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were heightened in July when two members of Islamic Jihad were convicted of having murdered two taxi drivers in Gaza the previous year. Within a month after the conviction, Jihad assailants shot and killed the Israeli commander of Gaza's military police force.

In October events moved rapidly within a short span of time. Three Palestinians were shot and killed attempting to evade a Gaza roadblock, precipitating widespread demonstrations in local refugee camps and a student strike in Gaza City. Three of the Islamic Jihad prison escapees were recaptured. And four Palestinians (including at least two Islamic Jihad prison escapees) and an agent of Israel's Shin Bet (the domestic intelligence and counterterrorist agency) were killed in a shoot-out at Gaza City's main intersection. During riots at Gaza's Islamic University, protesting this last incident, another two Palestinians were killed by the gunfire of Israeli troops when they were fired upon for riot-related activities. Further sympathy riots spread to Jerusalem, where hundreds of Palestinians clashed with Israeli police on the Temple Mount. Finally, on November 16, Israeli authorities arrested Islamic Jihad leader Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd ar-Rahman Odeh and ordered his deportation. The Islamic University in Gaza once again exploded into violent student demonstrations.

These summer and fall clashes played a major role in setting the stage for the *intifada* which began in earnest in December 1987. Time and time again, local Palestinians took to the streets in support of Islamic Jihad, underscoring the emotive power of that shadowy organization for the larger population. It was a power resting not so much on Islamic Jihad's ability to compel disciplined uniformity, but on an ability to impel people to action, to confront the Israelis as best they could.

If the role of Islamic Jihad in the pre-uprising period has been underappreciated, the organization's influence throughout the spring and summer of 1988 has been exaggerated. In part, this is because the Israelis mounted a concerted effort to break Islamic Jihad, with some success. Many Islamic Jihad leaders were jailed, and Jihadis have comprised a disproportionately high number of deportees. In part, too, Jihad's lessened role in the uprising has to do with the fact that organization, recruitment, and expansion are crucial for all the groups operating in the territories, and the clandestine and secretive nature of Islamic Jihad puts it at a disadvantage in the competition for members and influence. But its role in spawning Islamic political activism among Palestinians has been a vital one. Indeed, Islamic Jihad's effect upon mainstream Palestinian groups may well result in greater dangers to Israelis than the organization itself could ever pose.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hamas

Hamas, a quasi-acronym for the *al-Harakat al-Muqawwama al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Resistance Movement)[7] is a creation of the *intifada*. It is an invention of the traditional Muslim Brethren and is self-described in its literature as a "wing of the Muslim Brethren"[8] rather than an autonomous organization. Its role seems to be serving as a front group for the Muslim Brethren, participating as that group's proxy in the illegal and clandestine activities of the uprising. Hamas thereby safeguards the legal status of the parent organization.

The Muslim Brethren movement, founded in Egypt in 1928, had long championed evolutionary change over radical revolution. It was willing to enter into tacit alliances with Arab regimes such as those of Egypt, Jordan, and the Persian Gulf states; it even tacitly cooperated with Israel against secular nationalist Palestinian organizations.

On the eve of the uprising, the political climate in the region, and inside the territories in particular, favored the growth of this evolutionary Islamic trend. Just over the border, Muslim Brethren in Egypt were providing a valuable model for political achievement. But the Muslim Brethren's traditional position of reforming Muslim society before confronting the Zionist challenge to Islam was overtaken by events, and the organization found itself outflanked and outgunned by Islamic Jihad. Almost overnight the ideology of the Brethren was rendered outmoded; gradualism was passé.

The response was to form Hamas; or, more precisely, to issue leaflets under Hamas's name, for it is not at all clear that there are members of Hamas (as opposed to the Muslim Brethren operating under a new and different banner). Because Hamas had to shed its tainted associations with Arab regimes and Israeli authorities, its rhetoric has been even more inflammatory than that of the Unified National Leadership and Islamic Jihad. Moreover, since Hamas's principal constituency is in Gaza, where refugees from pre-1967 Israel form the majority, it shows little enthusiasm for any "peace process" leading to Palestinian recognition of a Jewish state: "To our people and to the world we declare our stand on peace . . . 'no' to peace with the Zionist entity . . . . Where is there justice with them still possessing one inch on the coast of Haifa and Acre?"[9]

[7] It seems as though the leaders of Hamas were improvising with their name as the uprising progressed. Their early leaflets were signed with the three initials of the formal Arabic name; only later did they adopt the four-letter acronym which has now been universally accepted by Palestinians and Israelis alike and which corresponds to an Arabic word meaning "zeal." "Islamic Jihad" and "Islamic Resistance Movement" are also names taken by radical Lebanese organizations, but there appear to be no connections between the Palestinian and Lebanese groups.

[8] Article 1, "The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement—Palestine" (hereafter "covenant"), August 1988.

[9] Hamas leaflet of March 14, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

After nine months of operating on an ad hoc basis, Hamas issued a forty-page covenant detailing its political philosophy in mid-August 1988. The covenant is a clear and cohesive document representing the world view of many fundamentalist Muslims in the territories. It holds that the challenge for Palestinians now is not to find ways to transform the *intifada* into a political process aimed at coexistence with Israel, but to escalate the battle to expunge the Zionists from Muslim territory. Contrary to the "two-state solution" in international vogue, Hamas's document is a forceful reminder that attempts to moderate the traditional, outright Palestinian refusal to countenance a Jewish state in Palestine are certain to face stiff opposition. The covenant calls on classic concepts of Islam.

> The Islamic Resistance Movement considers that Palestine is Islamic *waqf* [mortmain, inalienable] land, assigned to the Muslims until the end of time. It may not be renounced or conceded, whether in whole or in part. It does not belong to an Arab state or to all Arab states, nor to a king or president, nor to all kings or presidents, nor to an organization! [*sic*] or to all organizations, be they Palestinian or Arab. (Article 11)

Moreover, Hamas rejects the idea of an international peace conference, which the PLO has long championed as the means to gain diplomatic support and, eventually, statehood.

> Initiatives—so-called peaceful solutions—and international conferences to solve the Palestinian problem contradict the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Renouncing any part of Palestine is equivalent to renouncing part of the religion. . . . We do not believe that such conferences can implement our claims, give us back our rights, nor do justice to the oppressed. These conferences are no more than the appointment of infidels as judges over Muslim land. When have infidels ever dealt justly with the faithful? (Article 13)

In short, Hamas sees only one legitimate path to regaining Palestinian land and Palestinian rights. "There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except through *jihad*. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are a waste of time and entirely useless" (Article 13).

In contrast to this maximalist rhetoric, Hamas undertakes primarily nonviolent operations, lacking the training, experience, and outside support for more activist tactics. Its leaders evidently realize that they are unprepared to compete with either Islamic Jihad or Habash's Popular Front in taking the battle directly to the Israelis. Hamas also seems to recognize that while most Palestinians identify with the uprising, only a handful are ready to engage in violence or terrorism. Therefore, rather than urge direct confrontations, Hamas attempts to assert its influence at the expense of mainstream PLO organizations and the unified leadership by calling for boycotts of Israeli goods, tax payments, and licensing, and for carefully orchestrated commercial strikes. Hamas's attempts to test the receptivity of the population to such strikes have grown steadily more successful, not just in Gaza but also in the West Bank.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hamas has made great strides toward gaining popular support. With no particular political program other than revulsion of the Zionists and what it calls the "capitulationist Arabs," Hamas hopes to claim victory in the popularity contest with other Palestinian groups by standing firmly, espousing orthodox rejectionism, and brooking no compromise. Now that there is a political ferment inside the Palestinian community about whether and how to transform the destructive power of the *intifada* into a constructive political initiative, Hamas has acquired a relevance that it did not enjoy in the days when throwing stones was the sum of Palestinian political activity. Before the recent diplomatic maneuvering, Hamas did not stand for anything special. Now it has a political identity different from Yasir 'Arafat's followers in Fatah.

An Islamized Fatah

The blurring of political and religious dimensions in the Palestinian resistance has found its most important home inside Fatah, the largest and most influential organization in the PLO.

Inside the territories, Fatah is a mirror of the external PLO—an umbrella under which there is room for almost every stream of Palestinian nationalist activity. Fatah's strength lies in its appeal to nationalism of all forms and its myriad approaches to confronting Zionism. There is a place in Fatah both for terrorists who blow up civilian passenger buses and for supporters of peaceful coexistence with Israel and a two-state solution. This eclectic nationalism, however, is the Achilles' heel of Fatah as well. Because Fatah tries to be all things to all people, it is unclear what allegiance to this group actually means. As one Palestinian privately noted, "Fatah is everyone, but Fatah is no one."

In recent years, Fatah accurately took the pulse of the community of Palestinians and reached out to the growing Islamic trend. Such a shift is not the result of a change in philosophy by Fatah's loyalists, but the product of a careful reading of the political tea leaves. As fundamentalist Islam wins adherents within the insurgency, Fatah does not wish to be left behind.

Fatah's appeals to the Islamic movement have struck a responsive chord. Whether it is because of the practical benefits Fatah offers its associates, or because of the political appeal of being on the inside of the largest and most powerful Palestinian organization, fundamentalist Muslim leaders have been speaking more kindly of Fatah, and of the PLO in general. Among the stinging rebukes in Hamas's charter, one can still find warm words for the PLO as "the father, the brother, the relative and the friend . . . [who] shares the common homeland, the common disaster, the common destiny and the common enemy." Hamas hopes for the day "when the PLO embraces

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Islam as a way of life," at which time the fundamentalist Muslims will "enlist in its army [so as to] kindle its torches that will incinerate the enemy" (Article 27).

Such sentiments raise dangerous possibilities. While each party hopes to exploit the other for its own aims, it is not clear who is co-opting whom. The current situation amounts to nothing less than a fight for the soul of Fatah. The main protagonists are, on the one hand, Fatah nationalists intent on sheltering the growing Islamic sentiment under the Fatah umbrella and, on the other hand, fundamentalist Muslims eager to steal Fatah away from its "capitulationist" external leadership.

Within the territories, little contradiction is now seen between Fatah activism and religious zealotry. Two years ago, one of the luminaries of the Islamic movement in Ramallah prophesied that "the rise of Islam means that the PLO becomes more Islamic,"[10] and he may be correct. The leaflets of the Unified National Leadership regularly contain invitations to Islamic groups to join forces with the nationalists "on the bases of a militant program to escalate the uprising and repulse the occupation."[11]

Islam and the Political Process

The emergence of an Islamic trend marks an important development in West Bank and Gaza politics, and has implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time in decades, devout Palestinian Muslims are speaking the language of action, not just piety. From the pulpits of mosques throughout the territories (with the apparent approval of Jordanian *waqf* supervisors), preachers are imploring their listeners to intensify the struggle against the Zionists. Islamic weddings, funerals, and Friday prayers have become organizational meetings for all varieties of Palestinian organizations. Mosque loudspeakers are replacing the conventional media as the way to transmit news, information, and directives of the uprising. Through the mosques, Islam has provided the uprising with foot soldiers, headquarters, and communications networks. Alone among Palestinian institutions (such as universities, hospitals, and charitable societies), mosques have been largely exempt from suspension or closure by the Israelis. In short, among the mass of Palestinian Muslims caught in the uprising, there has been a blurring of the political and the religious. As Muhammad Siyam, rector of Gaza's Islamic University, has observed, "Nationalists are becoming more religious; the Muslims are becoming more concerned with the nation. There is a gradual alliance."[12]

[10] *Al-Fajr* in English, July 19, 1987.

[11] See, for example, Leaflet 32, Baghdad Voice of the PLO Radio, January 7, 1989; cited in FBIS: *NESA*, January 9, 1989.

[12] *Al-Fajr* in English, September 6, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The creeping Islamization of Fatah may prove the most lasting effect of the rise of activist Islam in Palestinian politics. Some even envision the Islamists capturing the nationalist movement and reducing the political conflict between Israelis and Palestinians to a religious crusade.

For this reason, the fundamentalists share some tactical interests with the Israelis. Revealingly, when Israeli defense minister Itzhak Rabin proposed internationally supervised elections as the centerpiece of a plan to pave the way for talks between Israel and local Palestinians last winter, it was summarily rejected by the PLO as an attempt to undermine that organization's self-declared role as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." Virtually all Palestinian leaders in the territories, some undoubtedly with reluctance, endorsed the PLO's position. But Shaykh Yasin, the blind spiritual leader of Hamas, spoke in favor of the plan. "There is no other way to elect representatives of the Palestinian people," he told Israel Television. "This is the only way."[13] Yasin and Rabin, an odd pair of allies, shared this common ground because both are committed to circumventing, if not torpedoing, 'Arafat's "peace initiative." When, three months later, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir proposed elections, Yasin's response was far less enthusiastic. But if 'Arafat does accept this election proposal, the fundamentalists will surely not be far behind.

The U.S. government's assumption that 'Arafat can and will deliver the Palestinians in the peace process must be seen as a very risky wager.

Of course, the fundamentalists have far to go before they can challenge 'Arafat's followers for political predominance in the territories. A more immediate fear is that the Islamic trend may grow strong enough to acquire a veto over the emerging political process. By embarking on a political challenge to Israeli control of the territories, in addition to a military challenge, 'Arafat has put that emerging veto to an early test. For example, the Palestinian declaration of independence resurrected and re-affirmed traditional PLO support for a "democratic, secular" state, which no fundamentalist Muslim could possibly countenance.

Thus, the U.S. government's assumption that 'Arafat can and will deliver the Palestinians in the peace process must be seen as a very risky wager. Islamic movements are growing inside the territories, and Fatah itself is being Islamized. The goal of the funda-

[13] *The Washington Times*, January 31, 1989.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mentalist Muslims is to gain support under the Fatah umbrella sufficient to claim the mantle of Palestinian leadership when, as the Islamic groups expect, the PLO either fails to provide substantive gains through the negotiating process, makes too many concessions along the way, or disintegrates under extreme internal pressure. As Shaykh Bassam Jarrar has said, "After the PLO reaches a stalemate regarding a political solution, the PLO will then make an alliance with the Islamic groups."[14]

Should it come to pass, such an alliance will be less likely than today's alignment of Palestinian groups to reach a peaceful accommodation with Israel. To most fundamentalist Muslims, a two-state solution is at best one step in a "strategy of phases" leading to the ultimate dismantling of Israel. The longer this evolution of an Islamic-nationalist entente continues, and the greater the role of fundamentalist Muslims in the daily confrontation with Israeli rule, the more difficult it will be to create a political process outside the shadow of the fundamentalist Muslims' vision of a "Zionist-free" Palestine.

In the end, therefore, the peace process depends as much on intra-Palestinian developments as on Palestinian attitudes toward Israel. By anointing 'Arafat with the oil of U.S. recognition, Washington has gambled that if the latter problem is solved, the intra-Palestinian question will answer itself. But with the emergence of fundamentalist Islam as a vital new force in Palestinian politics, this is by no means assured.

[14] *Al-Fajr* in English, July 19, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES

Published for the Middle East Studies Association of North America and the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies

EDITOR:
Peter von Sivers, *University of Utah*

International Journal of Middle East Studies publishes research on topics dealing with the Middle East from the seventh century to the present. Particular attention is paid to history, political science, economics, anthropology, sociology, philology and literature, folklore, comparative religion and theology, law and philosophy. Subscribers to the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* receive the two annual issues of the Middle East Studies Association Bulletin. The Bulletin is a vital source of information on teaching and research in Middle East Studies and essential for anyone wanting to keep up with developments in the field.

Recent topics include:

- the role of women in the middle east
- economy and politics
- poetry and literature
- historic myth and islamic essence

International Journal of Middle East Studies (ISSN 0020-7438) is published quarterly. Subscription to Volume 21, 1989 (US and Canada only): $95.00; single parts $27.00.

Back Volumes: 11-20 (1979-1988): $98.00 each

Subscribers also receive the MESA bulletin FREE

Send orders to:

Journals Department
Cambridge University Press
32 East 57th Street
New York, NY 10022

Cambridge Journals



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SECOND BATTLE OF ALGIERS

by Khalid Duran

In many ways, Algeria represents a paradigm of the high hopes and subsequently dashed expectations of the Third World. Through a determined and protracted struggle, Algerians prevailed against France, their colonial power, and in 1962 established a neutralist, socialist state under the leadership of Ahmed Ben Bella, a leader of the Algerian resistance.

Before long, however, the triumph of the Algerian people began to crumble. The head of the military, Houari Boumedienne, seized power from Ben Bella in 1965 and political freedom—along with many enemies of the regime—began to disappear. Algeria's economy deteriorated, even as its population exploded, while the state bureaucracy evolved into a new class of overlords. Finally, in October 1988, the long-suppressed disappointment, frustration, and anger of the Algerian people found expression in an uprising that was as brief as it was violent and consequential.

The Events of October

From October 5 to October 10, 1988, Algeria witnessed its worst riots in twenty-six years of independence. From the cities of the coast to the oases of the Sahara, Algerians went on a rampage and destroyed whatever, in their eyes, represented the regime: city halls, police stations, courts—even post offices and bus stops. They also vented their rage on the political headquarters of the country's only legal party, the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale). Inevitably, stores were ransacked and cars burned, turning the main commercial streets of Algiers into scenes of devastation. State-owned businesses, prime examples of FLN corruption, were favorite targets. Despite the enormity of the damage, the rioters were mostly school children, twelve to fifteen years old.

In an effort to restore order, Algerian soldiers shot hundreds of these children. The official total is 161 killed in the riots, but diplomatic and hospital sources say there is little doubt the real figure is closer to five hundred. An unofficial human rights committee in

Khalid Duran, visiting professor of Middle Eastern studies at the University of California, Irvine, is the author of *Islam and Political Extremism*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Algeria insists that no fewer than a thousand perished in the melee. The damage to property, most of it government property, is estimated at about $250 million.

The October Revolt followed a series of strikes. Government offices, factories, ports, and universities were in the grip of work stoppages when the uprising came. Public service employees had called for a general strike in the capital on October 5, a Wednesday. On the eve of this strike, a first clash occurred between demonstrators and police. Not wishing to aggravate tensions or turn expected demonstrations into violent ones, the authorities withdrew all police from public places on the fifth.

On the morning of October 5, children gathered at their schools and set out to demonstrate. They were joined by many of the jobless youth always present on the streets of Algiers. Within a few hours, riots and plundering began.

By the next day, President Chadli Benjedid had decided to put the army in charge; a state of siege was declared in the capital and a midnight-to-six curfew imposed. These measures failed to stem the tide of violence. Although Algiers was quiet through the first night of curfew, hundreds of youths stormed the Civil Service Department building the next day, breaking windows and destroying files. On Friday, October 7, schools were closed for an indefinite period. The citizens of Algiers were told to avoid gatherings, and the curfew time was extended by one hour.

The situation continued to deteriorate as destruction and death spread to other cities: Oran, Mostaganem, Tiaret, and Annaba. Offices of the FLN and Air Algérie in Algiers were looted. Following Friday's weekly prayers, six to eight thousand fundamentalist Muslims marched through the city's eastern Belfort quarter shouting "Islamic Republic."[1] In response, the government again tightened the curfew, pushing it back to 9:00 p.m. A traveler in Algiers at the time reported that gunfire made the effective curfew for bystanders much earlier. "You can walk till 4:00 p.m., [but] after the 4:00 p.m. prayers that is it. There is machine-gun fire."[2]

Despite the Military Command's warning that order would be restored at all costs, the demonstrators completely ignored curfews. On the night of the eighth, they gathered on the main street, Didouche Mourad, chanting "Chadli, assassin!" According to witnesses, the army opened fire and the shooting continued for two hours, leaving many bodies in the street.[3] On the same night, sixty individuals were reportedly killed in violent clashes in Kouba, east of the capital, in perhaps the bloodiest single incident of the uprising.

[1] Agence France-Presse, October 5, 1988.
[2] Paris Domestic Service, October 9, 1988.
[3] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

By Sunday, October 9, the unrest had spread to the Berber region of Kabylie, east of Algiers. According to official radio services, youths in the Kabylie region had battled tanks, although no precise figures were given for the casualties or the number of individuals involved.[4] This news raised the possibility that ethnic tensions might be added to the political and religious discontent already generating the unrest. But as it turned out, Berbers did not join the uprising in large numbers, and this fact may have been critical to the suppression of the rioters.

Just hours before the president was scheduled to address the nation on Monday, October 10, another massacre occurred. Despite appeals for calm from Imam Sahnun, the foremost Islamic leader in Algiers, 20,000 people set out to demonstrate early in the afternoon in defiance of siege regulations. They were commemorating those killed in the rioting and protesting the authorities' decision not to return the dead to their families. Gathering in the Belcourt district, the demonstrators marched toward Martyrs Square at the entrance to the working-class quarter of Bab el Oued, where the riots first began. As they marched, troops fired warning shots to disperse them, but the demonstrators quickly reassembled and moved on in resolute silence. The two sides finally confronted each other at the Treasury Building outside the Bab el Oued district. After a two-minute warning period, the soldiers opened fire. At least twenty-five persons died; scores were wounded.

Accounts of this incident suggest that the demonstrators fired first, and there were indeed casualties among the security forces: a tank commander was shot dead, and two policemen were seriously wounded.[5] Apparently, a few demonstrators acted as *agents provocateurs*, giving rise to speculation that they might be partisans of exiled politicians, radical fundamentalist Muslims, or communist cadres from the outlawed Socialist Vanguard party. This would explain the ill-advised use of violence by the demonstrators, but not the demonstration as such, which did not appear to be organized or incited beforehand.

Expectations were running high before President Chadli's scheduled address to the nation at 7:00 p.m. that night. The president began by proclaiming that he personally was responsible for the harsh measures being used to quell the uprising. But having asserted his determination to end the violence, he went on to promise economic and political reforms, including an end to "the monopoly of power at all levels."[6]

[4] Ibid.
[5] Agence France-Presse, October 10, 1988.
[6] Algiers Television, October 10, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although described as hapless and uninspired by much of the foreign press, Chadli's speech had an effect on Algerians. On October 11, the government announced that the state of siege and the curfew would end the next day. On October 12, keeping the promise made in his speech, Chadli proclaimed a November 3 national referendum on a wide range of constitutional reforms. With this, the uprising came to an end.

The school children battling in the streets of Algeria took their cue from the Palestinian teenagers of the West Bank and Gaza. One young demonstrator was quoted as saying, "They aren't afraid, so why should I be?"

Nonetheless, Algiers continued to resemble a city at war for days afterward. Debris was everywhere and hulks of burned-out buses and cars lined the street. Nor could the memory of what had happened be easily erased. The slaughter, especially in Algiers, recalled the devastation that occurred when the colonial army of France made its desperate stand to hold the country. In fact, the upheaval of October is frequently referred to as the "Second Battle of Algiers," an analogy to the 1957 "Battle of Algiers" between French forces and the FLN. Although the government prefers to speak simply of "the events" (*ahdath*), it is also called the "Second Algerian Revolution."

Tellingly, those who sympathize with the rioters often call the October Revolt the *intifada* (uprising), a reference to the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation. There can be no doubt that the school children battling in the streets of Algeria took their cue from the Palestinian teenagers of the West Bank and Gaza. Witnessing almost daily television scenes of that uprising, Algerian youngsters set out to enact their own *intifada*. One young demonstrator was quoted as saying, "They aren't afraid, so why should I be?"[7]

The difference is that the Algerian schoolchildren were conducting an uprising against their own government and the party of their own people's liberation movement, rather than against forces of occupation. It served as a poignant if unintended warning to the youths of the West Bank that life after national liberation may be worse than before it.

[7] Agence France-Presse, October 8, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Causes of the Revolt

A proximate cause of the October Revolt may have been a speech delivered by President Chadli two weeks before the outbreak of violence, in which he castigated members of the ruling party for corruption. Instead of pacifying an exasperated public, this speech merely focused the public's scorn on the problems he addressed.

Why were Algerians so frustrated with their leaders? Five areas need to be looked at: human rights, the economy, the bureaucracy, religious policy, and foreign affairs.

Human rights. One cause of the October Revolt can be judged by observing the activities that arose in its aftermath. Since October 1988, political activity in Algeria has increased dramatically; at the center of this bustle of activity are the two unofficial and one official human rights committees. The more daring unofficial committee is headed by the former agriculture minister 'Ali 'Abd an-Nur Yahya, an advocate of autonomy for Algeria's Berber population. That particularist tinge has somewhat lessened his committee's appeal and influence, however. And that, in turn, has boosted interest in the official, government-sanctioned committee, which includes some renowned intellectuals, such as the writer Rashid Boujedra.

In the media, a host of well-educated professionals seized this chance to argue that, if Algerians are not kept informed by their own press, the foreign press—particularly the hostile French press—will have a virtual monopoly on reporting Algerian news. As a result, the Algerian media appear to have acquired greater independence and are now less subject to government control.

Likewise, other professional groups are no longer as tame as they were before October. The medical profession is very much at the forefront of the human rights movement, partly because of the conflicts that ensued when wounded demonstrators were brought into hospitals, pursued all the while by unrelenting security forces. Cases of police torture have led doctors and other medical workers to protest and even to stage another demonstration on October 31.

So far, the government has admitted to eighty-five cases of torture, some involving minors. The president has personally assured the public that he would not tolerate the practice, and some 400 security personnel are said to have been punished for such offenses. In the practice of torture, Algerian police clearly show the influence of their training by East Germans.

Social and economic conditions. The abysmal standard of living that continues to prevail in Algeria a generation after independence undoubtedly helped fuel the revolt. During the time since independence, the country's population has risen from nine million to twenty-five million, giving Algeria one of the highest growth rates in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world (3.5 percent per annum). By the turn of the century, the population is expected to reach forty million.

Though startling, such growth is not substantially different from that of other North African states. Population growth has become oppressive in Algeria principally because the country's economy, particularly its agricultural sector, is in complete disarray. Indeed, the hoarding of foodstuffs by party members, brought on by increases in the prices paid for agricultural products, may have been a key immediate impetus of the October Revolt. (Prices were being decontrolled at the behest of the International Monetary Fund.) But clearly, this phenomenon was only a symptom of far deeper economic ills.

The initial havoc in agriculture was wrought by forced, Soviet-style collectivization under the regime of President Houari Boumedienne (1965-1978); subsequent reforms merely experimented with new types of collective farms. Only now does it seem to be dawning on the authorities that the unhappy experiences of the past have left the peasants with no enthusiasm for another try at "socialist achievements." Accordingly, state land is increasingly being rented out to individual farmers. Since the October Revolt there has been a noticeable increase in the availability of food, but this is not necessarily indicative of any general trend toward increased productivity; rather, it is the result of the government's spending scarce foreign exchange to stock empty shelves.

Another source of damage to the nation's agricultural sector was the government's emphasis (again, Soviet-style) on heavy industrialization at the expense of agriculture. As in many other Third World countries, this artificially stimulated industrialization lured rural populations into the cities. With urbanites making up about half the population, Algeria is on its way to becoming another Iran or Egypt. In fact, a dangerous similarity with Egypt can be found in the projection that, within a decade or so, 70 percent of Algeria's population will be clustered on only 1 percent of the country's vast territory.

After the destruction of agriculture, the second great weakness of Algeria's economy is its dependence on oil exports. In 1986 alone, oil revenues dropped 36 percent, from $12.5 billion to $8 million. Even these much-diminished oil exports accounted for 95 percent of Algeria's export earnings.

The oil boom allowed the country to school 200,000 university students, but scarcely was the school system established when it began to crumble. Today, the future of education, even at the primary and secondary levels, looks bleak, as the supply of teachers, schools, facilities, and funds lags far behind the need created by Algeria's rapid population growth. Until recently, the official figure for joblessness was 17 percent. Last November, this was raised to 20 percent, al-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

though many National Assembly members insist it cannot be less than 30 percent. For those under twenty, the figure may be as high as 50 percent. With jobs increasingly scarce, educated young people have turned to politics to express their discontent—and to violence.

Likewise, when the oil bubble was punctured, hundreds of economic projects in Algeria were abandoned. Factories were left unfinished, or came to a standstill for lack of spare parts and maintenance. Abroad, other oil states suffered similar slowdowns, and Algerian expatriate workers were laid off; their remittances to families back home fell by about $2 billion per year.

Though the crisis bore a certain resemblance to a Middle East bread riot, the causes lie deeper. As an exiled Algerian intellectual explained: "Petrol and couscous are taking the blame [but] the crisis results from an accumulation of explosive factors. Too much is too much."[8]

Bureaucracy. A third principal source of grievance for the Algerian people was the state and its bureaucracy. The state's Arabization program was a prime source of discontent, along with the bureaucracy's inept operation of the educational system and the emergence of bureaucrats as a new class of masters. There is a consensus that the abuses of the bureaucracy are chiefly responsible for the outburst of rage that shook Algeria in October. Theoretically, this bureaucracy is distinct from the party cadres of the FLN, but in practice they are closely related. And, as the wrath of the demonstrators showed, there is little to distinguish them in the eyes of the public.

The official ideology of Algeria puts enormous stress on a program of Arabization. Similar programs also exist in the other Maghreb states (such as Tunisia and Morocco), but Arabization is of far greater concern in Algeria, owing partly to the thorough de-Arabization carried out during 130 years of French colonial rule, and partly to the bureaucracy's obsessiveness with this program. The Algerian government was very concerned that the thousands of Arabic teachers involved in the Arabization program should come from "socialist" Arab countries; by contrast, little attention was paid to their qualifications as instructors. As a result, Arabization rapidly became a mockery. (With similar ideological obsessiveness, tens of thousands of young people born of French-Algerian marriages were shunned by the Algerian government as potential traitors. The regime has insisted that such offspring totally renounce their French heritage, and refuses to look upon them as a point of contact between the two cultures.)

[8] *Le Monde*, October 13, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Arabization program evoked widespread discontent with Algeria's educational system. Many teenagers felt themselves disabled by the process of Arabization. While they would have welcomed a truly effective education in Arabic, they understandably preferred a solid French education to the defective training in Arabic they actually received. Moreover, as Algerians are well aware, top bureaucrats who tout Arabization—including Aboubakr Belkaid, the new minister of social affairs—generally send their own children to much maligned French-language schools, preferably in Switzerland.

This two-faced approach by the bureaucracy calls attention to the third, and perhaps greatest, grievance against it: that it has become a new class of masters.

After independence, the Algerian bureaucrats who replaced French bureaucrats aspired to the same status as their predecessors. Just as the French had lived far above the natives, the new bureaucrats aspired to lord it over their countrymen. What strikes one in socialist Algeria, consequently, is not only the enormous inequality of wealth, but also the frequently vulgar ostentation of the *nouveaux riches*. This process traces back, at least, to the years of Boumedienne, who ruled Algeria with an iron fist and gave relentless lip-service to Arabism-Islamism. As many Algerians see it, what he actually did was quite different: he turned the country into a Stalinist regime, complete with oppressed masses and a well-to-do *nomenklatura*. In the process, some of his closest associates became millionaires, even billionaires.

One current symbol of the good life among Algeria's *nomenklatura* is the ultra-modern shopping and amusement center at Riyad al-Fath, damaged in the rioting. The children of the ruling class can be seen driving to Riyad al-Fath in their BMWs and Mercedes-Benzes, and dancing at the elegant discos there. This oasis of luxury stands in stark contrast to the desert of monotony and shabbiness surrounding it, a desert reminiscent of Eastern Europe in the fifties.

The bureaucracy is also conspicuously incompetent, especially at its lower levels. Due to the low level of skills on the eve of independence, large numbers of Algerians had to be entrusted with important assignments for which they were unprepared. Choosing someone to serve as a ministry's section officer was often a matter of selecting one semi-literate to oversee a section of illiterates. Inevitably, Algeria's administration was severely handicapped, and remains so to this day.

Worse, the bureaucracy is extremely fearful of young blood, especially if it is more skilled. The younger generation of would-be bureaucrats is poor, even destitute; it is proficient in Arabic, and perhaps English, German, or Russian, and technocratic in outlook. The older generation of bureaucrats, rich and clannish, uses the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

French language and apes the colonial manner, camouflaging ignorance with hauteur and incompetence with ideology.

But the older bureaucrats can rely on the support of the FLN regime far more than can the youth waiting to replace them. After all, many of the older bureaucrats fought, sometimes heroically, for independence, and this is still honored by the party. Unfortunately, the glory of days gone by does not compensate for the kind of administrative incompetence that allowed the educational system to fall behind the country's needs, even when the oil boom was providing funds. Moreover, 60 percent of the present Algerian population was born after independence and, not having experienced the glory of liberation, they disdain the ceaseless propaganda extolling the FLN's still-ruling old guard. What counts for the young is not the one million martyrs of a generation ago, but the abject poverty brought by a generation of FLN rule.

What counts for the young is not the one million martyrs of a generation ago, but the abject poverty brought by a generation of FLN rule.

Religion. Among the leading FLN cadres, Islam is an inalienable dimension of Algeria's national and cultural identity—but that is not the same thing as a religious, or even an intellectual, commitment. Over the years, they developed a tendency to delegate Islamic affairs to people whom they themselves would deride as fanatics, but whose support they wished to enlist (or whose opposition they wished to neutralize). The possible consequences of this policy were not given much thought, and they have proved disastrous.

Consider, for example, the Algerian government's treatment of the Egyptian scholar Muhammad al-Ghazali, a luminary of the fundamentalist Muslim Brethren. Secularist Algeria would seem an unlikely place for Ghazali to find employment as a professor of Islamic studies, but that is his position at the University of Constantine. Apparently, the party thought that inviting someone of Ghazali's stature to teach would purchase peace from fundamentalist troublemakers. Gulled by this line of reasoning, the FLN cadres were surprised to discover that people were taking Ghazali's ideas seriously, and citing them as a basis for making demands against the state.

As things worked out, however, religious discontent was somewhat defused during the October Revolt. True, fundamentalists had begun to agitate for their cause, and they might have risen to assume leadership over the Revolt, given the absence of alternative leadership, had it not sputtered out following Chadli's address. With

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mosques serving as staging grounds for demonstrations, especially after Friday's noontime services, the fundamentalists were well-positioned to grab the initiative. Ominously, the atmosphere surrounding burials of slain protesters was taking on the same characteristics seen during the 1978 revolt that brought Khomeini to power.

But fundamentalist leaders apparently decided that this was not their moment, that an attempt to thrust their system on a reluctant majority might backfire, especially since they lacked support among the officer corps. Widely respected preachers at important mosques pleaded for calm; some even met with the president. The understanding they reached was probably a major factor in defusing religion as a rallying point for further agitation.

Foreign policy. Algeria's position in foreign affairs since independence has been largely the same as India's: ostensible non-alignment with a distinct tilt toward the Soviet Union. Over the years, most Algerians have developed a distaste for this policy, and this distaste influenced the October Revolt.

First, the young Algerian demonstrators saw no sense in the FLN's policy of confrontation with Morocco, especially when each country had so many domestic worries. The conflict with Morocco began in 1975 after Spain withdrew from the Spanish Sahara, a territory that has close ties to the kingdom of Morocco and which is in every respect an extension of Morocco's southern region. The Polisario organization (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sakiet el Hamra y Rio de Oro), begun as a Moroccan movement for liberation of Spanish Sahara, metamorphosed into a secessionist movement, fighting Morocco with Algerian support and bases. In this form, Polisario was largely a creation of Boumedienne (with Moscow's backing). Chadli had gradually been disentangling his country from the conflict, against the wishes of a segment of the military and a part of the FLN, which "denounced the betrayal of the Islamic-Marxist ideal."[9] Nevertheless, for the rioters, the pace of disengagement was too slow, and Polisario offices were among the targets of the October Revolt.

Also, the government's support for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan lacked popular appeal. The Afghan *mujahidin*, after all, looked to Algeria as a model for their own war of national liberation, and the similarities were too obvious to be ignored by Algerians. Casting Algeria's United Nations vote alongside the Soviet Union's, when 123 states demanded Soviet withdrawal, destroyed whatever remained of the FLN's credibility as a party of liberation.

[9] Jean Daniel, "La sanglante faillite,"*Le nouvel observateur*, October 14, 1988, p. 24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Revolt's Lack of Leadership

Given the many deep frustrations expressed by the October Revolt, why did it go no further? Two main factors were responsible: the absence of leadership among opponents of the regime and the rift between Arab and Berber dissidents in Algeria.

The absence of leadership is not hard to explain. The FLN regime has a particularly gruesome record of liquidating opponents. Of the leaders who came out of Algeria's war of liberation, perhaps half were murdered by the bureaucratic wing of the FLN that assumed power in Algiers. While this seems to be the fate of most revolutions, Algeria offers a particularly stark case of a revolution devouring its own children. The most heroic resistance fighter of all, the Berber commander Belkacem Krim, was killed in a hotel in Frankfurt, West Germany, in 1970. Muhammad Khidr, another founding father of the FLN, was killed in Madrid in 1967.

Ahmed Ben Bella initiated this policy of liquidation on becoming Algeria's first president. But his successor, Boumedienne, was the grand executioner. (The two can be compared to Lenin and Stalin.) Under Chadli, the purges have assumed a more humane character, but the policy of assassination has not entirely ceased. One of the Chadli regime's most prominent victims was 'Ali Mécili, a Berber intellectual and member of Ben Bella's government immediately following independence, who went into exile and became famous in France for his humanitarianism. A much sought-after lawyer, he provided legal counsel to large numbers of Algerians and other foreign laborers, often without charge. On April 7, 1987, he was shot at the door of his apartment, depriving the democratic opposition in Algeria of its most selfless and respected intellectual.

Of the FLN's erstwhile leadership, only Ben Bella and Hocine Ait Ahmed survive. Ben Bella, who was overthrown by Boumedienne and kept in captivity from 1965 to 1979, supposedly converted from socialism to fundamentalist Islam during his long imprisonment. Quite a few Algerians still revere him as a symbol of the freedom struggle, but even more hold him responsible for much that went wrong with the revolution.

By contrast, Ait Ahmed was until recently a fairly popular opposition leader. He had a strong base of support in France (where some 40 percent of the 800,000 Algerian expatriates are Berbers and most of them oppose the government in Algiers). Unfortunately, he entered an alliance with Ben Bella—the Algerian Democratic Movement—which never really took off, principally because Ben Bella saw in it a staging ground for his own comeback rather than a partnership for a new Algeria. (Under Algerian pressure, Ben Bella was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

turned out of France after his armed guards participated in a brawl; he found asylum in Switzerland.)

In addition to the absence of a consolidated opposition leadership for it to draw upon, the October Revolt was too spontaneous to produce its own new leadership. It lacked that one central figure, that one charismatic personality, around whom the Algerians could rally, and this proved to be a principal weakness.

Arab vs. Berber

The population of Algeria is generally estimated to be roughly 70 percent Arab and 30 percent Berber, although a figure of 60 percent to 40 percent is also commonly heard, especially among the Berbers themselves. Over the years, the Berber minority has been subjected to suppression and forced assimilation, against which the Berbers have strenuously protested. Yet Arab opponents of the regime have not generally supported these Berber protests. Consequently, when the October Revolt began, it won only weak Berber allegiance.

Oddly enough, given the importance that many Algerians attach to the Arab-Berber distinction, the racial division is not a sharp one. Most Algerians are of mixed blood, and many who are staunch Arabs in their cultural identification are racially Berbers. Moreover, the Berber population itself is not racially homogeneous. Some are related to ancient Iberians; others, to the Egyptians; and some are apparently of Asian origin, probably originating in eastern Iran. In southern Algeria, Berbers have been mixing with black Africans since time immemorial. Geographically, too, the Berbers are not isolated, but live in pockets throughout the country rather than in one geographic section.

Thus, identification as an Arab or a Berber is rarely a racial question; generally, it reduces to the question of what language one speaks as a mother tongue. The Berber language is unlike Arabic, but is instead related to Ethiopian and ancient Egyptian; those who speak a Berber dialect (collectively called *tashilheet* or *shilha*) are considered Berbers, while Arabs are those who speak the Maghrebi version of Arabic.

The antipathy between Berber and Arab is ancient, going back to about 700 A.D. when the Arabs conquered North Africa and the Berbers were forcibly converted to Islam. But the present range of feelings among the Berber population is extremely broad. Some Berbers have become more royalist than the king, identifying totally with everything Arabic. Others accept the Arabic language as holy but use their own language for secular purposes.

Politically, the overwhelming majority of Berbers are not fundamentalist Muslims; that is, they reject the demand that Islamic law

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(the *Shari'a*) should be enforced as the law of the state. Many Berbers prefer a secular, democratic state with a left-of-center quality—not because they are less devout Muslims, but because they have preserved tribal law, which differs from the *Shari'a* in many ways, including the role of women. They thus feel they have demonstrated (and this is a fact of some importance internationally) that Muslim piety can survive without Islamic law, contrary to what the fundamentalists aver. Berbers are therefore wary of fundamentalist notions filtering into Algeria from the Middle East along with Arabization.

This, in turn, raises questions about the Berber attitude toward Arabic culture generally and toward Algerian Arabs specifically. As many as half the non-fundamentalist Berbers reject Arabic as a foreign language imposed by Arab imperialism. Though they may concede some religious role to Arabic as the language of Islam, as well as an important foreign language, they reject it as a mother tongue, and many prefer French. Some Berbers advocate Algeria's withdrawal from the Arab League—on the grounds that it is not an Arab country. More radical voices among the Berbers even suggest that Algeria should rid itself of the Arabs as it previously pushed out the Romans and French. Perhaps a few dozen have converted to Christianity—more for the sake of rejecting Arabism than for religious purposes.

There are other problems as well. The Tuaregs—a nomadic Berber tribe—are numerous in the two countries that border Algeria to the south, Niger and Mali, and so they tend to disregard national boundaries. This has led local authorities to treat the Tuaregs brutally, imprisoning or executing them for border violations.

By contrast, Algerian Berbers see in neighboring Morocco, the only state with a Berber majority (some 60 percent of the population), an example that emphasizes the shortcomings of their own government. Although the Moroccan establishment guards the state's Arabic character and is wary of Berber particularism, it has found a *modus vivendi* with the Berbers. (Both King Hasan II and Crown Prince Sidi Muhammad of Morocco had Berber mothers.) Algerian Berbers naturally wonder why they cannot similarly come to terms with their government.

From the regime's point of view, one could argue that—whatever merits the Berbers' other complaints may have—the accusation that they have not been represented in government is false. For example, Kasdi Merbah, who has held many key positions in government and now serves as prime minister, is a Berber. But for most of his time in government, Merbah was head of military intelligence and a confidant of Boumedienne, later becoming close to Chadli. Though indeed a Berber, Merbah was chiefly responsible for quelling Berber unrest and thwarting the aspirations of his people.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus, Berbers have long felt excluded by the government in Algiers and, until the October Revolt, they constituted the vanguard of the movement for democracy. Denied self-expression at home, they emigrated to France in disproportionately large numbers and became politically active. Recordings of social protest songs in the Berber language are leading items in the thriving music shops that cater to North Africans living in France; and this music often finds its way back to Algeria.

After the murder of Belkacem Krim in 1970, the country's Berber-speaking population became increasingly alienated, with Tizi Ouzou, the Berber capital, serving as the focus of Berber resistance. Because the population of Algiers is largely Berber, the Algerian regime also feels threatened in its home base by Berber discontent. As a result, several Berber uprisings have been brutally suppressed over the years. Yet the Arab population of Algeria never supported the Berber protests, and when the October Revolt erupted, Berbers did not rally to it. Apart from a general strike, Tizi Ouzou witnessed only a few acts of burning, nothing comparable to the civil war of 1980.

President Chadli's Reforms

President Chadli's willingness to implement needed changes had been clearly expressed even before the October Revolt, and the uprising actually strengthened his hand with regard to economic, political, and military reforms. Opposition by hard-line FLN cadres has not ended as a result of the uprising, but these hard-liners now realize they cannot stonewall with impunity. They have seen the heavy price that the Algerian people can exact from the government when they are enraged. For the moment, the president and his reforms are being given a chance.

Political changes. On November 3, 1988, a referendum was held which drew a massive voter turnout, some 80 percent of those eligible. Of those voting, over 92 percent approved amending fourteen articles of the constitution in ways that restructured the government at the highest levels. Perhaps the most important change was the enhanced status of the prime minister, who will henceforth be in charge of domestic affairs and accountable to the National Assembly. In the past, he was little more than the president's voice.

The added responsibilities have been underlined by the appointment of Kasdi Merbah to serve as prime minister. He was, undoubtedly, the ablest man in the old governing team, and a respected technocrat. Of all significant public persons in the post-independence era, he has also been the one least given to Soviet-style socialism. Nevertheless, he is a personification of the old guard. He was a key

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

figure in all previous regimes, and some wonder how it is possible for a man of substance to be so flexible.

At the Sixth Congress of the FLN, held on November 27-29, further and perhaps even more important reforms were made. Under these changes, the head of state ceased to be the chief executive of the FLN party, remaining only its ceremonial president. Executive powers in the party will now rest, as before, with the FLN's general secretary, but he will be someone other than the Algerian president. The abolition of provincial party commissariats—who used to wield enormous power and thus embodied the repressive FLN bureaucracy—represented another move in the same direction of separating party and state.[10] Another FLN Congress is to be held after a year's time, and even before that, another referendum is to be held to decide further changes in the constitution and in major laws.

Algeria's only legal party, the FLN, resembles an exclusive British club more than a national party.

Fear looms large within the FLN that the president might be looking forward to a multi-party system, although Chadli has ruled this out for the time being. He does, however, seem inclined to permit independent candidates on the local level. On the national level, Chadli would like Algeria to have a system reminiscent of the Sadat era in Egypt, when that country's single party was split into three "tendencies"—left, right, and center. Again, this would allow party and government to diverge, with the FLN reverting to the role it played in its days of glory, when it served as a broad platform for all Algerians. Unfortunately, any attempt to effectively separate state and party is still unrealistic, for the party structures are very resistant to change. The FLN resembles an exclusive British club more than a national political party.

Economic changes. On November 12, Prime Minister Merbah presented the government's economic program to the National People's Assembly, acknowledging in the process a number of areas of economic weakness that demanded swift action. He emphasized the need for economic expansion, reclamation of uncultivated areas for agriculture, and ongoing investment in job-creating activities.[11] Although not explicitly stated, the address reflected Chadli's charge to the new prime minister to foster the growth of an efficient, market-oriented economy in place of the top-heavy and unworkable struc-

[10] *Le Monde*, November 30, 1988.
[11] Algiers Television Service in Arabic, November 12, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tures so dear to the late President Houari Boumedienne.[12] Hundreds of state-owned companies are now being dissolved or wrested from bureaucratic control; in agriculture, effective control of lands still nominally held by the state is being returned to private hands. Although over 90 percent of the Assembly's members voted to approve the government's program, about half privately voiced disapproval of the reform package.

Economic policy also figured prominently on the agenda of the Sixth FLN Congress. Particular stress was placed on reducing Algeria's reliance upon oil exports for foreign trade earnings, and on increasing the country's agricultural self-sufficiency. In his speech to the Congress, President Chadli also frankly broached the sensitive topic of Algeria's massive and growing foreign debt, squarely confronting the need to address the problem before it seriously imperils Algeria's economic future.[13]

The drive for both economic and political reform was unambiguously voiced in Algeria's new constitution, approved by referendum on February 23, 1989. In stark contrast to the previous constitution (written during Boumedienne's tenure), which was heavily freighted with references to socialism and socialist society, the new document makes no direct references to socialism.[14]

Military changes. The military has effectively controlled the presidency since independence. Ben Bella triumphed because he was supported by his defense minister, Boumedienne. Then Boumedienne himself took over, serving as president until his death. Chadli succeeded Boumedienne essentially because he was the senior military officer when the presidency became vacant.

Chadli's challenge will be to insure independence for the political leadership by transforming the armed forces into an institution that serves the civilian government. This is not easy, especially for someone who himself symbolizes the military's overlordship. But Chadli has left no doubt that he recognizes the need to confine his colleagues in the military to their own profession. The most difficult step in this process may be the integration of the officer corps into the mainstream of society, which involves curtailing some of the officers' privileges, a measure bound to provoke powerful resistance.

The danger of a military coup cannot be discounted. After the October Revolt, Algiers abounded in speculation about a coup, and the public's overwhelmingly positive response to the president was no doubt motivated by the fear of such an occurrence. Chadli took advantage of the situation, and less than a week after forming a new

[12] *Le Monde*, November 8, 1988.
[13] Algiers Television Service in Arabic, November 27, 1988.
[14] François Soudan, "Algérie: l'adieu au socialisme," *Jeune Afrique*, March 1, 1989, p. 24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government, he shook up the military leadership, carefully avoiding undue offense to the senior officers.

The Revolt and Foreign Policy

Had President Chadli failed to quell the October Revolt, the two most likely outcomes would have been a Boumedienne-style military dictatorship or a Khomeini-style Islamic state. These alternatives gained Chadli almost worldwide backing for his efforts to halt the uprising.

In the West, there was widespread fear that the October Revolt might provoke a takeover by the army, which would reverse Chadli's liberalization. Moscow, too, did not seem eager for a military dictatorship; and the prospect of the Algerian Communists coming to power was too remote for Moscow to seriously entertain. Despite the long Algerian-Moroccan conflict, King Hasan is said to have wished to help Chadli by making a conciliatory gesture toward Algeria, perhaps by having his parliament ratify the present (still disputed) frontier between the two countries. A takeover by hard-liners in the military, Hasan believed, would have reversed the progress being made toward conciliation and toward a community of Maghreb states. It might even have led to renewed war with Morocco.

The possibility that a fundamentalist Islamic state might emerge from the October Revolt was also not to be overlooked, for as the demonstrations progressed, they took on an increasingly fundamentalist tinge. This also helped Chadli, as almost everyone was anxious to have him stem the tide of fundamentalist Islam. With the Americans, Soviets, French, and Moroccans, this was understood. Even the Saudis and Iranians knew that a triumphant Algerian Islamism would not be an ally of either state, but would probably go its own way, and might emerge as a rival. Thus, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia quite openly expressed a desire to prevent a change of regime in Algeria.[15]

Chadli used the revolt to broaden the number of friendly relations that Algiers enjoys. Skilled in statecraft, he had been the first Algerian president to visit Paris and promote reconciliation with the former colonial power. Chadli improved relations with the United States and even paid a state visit to Washington, without reducing ties to the Eastern Bloc. King Hasan of Morocco's spectacular reconciliation with the Polisario leadership rid the Algerian government of another heavy legacy of Boumedienne. The Saudis, who had backed Morocco in the Saharan conflict, received Chadli with open arms, as did the Iranians. In fact, with the possible exception of the Turkish government, there has probably been no other regime that

[15] *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat*, October 8, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

simultaneously enjoyed such good relations with both Riyadh and Tehran.

The strong backing of moderate Arab states and the near absence of criticism from radical ones had a sobering effect on Algerian foreign policy, which had previously displayed a penchant for supporting Soviet-inspired socialist internationalism. The new foreign minister, Boualem Bessaieh, a former professor of Arabic literature and a poet, is equally at home in the Arab world and in the West. He also has the advantage of starting his new assignment at a moment of rare solidarity among Arab states.

Prospects

Following an election on December 22, Chadli Benjedid began his third term in office immensely strengthened.[16] The Arab press was almost unanimous in showering praise upon a president who did not hesitate to assume full responsibility for having restored law and order with so heavy a hand. He was also given high marks for removing several of his executives from their posts without making it look like a disgrace, giving them honorable but less important jobs. He was hailed at home and abroad as the "New Chadli" (a pun on his name "Benjedid," which means "son of the new"), and as "Chadli the Second," leading an Algerian Fourth Republic to a glorious future. In short, he was seen as a man who could clean up a mess and make a fresh start.

At the same time, it is not known just how far Chadli's fresh start can go before it runs into insuperable resistance. The 250,000 members of the FLN and the 35,000 employees of party enterprises, together with the 350,000 members of the armed forces, constitute the strongest and most intransigent power base in the country. While the recent reforms reduced the central committee from 300 to 155 members, the number of military officers on the central committee was not reduced at all. The FLN-military establishment has currently backed reform, but that is surely for tactical reasons; such self-effacement certainly has limits. At the brink of disaster, such forces tend to become panicky. The Yugoslav example, to which official Algeria has long felt related, shows where mounting nationalism can lead. It would be a major exception to the rule if the Algerian *nomenklatura* coolly and calmly accepted changing realities.

The Algerian model has long inspired the Third World: "To succeed at revolution, you should study the Algerian upheaval."[17] But that advice is history. As the dust settles after the October Revolt, Chadli must weigh the military's implied threat against the vociferous

[16] *Le Monde*, December 24, 1988.
[17] Jean Daniel, "La sanglante faillite."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

aspirations of Algeria's youth. Burdened by its past success, Algeria needs some pragmatic solutions as it charts its future, struggling with the revolution that beggared it, seeking a new Algerian model.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This summer, in a brilliant and provocative article in

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA *asks:*

HAVE WE REACHED THE END OF HISTORY?

"WHAT WE MAY BE WITNESSING IS NOT JUST THE END OF THE COLD WAR, BUT THE UNIVERSALIZATION OF WESTERN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AS THE FINAL FORM OF HUMAN GOVERNMENT."

With responses from:

ALLAN BLOOM

PIERRE HASSNER

GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB

IRVING KRISTOL

DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN

STEPHEN SESTANOVICH

Also featured in our Summer issue:
What the Democrats Need · Cornell and the Khmer Rouge
Loving the Missile Crisis and much more.

ORDER TODAY.

$21.00 for a one-year subscription, $38.00 for two years, $54.00 for three years.
Call toll-free: 1-800-543-4860, Dept. 120 · P.O. Box 3000, Department NI, Denville, NJ 07834

2930R

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Essay

UP FROM SERFDOM

by Jeffrey Paul

The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. By F. A. Hayek. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988. 224 pp. $33.00.

Why do people still advocate socialism? Given its evident failure as an economic system, socialism's resilience as an ideal commanding the allegiance of millions (especially in the universities) is something of a mystery. A related mystery is the question of why capitalist institutions, despite their economic success, lack a similar widespread appeal.

With *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism*, F. A. Hayek—best-known as author of *The Road to Serfdom* and a Nobel Laureate in Economics—has attempted to solve these twin mysteries.

Atavism and Ignorance

He believes the first paradox, that of socialism's ongoing attraction, can be resolved by understanding the moral error that creates socialism's appeal and the factual error that permits its continuance. Socialism, according to Hayek, is a vestige of humanity's primitive tribal mores, long discarded by the economically developed world. These mores evolved during the dawn of human history when man was a hunter and gatherer, and had to live in a tribal setting in order to survive. In such circumstances, the group's solidarity and its regulation by a common purpose were not only a necessary response to a hostile environment, but—owing to the small size of such groups—a feasible response as well. Hayek believes these tribal mores are instinctual in character and persist into the present as a part of modern man's genetic inheritance.

Thus, for Hayek, "an atavistic longing after the life of the noble savage is the main source of the collectivist tradition." Modern philosophies of group solidarity (socialism, broadly construed) are anachronistic attempts to justify theoretically this primordial tribal impulse. Rousseau's thought provides Hayek with the chief example of such intellectualized reactionism.

Jeffrey Paul is associate director of the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green State University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Not surprisingly, the experience with collectivist moralities in the modern world has been almost uniformly unsatisfactory. Indeed, all attempts to practice collectivist morality and its economic correlates on a national rather than a tribal scale have had disastrous consequences for those involved. And these disasters raise a further question about socialists: Why have they not retreated in the face of overwhelming failure? Hayek believes that the answer lies in the factual error socialists commit: they fail to discern the necessary connection between socialism and mass pauperization.

This lack of discernment, though concerning a matter of fact, has a strong psychological component. Specifically, it results from a hubris—most common among intellectuals—that will not admit the economy is too complex for planners to map out.

> One's initial surprise at finding that intelligent people tend to be socialists diminishes when one realises that, of course, intelligent people will tend to overvalue intelligence, and to suppose that we must owe all the advantages and opportunities that our civilisation offers to deliberate design rather than to following traditional rules, and likewise to suppose that we can, by exercising our reason, eliminate any remaining undesired features by still more intelligent reflection, and still more appropriate design and "rational coordination" of our undertakings.

Possessed of such convictions, socialists can never concede the impossibility of rationally constructing a centrally managed, modern industrial market economy that is the productive equal of capitalism. As a result, the disastrous effects of socialism are never linked to socialism as such, but facilely dismissed as resulting from a perversion of "true socialism." The practioners, never the faith, are always at fault.

Capitalism: A Product of Evolution

In contrast to socialism, a system invented by theorists, Hayek sees capitalism as a product of cultural evolution. In other words, capitalism did not spring from superior minds, but from natural processes. Accordingly, Hayek prefers not to speak of capitalism, which sounds like an intellectual system, but of "the extended order of human cooperation that arises from a competitive market." The institutions of this extended order—such as property rights, contract, and so on—have survived and proliferated because those who introduced these practices flourished as a result. While Smith, Locke, Hume, Menger, and others have explicated the principles and advantages of the extended order, they did not invent it. No single mind did. Obviously, this renders the extended order unappealing to those possessed by the hubris described above.

Does Hayek wish us to conclude that extended orders always must be evolved rather than fashioned by human intelligence? Probably not. Clearly, he wants to maintain that the genesis of most market systems was evolutionary, but it does not follow (nor does Hayek

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

suggest it does) that such systems cannot be the products of human design. Political leaders as diverse as Ludwig Erhard, Margaret Thatcher, and Augusto Pinochet have purposely restored the institutions of capitalism where they have atrophied or disappeared.

Morality and Survival

Hayek's views on the nature of morals, and specifically the moral practices necessary for capitalist orders, are more problematic. In keeping with his evolutionary theory, Hayek believes such moral practices exist because the people who adhere to them flourish. But their acceptance remains painful, in part because they contradict the vestigial tribal impulse toward solidarity and altruism. "Forming superindividual patterns or systems of cooperation," he points out, "required individuals to change their 'natural' or 'instinctual' response to others, something strongly resisted."

Moreover, because that tribal impulse remains efficacious within intimate groups, such as the family, it cannot simply be crushed. It must be kept alive, and with it the shadow of immorality that it casts on the evolved morality of the extended order.

Finally, Hayek maintains that it is impossible to justify the moral practices of the extended order, or indeed any moral practices, in the sense of providing sufficient reasons for people to adhere to them. All we can do is separate those practices that lead to human survival from those that subvert it, recognizing that such an empirical separation does not morally justify or morally condemn the practices. The nihilistic collectivist cannot be judged morally inferior to the defender of the extended order in any categorical sense.

What one can allege with certainty, however, is that poverty and mass starvation are necessary concomitants of socialism, while capitalism provides the necessary economic conditions for prosperity. We know this because we know that only capitalism, through its price system, allows the local knowledge of resources and preferences to be used in a way that satisfies the extraordinary variety of human preferences. The moral partisan of socialism, therefore, must recognize that he casts his lot against the welfare of the masses whose interests he professes to defend. And this is not an insignificant lesson to be conveyed or learned.

Conclusion

It is important to understand why the socialist moral vision is so resistant to the claims of empirical reality. But has Hayek really explained this conundrum? Is he right that the continuing attraction of socialism results from an atavistic impulse and a hubris that renders people blind to the necessary consequences of that impulse?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is somewhat naive to think that ignorance explains the continuing attraction of socialism. More than Hayek admits, socialism's advocates are indeed familiar with the dubious achievements of their favored system. But they are wedded nevertheless to its moral vision, or at least they are morally repelled by the institutions of capitalism. To whatever extent these advocates are actually ignorant of socialism's abundant deficiencies, theirs is now a willful ignorance. In short, Hayek provides an explanation that seems more appropriate to the nineteenth century, when the evidence against socialism was just coming in, than to the twentieth century, when it is overwhelming. The critical questions that inspire this volume have yet to be fully answered.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Correspondence

LESSONS OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

To the Editor:

Efraim Karsh's "Military Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War" (ORBIS, Spring 1989) is informed and informative. While Karsh made virtually no observations about the tactical and doctrinal lessons of the war, his comments on grand strategy and military policy were highly illuminating . . . .

However, when Karsh asserts that one of the lessons of the war is that "air power—particularly the bombing of population centers—can be a key element in achieving victory," I must respectfully disagree. His basic assertions about the nature of air power may well be correct. I merely submit that the bombing of population centers had little to do with determining the outcome of this war. Karsh is right on target in saying that Iraqi air power and the collapse of Iranian morale were the main factors that forced Iran to stop fighting, but he is mistaken in believing that Iran's morale was shattered by the bombing of her cities.

It is important to understand that, when the Iranians agreed to a cease-fire in August 1988, they were not simply unwilling to continue the war; they were, above all, physically unable to continue, because they no longer had the wherewithal. This was due to the Iraqi air force's devastating attacks, not on Iranian population centers, but on Iranian economic targets. Both Iran and Iraq financed the war largely through oil revenues, and by 1988 the Iraqi air force had virtually closed the Persian Gulf to Iranian and Iran-bound shipping, reducing Iran's oil exports to a mere trickle (about half a million barrels a day, compared to about 3 million barrels a day in 1982). This in turn led to severe front-line shortages of Iranian armor, artillery, aircraft, ammunition, medicine, and spare parts. By 1987, oil-rich Iran was actually short of fuel for essential military needs because of Iraqi air strikes against refineries, pumping stations, and cracking plants. Iraq's bombing of economic targets effectively destroyed Iran's ability to win the war. The adverse impact of this on morale was merely a secondary consequence.

With regard to morale, however, the bombing of Iranian cities was less significant in bringing about the collapse of Iran's will to fight than several other factors. The most important of these was the general war-weariness that followed eight years of fighting and six

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

years of failed offensives. Few remember that it took only three years of similarly incompetent leadership to bring the French army to open mutiny in May 1917. That the Iranian army did not mutiny attests less to its devotion than to how thoroughly the Khomeini regime has terrorized its own people. Indeed, Iraqi morale was also falling in early 1988, despite its army's having won most of the battles for six years.

Even Islamic fanaticism, which Karsh cites as the main factor that sustained Iranian morale, played a more important role in demoralizing Iran than did the War of the Cities. Since it is a fundamental tenet of Islam that what happens is the will of God, the effect of six years of failed offensives on a true believer can only be imagined. When Iraq seized the initiative in April 1988 and began winning the kind of offensive victories that had eluded the Iranians for so long, it confirmed a suspicion long held by Iranian Muslims that God might be on the Iraqi side.

David Segal
Denver, Colorado

The Author Responds:

I welcome David Segal's criticism of my emphasis on the importance of strategic bombing during the Iran-Iraq War, especially since our views are complementary rather than convergent. In fact, I believe that Segal's argument lends support to my major line of reasoning.

In the first place, Segal fully concurs with my general argument on the crucial impact of strategic bombing on the course of regional wars—this, in itself, is an undeniable deviation from the conventional wisdom regarding the value of air power. The role of strategic air power in regional conflicts has been one of the most undervalued aspects of modern strategy. Viewed at best as an instrument of limited utility, and at worst as a blunt tool that may render the objective of a moderate, negotiated peace more remote, it has been looked upon with skepticism by strategists and decision makers alike.

Nor is Segal opposed to my contention that strategic bombing played a key role in ending the war. Our differences, therefore, are reduced to the operational level, namely, the optimal ways for the employment of strategic air power. And even there, the gap between us is far narrower than it appears at first glance. Both of us agree on the devastating impact of air raids on economic targets. We only differ in our judgment regarding the utility of attacks on population centers: while I deem this operational mode to be of extreme efficacy, Segal considers the value of the attacks on Iranian population centers to have been virtually nil.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet the impact of the various Wars of the Cities on Iranian national morale was devastating. True, attacks on population centers were not the sole component of Iraq's strategic campaign. Nor would they have been so effective were Iran able to achieve a major breakthrough on the ground. However, with the ground forces locked in a stalemate, the conflict's focus shifted to the strategic sphere where attacks on population centers came to play a key role. The depth of Iranian anxiety over the Iraqi air raids on their cities was clearly illustrated by the regime's reactions on many occasions. For example, during the 1985 War of the Cities, which led to mass demonstrations against the war (and the regime), the authorities prohibited the conduct of night maneuvers in the vicinity of cities in order to avoid mass panic. The Wars of the Cities also created a visible dissatisfaction among the Iranian population with the lack of adequate anti-air protection, thereby forcing the regime to embark on an ambitious effort for the construction of public shelters. The most salient demonstration of the public impact of air raids was given during the 1988 War of the Cities which led to a mass exodus of Tehran and the disruption of the activity of most government offices.

Efraim Karsh
Tel Aviv University

SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

To the Editor:

I agree with Steven Adragna ("A New Soviet Military? Doctrine and Strategy," ORBIS, Spring 1989) that, given present conditions, one must approach the announced changes in Soviet defense and foreign policies with a large dose of skepticism . . . . It is true that . . . the so-called new Soviet defensive doctrine retains the concept of total victory over an "aggressor" by offensive operations. The latter concept, however, is being challenged by some of the new breed of Soviet defense academicians.

The obvious difficulty in assessing the implications of Gorbachev's new military doctrine . . . is that the Soviets themselves are in the midst of a debate about them, and, so far, have no precise, practical definition of the meaning of "reasonable or defense sufficiency." Naturally, the Soviet military has tried to minimize the impact of the doctrine on the armed forces, and has tried to fit it into the framework of long-standing Soviet views on security requirements, force posture, and warfighting concepts. What appears to have changed, however, is that, unlike in the past, the Soviet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military no longer has a virtual monopoly on military doctrine, defense policies, and requirements.

Leon Gouré
Science Applications International, Inc.

To the Editor:

Steven Adragna seems determined to keep the significant flux and major change now occurring in Soviet military doctrine and strategy from spilling out and engulfing a long familiar framework. With all due respect, I could not escape the feeling that the author's own need for reassurance of an unchanging threat has led him to project onto his subject a preordained imperviousness to change that keeps him from recognizing that unprecedented transformation is taking place.

The author cites Soviet writers who continue to allege the malevolence of imperialism, and says that these sources "suggest no evidence" that "the Soviet leaders might abandon this philosophical heritage." But he ignores far more authoritative statements of the leaders themselves and others asserting that disarmament *is* possible while imperialism still exists, that the capitalist system is *not* dependent upon military industry, and the like. Similarly, while it is true that the Soviets today criticize deterrence, it is not for the reasons he adduces. Deterrence is not criticized because the Soviets find it too constraining, but because—while accepting mutual deterrence as the current basis for security—they want to go beyond nuclear deterrence to mutual security through radical disarmament.

A major part of Adragna's discussion is an attempt to rebut the idea that the Soviets prefer conventional to nuclear war-waging strategy. He is correct that a stress on keeping any war conventional is not a product of the new thinking, but for the wrong reason: that change in Soviet military doctrine already occurred—in the last half of the 1960s, was reinforced in the 1970s, and continues to this day. It has, however, come under challenge in the late 1980s, not because of any preference for nuclear war, but because of a new stress on preventing any war at all. It is not correct, and has not been for a quarter of a century, to say that the Soviets see "no meaningful political distinction between conventional and nuclear warfare," nor would it be true to say that they see no meaningful military distinction. The cited statements by Marshal Akhromeyev and others on the growing indistinguishability of nuclear and non-nuclear war were not made in support of a nuclear war-waging strategy, as Adragna seems to believe, but in support of the need to prevent conventional as well as nuclear war.

The author's references to a Soviet commitment to pre-emptive military action (in case of a perceived imminent enemy attack) are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also long out of date, and have long been supplanted by launch-under-attack.

The discussion of developments in Soviet military doctrine on the role of defense is closer to the mark, but refers to the period from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, and not to the change introduced in 1987-88. A new appreciation of the impact of modern military technology did, indeed, in the decade before 1987 lead to a more flexible "offensive/active-defensive" doctrine at the strategic and operational theater level, rather than a lopsidedly offensive one.

But a much more far-reaching change has now been adopted and is being applied. The traditional Soviet (and American) objective has been to achieve victory by defeat of the enemy forces. In a truly revolutionary change, and not without misgivings within the Soviet military establishment, this objective is being supplanted by the much more limited objective of waging an effective defense to prevent success of an enemy attack, and to permit termination of the conflict on that basis by political means, rather than by military defeat of the enemy.

Faced with Gorbachev's announcement of major unilateral reductions as part of the restructuring of Soviet military forces, the author concedes these would represent "a significant cutback" if carried out. He raises a number of relevant questions: Will the reductions include modern or only old weapons? Will weapons be scrapped or mothballed? Will weapons production be reduced? Will units withdrawn be disbanded or merely relocated? Will weapons be transferred to allies? . . . Many of these questions have (presumably) now been answered by Soviet spokesmen, and not in the way the author implies. Not all suspicious doubts will be stilled until the reductions have been completed and confirmed by Western intelligence. But when these reductions and restructuring are confirmed over the next two years, their relevance to the changes in military doctrine will become clear. The author may rest assured the West is not going to respond to these reductions before they are made, but he leans too far to the side of caution and skepticism when he suggests the reductions "cannot be intelligently assessed" before then. It is never premature to think about ongoing developments and their significance.

Incidentally, the author's own premature but preordained assessment is clear when he states that the past record of Soviet reductions in "1924, 1946 and the early 1960s" were each followed "after several years" by the armed forces emerging "at a higher qualitative and quantitative level."

The major reductions in 1923-25 were not followed by any quantitative increase for more than a decade, until after Hitler came to power; the reductions of 1946-48 were followed by a major increase

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

paralleling the major U.S. build-up during the Korean War, but still remained far below the 1945 level; the major reductions from 1955-1961 were followed by gradual limited increases starting in the late 1960s (as the Soviets gave more attention to contingent preparations for conventional warfare), but have never reached the levels of 1955. The author's historical reference seems more a pre-emptive rhetorical defense against seeing the implications of the major impending unilateral reductions than an exercise in learning from history ....

The author's concluding peroration warns that the Kremlin remains serious, "deadly serious," about planning for a war "in the event that one should be 'forced upon' it," and "continues to develop plans for dealing with any military contingency"—just, one may add, as NATO also seeks to do. What is important, and totally absent from the article, are the significant ways in which Soviet military doctrine and strategy are being refashioned to avert—or if necessary to deal with—these contingencies in new ways.

Raymond L. Garthoff
The Brookings Institution

To the Editor:

Traditionally, Soviet military doctrine has concerned "the essence, objectives and nature of a possible future war ... and the preparation of the country and the armed forces to wage it." In 1987, doctrine was redefined as concerning "the prevention of war ... and the preparation of the country and the armed forces to ward off aggression." Steven P. Adragna notes this fundamental change but does not ask what caused the Soviets to jettison a definition that had served them well for sixty years.

This is because Adragna does not distinguish between the military-political and military-technical levels of doctrine. He demonstrates that many of the doctrinal trees are the same, but overlooks the fundamental change taking place in the forest. Worried that the Soviets' new political thinking will deceive us, he mentions my book *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* as an example of Western analyses that discern a new defense-oriented doctrine. In fact, the chapters he cites explicitly describe offensive Soviet strategies. In my final chapter, written in June 1986, I concluded (wrongly) that this offensive strategy would persist.

Underlying his analysis is the common but erroneous assumption that Soviet military behavior can be explained by an urge to aggression, an assumption that was codified in the doctrine of deterrence. It cannot, however, explain developments during the last three years. And, when we look more carefully at the historical record, we find that the assumption is not supported by the totality of the evidence of Soviet behavior since 1939. Rather than an illegitimate urge to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

aggression, Soviet military behavior has been and continues to be shaped by a legitimate concern for national security. As I show in *Military Objectives*, through 1986 that concern was focused on the worst case of world war, a war the Soviets absolutely wanted to avoid but could not afford to lose. This is what has changed. Soviet security concerns are now being re-centered on the less demanding contingency of conflict on the Soviet periphery.

From 1948 through 1986, Soviet military requirements were driven by the increasingly demanding objective of not losing a world war. This required the defeat of NATO and the eviction of U.S. forces from Europe, and implied an offensive posture, conventional superiority, and operational surprise. The Soviets are now moving to adopt the more limited objective of ensuring the territorial integrity and internal cohesion of the Soviet bloc. This does not require military superiority or surprise. An offensive into Western Europe is prohibited, since it would precipitate world war. That is why the Soviets can now afford to make unilateral cuts.

In 1983-84 the Soviets finally acknowledged that, in preparing for world war, they had increased tension and made war more likely, meanwhile incurring heavy political, economic, and military costs. In 1984, the Soviets chose to address only the symptoms of the problem, namely the political costs of their offensive posture. By giving doctrinal precedence at the military-technical level to averting world war, the Soviets could adopt a defensive posture. This meant foregoing the advantage of surprise. The new policy was publicized in the Warsaw Pact statement of June 1986, the Budapest appeal. It was intended to reduce tension and open the way for negotiations on mutual force reductions. But the military focus was still world war.

In late 1986, economic duress forced the Gorbachev leadership to address the root of the problem. It reached the radical conclusion that the age-old adage, "if you seek peace, prepare for war," no longer applied, and that to avoid world war in the nuclear age one must cease preparing for it. By early 1987, the Soviets had adopted the planning assumption that world war could and would be averted; two years later Gorbachev announced the unilateral cuts of 500,000 troops. The doctrinal shift had already been signaled in May 1987; the Warsaw Pact Berlin declaration advocated mutual reductions to a level where neither side would have the capability for offensive operations.

The only way of escaping the vicious circle was to plan on the assumption that world war could and would be averted by political means. The assumption of no world war was essential if the Soviets were to make the unilateral cuts that would prime the pump of mutual force reductions. Only by ceasing to plan for the contingency

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of world war would it be possible to move significant resources out of defense and into the civilian sector.

Without this assumption, concepts of sufficiency and defensive doctrine were essentially meaningless. The crucial question is: sufficient for what? To defeat NATO and evict U.S. forces from the continent? Or sufficient to ward off aggression?

Overlapping changes generate confused evidence, which is further complicated in this case by the unrelated decision in 1979-1980 to redirect military attention towards strategic defensive operations, which had been neglected. Confusion is compounded if one uses writings by those at the military-technical level to explain developments at the military-political level.

The trend is the other way. Gorbachev is seeking to extend the military-political domain at the expense of the military-technical and to break the military's monopoly over the latter. Planning for war is now too serious to be left to the generals.

Michael MccGwire
The Brookings Institution

The Author Responds:

For obvious reasons, I shall not address those points on which my colleagues and I agree, but shall attempt to respond systematically to those on which we disagree.

Leon Gouré's comments raise a few points that require some clarification. Gouré argues that the primacy of the offensive is being challenged by a new breed of defense academicians. Indeed, he says, "the Soviet military no longer has a virtual monopoly on military doctrine, defense policies, and requirements." In point of fact, it never had a monopoly on military doctrine, which is formed at the highest political levels—with appropriate input from the military. Military art, however, has traditionally been worked out by the General Staff (in accordance with established military doctrine), and it is here that the *institutchiki* have begun to trespass somewhat on what has previously been the military's turf. While it is certainly true that Gorbachev has solicited the opinions of a broader range of defense intellectuals than has been the case in the past, it remains an open question as to whether these academicians have much direct influence over the formulation of Soviet national security policy.

In any case, the critical issue is not so much the degree of civilian involvement in shaping doctrine and military art, but whether there is real substance to the avowed doctrinal changes. My thesis is not that there is no real substance to alleged changes in Soviet military doctrine, but rather that we have tended to misinterpret them, and that they represent little that is new in terms of the political aspect

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of doctrine. It is true that Western development of high-tech weaponry has made Soviet military leaders realize that Warsaw Pact forces might be obliged to go on the defensive for a given period of time in the event of a war in Europe. But recognizing a past failure to place sufficient emphasis on defensive *operations* is not necessarily synonymous with shifting to a defensive *strategy* or with a defense-dependent doctrine.

Garthoff's principal arguments are as follows:

A reluctance to accept the possibility of a diminished Soviet threat has blinded me to the unprecedented transformation in Soviet military policy. It is a frequent assertion of proponents of the "radical change" theory that those who do not share their view secretly dread the prospect of an evaporating Soviet threat. This is intellectually wrong and morally unfair. We should all like to see a lessened Soviet threat and better U.S.-Soviet relations, but wishing will not make it so. While many of Gorbachev's security initiatives may indeed be revolutionary, in the aggregate they do not yet add up to a revolution. Thus far, Soviet initiatives seem to have been designed primarily for the purpose of maintaining Soviet security in a period of financial hardship, and their ultimate aim seems targeted more at reducing Western threat perceptions than at actually reducing the threat.

The Soviets have accepted mutual deterrence, but want to go beyond it to mutual security through radical disarmament. This is incorrect. The Soviets have explicitly condemned mutual deterrence as being dangerous and amoral, in contrast to many Soviet initiatives on ensuring peace through radical disarmament—which were put forward even as the Soviet Union dramatically built up its military. From a Soviet doctrinal perspective, the Western conception of deterrence is synonymous with aggression and intimidation; Soviet force deployments are necessary in order to temper the West's inherent urge to aggression. There is also nothing new in the Kremlin's calls for mutual security through radical disarmament. Disarmament has been a long-standing plank of Soviet policy, though not of actual practice.

Recent Soviet statements do not indicate a preference for nuclear operations, but instead speak to the need to prevent both nuclear and conventional war. Also, the Soviet commitment to pre-emptive military action no longer applies. Nowhere in my article do I write that the Soviets prefer nuclear operations. Rather, I argue that the Soviet leadership seeks to avoid war. Garthoff fails to acknowledge the enduring Soviet belief that *if* war becomes inevitable, the single objective must be to win it, using any and all means necessary to ensure victory. Moreover, it is wrong to argue that the Soviets are emphasizing either conventional or nuclear warfare; they are preparing for both. While Garthoff and others may take comfort from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the soothing words coming from Moscow with respect to theater nuclear weapons, the fact remains that the USSR has completed a major modernization of its own short-range nuclear forces, it enjoys a significant superiority over NATO with respect to such forces, and it continues to deploy nuclear artillery shells in forward positions. A number of recent Soviet military texts also deal explicitly with the employment of tactical nuclear weapons in both offensive and defensive operations.

The Soviets have rejected the concept of achieving victory by defeating the enemy's forces. They now seek only to prevent a successful enemy attack, in order to buy time so that political means can be brought to bear to terminate the conflict. Again, this assertion is not supported by the evidence. The Soviets do not speak only of defeating the enemy's forces, as Westerners usually do. They also emphasize defeating the enemy's support structure, his decision-making ability, and his will to resist. Many Soviet leaders still refer to waging a victorious counteroffensive against a potential aggressor. Since Soviet military doctrine maintains that socialist armed forces are incapable of launching predatory wars, however, there is no practical distinction to be drawn between "offensive" and "counteroffensive" operations; the Soviet view holds that NATO will invariably be the first to attack. Also, the deceptive (to Westerners) nature of the Soviet concept of "political means" must not be forgotten. There is no evidence of a Soviet willingness to seek a negotiated settlement to a future war (for which NATO would, by definition, be responsible) without first attempting to defeat the enemy and "destroy him utterly."

I am too cautious in my assessment of the promised Warsaw Pact force reductions; further, the West will not overreact to those reductions. The promised force cuts do not necessarily signal a permanent doctrinal shift and should not be treated as the basis of a radically new security environment. Indeed, the Soviets have not addressed many of the questions I raised in the article: tank and artillery production has not slowed; forward-deployed stockpiles are not being withdrawn; the combat support infrastructure for "disbanded" units probably will not be removed; and the reconfiguration around a corps/brigade structure calls into question the ultimate impact of the reduction in armaments. Already, Soviet leaders are hinting that unless NATO moves quickly to make some unilateral cuts of its own, the Warsaw Pact may be forced to rethink its disarmament plans.

Also, despite Garthoff's assurance, I am not at all confident that the West will not react to the cuts before they are made. Political pressure is building rapidly in Western Europe to reach an agreement on conventional force reductions while the Soviets seem so amenable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Even if an actual treaty is not hammered out in the near term, dissension within NATO over force modernization and arms control policy may serve Soviet interests equally well.

The historical examples of Soviet force cuts driven by economic necessity are inaccurate. In each instance, the subsequent build-up was attributable to perceived threats abroad. While history is certainly open to different interpretations, Garthoff is the one defending established theories rather than learning from history. Stalin recognized the need for tight integration of heavy industry with the requirements of the military; the "New Socialist Offensive," launched in October 1928, emphasized heavy industry, and by the early 1930s the USSR had established a firm industrial foundation for the production of special steel for armor, new types of aircraft and engines, and other materiel. The threat of Nazi Germany no doubt spurred the Soviet military build-up along, but it was not the root cause. Likewise, the USSR did not wait for the U.S. postwar rearmament before beginning to rebuild its own shattered military-industrial base. Indeed, had the USSR's clients not undertaken to invade South Korea, the U.S. rearmament might not have taken place. The growth in the size of the Soviet armed forces during the late 1960s may not have reached 1955 levels, but it did include the deployment of nuclear weapons with the ground forces, as well as the development of a broad range of new equipment designed for a tightly integrated nuclear/conventional battlefield, all in quantities far in excess of anything NATO possessed at the time.

It is therefore a bit premature to conclude that the recently announced force reductions will not be offset at some point in the future. Soviet leaders have already warned that they may be forced to modernize their own forces if NATO is not more forthcoming in the arms control arena.

Soviet military doctrine and strategy are being refashioned so as to avert or if necessary deal with potential crises in non-military ways. This is partly true, but for self-interested reasons. In light of the Soviet view on the important link between economic potential and military strength, it is not surprising that, in the current period of economic and technological stagnation, the Soviet leadership would seek to downplay the role and importance of the military. It is likely that other policy tools—diplomacy, political warfare, and efforts to sway Western public opinion, through offers to work cooperatively on "common issues" such as arms control, the environment, and world health—will be used to promote Soviet interests. (In the Soviet lexicon, "common interests" are usually synonymous with "Soviet interests.) It is by no means certain that the West has much to gain over the long term from the success of perestroika as it is presently constituted.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Michael MccGwire raises objections similar to Garthoff's. His principal arguments include the following:

The Soviets have jettisoned their old definition of military doctrine and have adopted one that reflects a commitment to preventing war. While the Warsaw Pact did indeed adopt a "new" military doctrine in 1987, it hardly represents a complete rejection of traditional doctrinal precepts. As statements by Admiral Kostev, General Serebryannikov, and others demonstrate, Soviet military doctrine is still concerned with preparing the country and the armed forces for waging a war if this should become necessary. Moreover, there is no advantage in looking at the political and military-technical aspects of the new doctrine independently. The former is still based on a Leninist world view (*mirovozzrenive*) in which sociopolitical competition is inevitable but should be kept short of war if possible; the latter is still preoccupied with the requirements for waging war and achieving victory if war should become inevitable.

The view that Soviet military behavior is shaped by an urge to aggression no longer applies. The new military doctrine now sets for itself the more limited objective of defending the territory of the Warsaw Pact, with an emphasis on war prevention. At no point in my article did I argue that Soviet military policy is driven by an urge to aggression. On the contrary, one of the principal objectives of Soviet military power is to restrain "imperialism's" aggressive urges, so that other "peaceful" forms of competition may be employed.

With respect to the military requirements established by the new doctrine, MccGwire may be correct in stating that they do not require overwhelming numerical superiority or surprise, as has long been envisioned. This does not mean that there is no threat, however. It is one thing to argue that the requirements of military strategy have changed (at least for the short term); it is something else again to assert flatly that "an offensive into Western Europe is prohibited, since it would precipitate world war." Moreover, Soviet military doctrine may now accord precedence to averting world war, but the principal means of accomplishing this remains the maintenance of a superior combat capability—designed to deter the adversary's inherent aggressiveness, and capable of defeating him if war should be thrust upon the USSR.

This radical doctrinal shift was made possible by the Soviet's ceasing to plan for the contingency of world war. Today, such a war can and must be averted by political means. As I pointed out in my article, the Soviet definition of political means is not consonant with Western definitions of this concept. More important, there is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet leadership has ceased to contemplate the possibility of war with the West. The point bears repeating: In the modern era, according to the Soviets, war between the two

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

social systems should be avoided if possible, for its risks and consequences would likely be catastrophic. Nevertheless, the possibility of war cannot be ruled out, and the Soviet leadership therefore continues to examine it very seriously. As Senator McCain's article in the Spring 1989 issue of ORBIS ("A New Soviet Military? Weapons and Budgets") demonstrates, the preponderance of evidence indicates that building up the military continues to be a principal concern of the Kremlin leadership. Given the shrinking pool of draft-age Slavic males and the current Soviet economic malaise, the "U.N. cuts" hardly constitute proof of a new Soviet belief in the disutility of military power.

It is wrong to apply writings at the military-technical level to the military-political level. "Planning for war," we are told, "is now too serious to be left to the generals." In reality, the political and military-technical aspects of doctrine are inextricably bound, with the former taking precedence over the latter. What MccGwire has done is to interpret statements by Soviet leaders as indicative of *goals* and not merely *means*. While the military-technical aspect has continued to evolve in accordance with both developments in technology and economic realities, the enduring principles underlying the political aspect of Soviet military doctrine have not changed. The central question is not what constitutes "sufficient defense." It is, instead: What are the goals of Soviet military doctrine, and how—if at all—have they changed?

It is appealing to hear that security is too important to be left to the generals. But several of our allies have too few generals involved in evaluating and formulating arms control proposals, and too many political leaders calling for quick agreement on conventional force reductions without thinking through the implications. The West needs to find a balance between a sincere desire to break new ground on arms control and East-West relations on the one hand, and a commitment to defend liberal values and principles on the other.

Steven P. Adragna
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Tufts University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Thornton D. Hooper Fellowship in International Affairs

The Thornton D. Hooper Fellowship Competition promotes original research on international issues affecting U.S. interests. International relations specialists, political scientists, economists, historians, and members of related disciplines are invited to apply. The applicant who is selected will spend a year in residence at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, beginning in the fall of 1990, and will receive a stipend commensurate with his or her experience.

Applicants should submit copies of three publications (or writings accepted for publication), a curriculum vitae, three letters of recommendation and a 1,000-word research proposal on some aspect of international affairs. Fellows must have received a doctoral degree or have equivalent experience.

Previous Fellows

Nicolai N. Petro (current)	Vladimir Tismaneanu	J.E. Peterson
Howard J. Wiarda	Milan Hauner	Michael Handel

Application Deadline: December 15, 1989

Submit applications to:

Hooper Fellowship Competition
Foreign Policy Research Institute
3615 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Brief Reviews

WORLD POLITICS

Mask of Treachery. John Costello.

Preventing World War III. David M. Abshire.

The State, Conceptual Chaos, and the Future of International Relations Theory. Yale H. Ferguson and Richard Mansbach.

The Undeclared Bomb. Leonard S. Spector.

The World Council of Churches and Politics, 1975-1986. J. A. Emerson Vermaat.

WAR STUDIES

NATO's Central Region Forces. Anthony H. Cordesman.

On the Defensive? The Future of SDI. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and James A. Schear, eds.

The Shield of Faith: The Hidden Struggle for Strategic Defense. B. Bruce-Briggs.

Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective. Ephraim Kam.

The U.S. Intelligence Community. Jeffrey T. Richelson.

The U.S. Maritime Strategy. Norman Friedman.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America. Carlos Marichal.

Inflation Stabilization. Michael Bruno et al., eds.

The Irreversible Crisis. Paul Sweezy and Harry Magdoff.

Privatization. John Vickers and George Yarrow.

States and Markets. Susan Strange.

THE UNITED STATES

An American Vision. Edward H. Crane and David Boaz, eds.

The Anxious Years: America in the Vietnam-Watergate Era. Kim McQuaid.

Baby Boomers. Paul C. Light.

Mandate for Leadership III. Charles L. Heatherly and Burton Yale Pines, eds.

Men of Zeal: A Candid Inside Story of the Iran-Contra Hearings. William S. Cohen and George J. Mitchell.

1968 in America. Charles Kaiser.

Special Relationships: A Foreign Correspondent's Memoirs from Roosevelt to Reagan. Henry Brandon.

Winning America: Ideas and Leadership for the 1990s. Marcus Raskin and Chester Hartman, eds.

EUROPE

Autobiography. Volume II: 1937-1960. Mircea Eliade.

Central and Eastern Europe. William E. Griffith, ed.

The Jews in Polish Culture. Aleksander Hertz.

Prelude to Solidarity: Poland and the Politics of the Gierek Regime. Keith John Lepak.

Towards a Radical Democracy: The Political Economy of the Budapest School. Douglas M. Brown.

With Stalin against Tito. Ivo Banac.

THE SOVIET UNION

The Children of the Arbat. Anatoly Rybakov.

Gorbachev and the Soviet Future. Lawrence W. Lerner and Donald W. Treadgold, eds.

Gorbachev's Reforms. Peter Juviler et al., eds.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Is Russia Reformable? Robert V. Daniels.

The Jews of the Soviet Union. Benjamin Pinkus.

Politics, Society, and Nationality inside Gorbachev's Russia. Seweryn Bialer, ed.

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev. Martin McCauley, ed.

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: Prospects for Reform. David A. Dyker, ed.

THE MIDDLE EAST

The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa. Trevor Mostyn, ed.

Colonising Egypt. Timothy Mitchell.

The Emergence of the South Lebanon Security Belt. Beate Hamizrachi.

Israel's Fateful Hour. Yehoshafat Harkabi.

The Mufti of Jerusalem. Philip Mattar.

The Palestinian Entity, 1959-1974. Moshe Shemesh.

The Politics of Provocation: Participation and Protest in Israel. Gadi Wolfsfeld.

The Soviet Union and Syria. Efraim Karsh.

AFRICA

Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda. Mzala.

The National Question in South Africa. Maria van Diepen, ed.

Psychoses of Power: African Personal Dictatorships. Samuel Decalo.

The Red Orchestra: The Case of Africa. Dennis Bark, ed.

Revolutionary Ethiopia. Edmond J. Keller

Southern Africa in Crisis.

EAST ASIA

The China Consuls: British Consular Officers, 1843-1943. P.D. Coates.

Edgar Snow: A Biography. John Maxwell Hamilton.

Fiji: Opportunity from Adversity? Wolfgang Kasper et al.

If Everybody Bought One Shoe: American Capitalism in Communist China. Graeme Browning.

Last Chance in Manchuria: The Diary of Chang Kia-ngau. Donald G. Gillin and Ramon H. Myers, eds.

The Marcos Dynasty. Sterling Seagrave.

The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness. Peter N. Dale.

Policy Making in China. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg.

LATIN AMERICA

Castro's America Department: Coordinating Cuba's Support for Marxist-Terrorist Violence in the Americas. Rex A. Hudson.

Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru. Edmundo Morales.

El Salvador at War. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, eds.

La Prensa: The Republic of Paper. Jaime Chamorro Cardenal

Papa Doc, Baby Doc. James Ferguson.

What are We Afraid Of? An Assessment of the "Communist Threat" in Central America. John Lamperti.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS
by Adam M. Garfinkle

Mask of Treachery. By John Costello. New York: William Morrow, 1988. 765 pp. $22.95.

Why would an aristocratic Englishman become a Soviet spy? What was the inner psychology of the celebrated art historian Sir Anthony Blunt, one of the "Cambridge four" who fed the Soviets vitally important information from the late 1930s to the early 1950s?

A Cambridge-educated historian, Costello offers a masterful analysis of the relationship between the British ruling class and the agents' underworld. Inspired by self-hatred and cynicism, the Cambridge spies were ideological simpletons with shockingly naive assumptions. For them, the British empire was doomed; the United States had spawned a pragmatic, materialistic, and selfish civilization; the Soviet Union personified the tide of history.

Although infatuated with romantic illusions about Stalinist Russia, the Cambridge spies were certainly not committed Communists. Costello argues that Blunt and his colleagues did not betray their country for the sake of high ideological considerations. Nor was it the future of mankind that they were trying to serve. Treason was, for them, an elitist, condescending, and ultimately narcissistic game. As Costello convincingly writes, they were precisely the "empty political vessels" whom the Soviet recruiters could mold into the perfect spies. Costello's disquieting and pessimistic conclusion is that the careers of Blunt and his Cambridge co-conspirators demonstrate that "the ethics of conspiracy—and the motivations for betrayal—are not merely ideological, but timeless and never-ending." V.T.

Preventing World War III: A Realistic Grand Strategy. By David M. Abshire. New York: Harper and Row, 1989. 320 pp. $19.95.

Abshire reminisces about his service as U.S. ambassador to NATO, discusses NATO, and pleads for a grand strategic outlook. Unfortunately, his personal reminiscences have only minor interest and his review of NATO issues is routine. But the third of these efforts, the presentation of Abshire's ideas about grand strategy—the full deployment of a state's resources and vulnerabilities—does work.

Though his proposals for such a strategy contain few surprises, being small in scope and bureaucratic in nature, they are thoughtful and viable. The author would have Washington beef up deterrence by paying more attention to conventional forces. He calls for greater coordination with allies on such matters as negotiations with the USSR, competition for scarce resources, trade policy, and exploitation of technology. Finally, he proposes the creation of a new White House

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

position, a cabinet-level counselor to the president "responsible for overall strategy," one individual who would coordinate security and economic planning.

Abshire makes a compelling case that America needs an overall conception of its role in the world, a "long-range, integrated strategy." Here lies the real value of *Preventing World War III*—not so much in the specifics of a strategy as in the repeated call for a different (indeed, a more Soviet) way of thinking. Abshire's untiring campaign to get Americans to think on a larger canvas and with a longer vision will probably remain his lasting legacy. D.P.

The State, Conceptual Chaos, and the Future of International Relations Theory. By Yale H. Ferguson and Richard Mansbach. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner, 1989. 127 pp. $16.00.

Ferguson and Mansbach are disturbed by the unreflective and contradictory way the concept of the state is used in international relations theory, and they demonstrate well the perils of employing concepts without defining them or thinking seriously about them. Then, rather than construct a sound concept of the state to replace the chaos, they dismiss the concept altogether as hopelessly normative, and resolve instead to pursue "historically grounded analyses of shifting patterns of authority." Far from dispelling chaos, this pursuit only makes it worse, particularly as it is conducted in the arcane language of international relations theory.

Ferguson and Mansbach are right to criticize the looseness of concepts of the state in international relations theory, but wrong to think that the concept is dispensable; they have prematurely abandoned the effort to refine the notion, and so end up leaving one wilderness only to enter another. Although the authors range farther in their readings and thought than most international relations theorists, it is not far enough. If they had followed some of the authors they cite (such as Clifford Geertz, Hans Kohn, and S.N. Eisenstadt), they would in time have been introduced to some theorists who could shed light on the concept of the state (such as Ernst Cassirer, Michael Walzer, Alfred Schutz, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, and Isaiah Berlin).

The Undeclared Bomb. By Leonard S. Spector. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988. 499 pp. $34.95 ($12.95, paper).

In his fourth study of nuclear proliferation for the Carnegie Endowment, Spector emphasizes a new aspect of the problem: countries that can build nuclear weapons, but do not publicly admit their nuclear capability. The most obvious case of "quiet proliferation" is Israel, but Spector also puts India, Pakistan, and South Africa in this category.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

After his first study, Spector's subsequent works have included material from earlier ones, and this latest volume is no exception; it covers virtually all aspects of the proliferation issue and it includes explicit corrections to Spector's earlier studies. In addition to detailed analyses of the nine countries most likely to acquire nuclear weapons, Spector provides material on delivery systems, the organizations responsible for controlling proliferation, and a primer on the technical requirements for manufacturing nuclear weapons. By drawing on the material made available by Mordechai Vanunu (the Israeli technician who went public), Spector has expanded his earlier chapter on Israel. (Its nuclear arsenal appears to be larger and more advanced than previously thought.) And he has done the same for Pakistan, using material released by the Reagan administration and congressional inquiries into Pakistani efforts to build a nuclear weapon. Thoroughly documented and researched, this book is the standard reference on nuclear proliferation. B.B.

The World Council of Churches and Politics, 1975-1986. By J. A. Emerson Vermaat. Lanham, Md.: Freedom House, 1989. 128 pp. $19.75 ($9.75, paper).

The Geneva-based World Council of Churches (WCC) represents more than 300 non-Catholic Christian denominations and organizations. Since its establishment in 1948, J.A. Emerson Vermaat shows, it has become ever more politicized and left-wing, and especially so in the past fifteen years. While Vermaat is careful to assert that the WCC "is not a Soviet front organization," he does demonstrate in detail how undeniable Soviet Communist party fronts, such as the Christian Peace Conference, have exerted enormous influence over the Council's policies and pronouncements. Vermaat gives us a series of well-researched examples, rich with the WCC's own documents, having to do with the WCC's "selective silence" over human rights violations in the Soviet bloc, the monitoring of human rights in Asia, Central American liberation theology, nuclear disarmament issues, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The only curiosity in an otherwise valuable book is its final few pages, wherein the author makes seven suggestions to the WCC in the interests of its reform toward true balance and objectivity. After describing so many viperous deceits and skulduggeries, how could Vermaat even imagine that the WCC is interested in or capable of balance and objectivity?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WAR STUDIES
by Bruce Berkowitz

NATO's Central Region Forces: Capabilities/Challenges/Concepts. By Anthony H. Cordesman. London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1988. 278 pp. £20.00.

Measuring the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance on the Central Front is a favorite topic of military writers, but Cordesman's solid, professional assessment is the most comprehensive that a private analyst has produced to date.

The capabilities of conventional forces are difficult to assess, as their effectiveness depends on unquantifiable factors such as organization, command skills, logistics, and intangibles like morale and training. Nevertheless, Cordesman captures much of this detail. He first compares NATO and Warsaw Pact forces as a whole, then focuses on the individual NATO members, devoting a chapter to each country. His in-depth analysis includes such details as the age and quality of weapons, the level of readiness, peacetime deployment patterns, and the ability of forces to reach their prepared positions during wartime. Cordesman also analyzes the political and economic factors underlying each country's policies.

Assessments of whether NATO forces are adequate usually contain some subjective judgments, if only because it is impossible to determine just how much risk Warsaw Pact leaders would accept in planning an attack. Cordesman himself is highly critical of the adequacy of NATO forces to carry out their mission, but to his credit, he does not impose this judgment, leaving the reader to draw conclusions based on the material presented.

On the Defensive? The Future of SDI. Edited by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and James A. Schear. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1988. 205 pp. $24.50 ($12.75, paper).

The rough, partisan edges of the "Star Wars" debate have eroded and the issue of strategic defense has become an element within mainstream defense thinking in the United States. That is not what *On the Defensive?* says, but that is what it signifies. Its contributors are all experienced "defense Democrats" and moderate Republicans inclined to see the pernicious side of strategic defense rather than the hopeful potential. But none dismiss the SDI program out of hand as so many did only recently. Nor are the objections presented here dismissive of opposing views; these authors want to reshape SDI, not kill it. Indeed, the central chapter of the book, bearing the signatures of Joseph Nye, William Perry, and Brent Scowcroft, recommends the building of a terminal-phase ballistic-missile testing complex at Kwajalein atoll.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All the chapters get down to specifics and make specific proposals. The redirection of the SDI program presented—toward point defense and away from area defense, toward long-term research and away from grand demonstrations and early deployment, away from boom and bust budget cycles and toward funding stability at moderate levels—is a serious alternative program that cannot be ignored. Nor will it be, for Scowcroft is now the national security adviser. With the debate over strategic defense taking on a constructive new tone, perhaps we will begin to see real progress made on strategic defense during the Bush administration. A.M.G.

The Shield of Faith: The Hidden Struggle for Strategic Defense. By B. Bruce-Briggs. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988. 464 pp. $22.95.

The high profile of the Strategic Defense Initiative has brought forth scores of books about strategic thinking on defenses. Inevitably, some are better than others—better researched, better written, better structured, better tempered. *The Shield of Faith*, unfortunately for the author and any unwitting reader, is possibly the worst book ever written on strategic defense.

Bruce-Briggs has apparently spent much of his adult life in or near the center and center-right think tanks where much of U.S. strategic thinking has been generated during the last forty years. Consequently, instead of analyzing strategic defense, his narrative is little more than institutional gossip—Al Wohlstetter said thus-and-so, Herm Kahn argued that-and-therefore, Dick Foster tried such-and-such—punctuated by attempts to explain the issues and technologies involved. But, while factual errors seem rare, no serious arguments for defensive deployments are mustered and no real analysis emerges. What remains is just the slightly tendentious narrative of a true believer.

Then there are the trifles that make a weak book downright bad. Bruce-Briggs has a maddening habit of writing out acronyms, so that ACDA becomes "ack-dah" and SABMIS becomes the pseudo-Arabic "saahb-miss." Finally, what does one make of the sheer tactlessness of quoting Donald Brennan's 1980 suicide note verbatim and suggesting that frustrations concerning strategic defense motivated his death? A.M.G.

Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective. By Ephraim Kam. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988. 266 pp. $25.00.

Many fine works on strategic surprise have appeared in recent years. Kam accords these works respect, but is not satisfied by them. The failure of intelligence to foresee aggression is a phenomenon with many causes, he argues, and more complicated than other writers have suggested. Choosing eleven examples of strategic surprise

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(from Germany's 1940 invasion of Denmark and Norway to the Egyptian and Syrian attack in 1973 on Israel), Kam sets out to demonstrate this complexity.

While he does not exactly succeed in his ambitious endeavor, neither does he fail. He identifies a number of factors in the intelligence process that can contribute to failure, the three most important being the quality of information about the enemy, erroneous cognitive predispositions, and the interdependence of the intelligence process's various parts. Kam then goes on to insist that the last of these is principally responsible for surprise attacks: when one component of the system fails, the others are likely to suffer as well. Probably so, but Kam does not tell us enough about how this happens to prove the case.

That said, *Surprise Attack* is a thoughtful and well-reasoned contribution. Kam's survey of the literature is edifying and thorough; by itself it is a valuable contribution. Whether the book's strong emphasis on the interdependence thesis is warranted awaits further work.

A.M.G.

The U.S. Intelligence Community. By Jeffrey T. Richelson. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988. 485 pp. $39.95 ($16.95, paper).

Richelson, who has established himself as one of the leading unofficial experts on U.S. intelligence activities, has updated an earlier study to present a comprehensive description of U.S. intelligence organizations and programs. Avoiding most of the controversies concerning intelligence operations, he concentrates instead on providing an objective description of the community and its functions. After an initial description of the structure of the intelligence community and each of the organizations within it, the bulk of the book surveys the community's various programs for the collection and analysis of intelligence data. It concludes with brief discussions of counterintelligence programs, covert action, and intelligence management.

Richelson's data include open-source official material, declassified documents, and leaked material that has been published in the press. The main shortcoming here is that it is impossible to verify the accuracy of material based on unofficial sources—and make no mistake, if something has been leaked, it is in this book. Yet it will surprise more than a few readers to discover just how much unclassified information is available on U.S. intelligence activities, and Richelson's book is a useful compilation.

The U.S. Maritime Strategy. By Norman Friedman. London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1988. 246 pp. $30.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Navy officials, most notably John Lehman, justified the buildup in U.S. naval forces during the 1980s by promoting the Maritime Strategy. Friedman, who has served as a private consultant to the navy and is well-qualified to provide an unofficial but informed explanation of the strategy, argues that the Maritime Strategy supports the U.S. commitment to NATO. Specifically, he says, U.S. naval forces provide high-leverage assistance to NATO by outflanking the Soviets and ensuring control of the seas, which is essential for reinforcing NATO from the United States. After providing this rationale for the strategy, he shows how the navy's planned force levels and weapons systems are derived from the strategy. He also discusses various scenarios to illustrate how the navy might execute the strategy in wartime.

Unfortunately, the controversy over the Maritime Strategy is not whether a 600-ship navy is desirable, but whether it is the best use of our resources, and Friedman does not compare the strategy to other approaches for the defense of NATO. Also, Friedman concentrates only on the Soviet threat, even though other threats requiring different naval forces are becoming increasingly important: witness special operations like the escorting of reflagged tankers in the Persian Gulf. Still, Friedman does provide one of the most thorough explanations and justifications of the strategy to date.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
by Patrick Clawson

A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America. By Carlos Marichal. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989. 273 pp. $45.00 ($16.50, paper).

For 150 years, Latin America has experienced a recurring cycle of debt crises, experiencing crashes in 1825, 1873, 1890, 1931-33, and 1982-84. Marichal's highly readable account of this history, from 1820 through the 1940s, rests on an impressive command of the primary and secondary sources. He convincingly demonstrates the strong similarities among the cycles and the failure of the participants to learn from history. Anyone contemplating lending to Latin America would be well advised to consult this work.

But Marichal's analysis of the causes behind the debt crises will be depressing for friends of Latin America. He systematically downplays responsibility by Latin governments or societies, arguing that the crises have been caused by financial crashes in the money market centers, not by the actions of debtor nations. He further asserts that, "the technicalities of the foreign credit transactions should not ob-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scure the fact that the loans were *political instruments*" (emphasis in the original) rather than economic ones. With that attitude, it is not surprising Marichal barely discusses the uses to which the loan proceeds were put—surely a major factor in explaining why the loans were frequently not repaid in full.

Nor does Marichal make a secret of his preference for non-repayment of debts. The Argentine policy of repaying its debts in full during the late 1930s and 1940s he calls "folly," and he unfavorably contrasts this "sacrifice [of] economic advantages" with the Brazilian policy of refusing to pay. The implication is clear: those who make sacrifices to repay their loans are misguided; repudiation is the best policy. This attitude is not likely to encourage those who contemplate lending to Latin America.

Inflation Stabilization. Edited by Michael Bruno et al. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988. 410 pp. $30.00.

High inflation, sometimes bordering on hyperinflation, has become relatively common in developing countries in the 1980s. In June 1987, a group of distinguished economists assembled to analyze the inflationary experiences of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Israel, and Mexico, and the eight conference papers collected here provide the most complete account to date of these episodes. The volume, accordingly, is the authoritative reference work on high inflation.

The volume's analyses, however, are not as high quality as its descriptions. The basic issue considered by most authors is the relative merit of heterodox and orthodox anti-inflation programs; or, more crudely, of wage-and-price freezes compared to balancing the government budget. Generally, these analyses are too narrowly focused on domestic economic factors to provide a satisfactory account of high inflation's origins and the effects of anti-inflation programs. The authors barely mention sociopolitical factors, such as the character of the government (the transition to democracy, the pressure of upcoming elections, and so on), or the pressures from organized social groups. Nor is much consideration given to the reaction of foreign banks and aid sources. Surely the flows of aid that came after the adoption of stabilization programs in Israel and Bolivia did much to make those programs succeed. Similarly, the effectiveness of the anti-inflation programs in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico was partly a product of their impact on foreign banks, particularly the banks' willingness to provide new loans and demand less debt service.

The Irreversible Crisis. By Paul Sweezy and Harry Magdoff. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988. 76 pp. $4.50 (paper).

Sweezy and Magdoff, the pre-eminent U.S. Marxist economists, have written another short, easy-to-read, and clearly reasoned book

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about U.S. macroeconomic problems. In it they also provide a foundation for the left's program of state intervention. Those who are familiar with that program only in bowdlerized versions—from liberal commentators or the Democratic party—will find it more compelling in the original.

They hold that America has ample investment capital but that those funds go into speculation instead of productive activity. The results are decay in industrial productivity and an economy precariously balanced on top of a spectacularly high debt. The solution is a return to what Keynes advocated in his leftist moods: stimulating investment by state spending and by redistributing income to the poor (which would increase consumption and therefore create demand for new factories to produce the goods consumed).

The Sweezy-Magdoff case for active interventionism cannot be reconciled with the economic facts. Had the United States ample capital and only limited investment opportunities, it would not be borrowing $150 billion a year from foreigners. The unpleasant truth is that any effort to stimulate the U.S. economy through Keynesian government spending would primarily stimulate the East Asian economies that produce those goods. In fact, the main problem facing the United States is not stimulating demand but improving its capacity to supply markets at home and abroad at a reasonable price and with high quality.

Privatization: An Economic Analysis. By John Vickers and George Yarrow. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989. 441 pp. $39.95.

Privatization of state enterprises is a worldwide movement, but England has had the most experience with it under Prime Minister Thatcher. Vickers and Yarrow subject this British experience—especially the privatization of telecommunications, energy, transport, and the water supply—to careful analysis. Their presentation is detailed and authoritative, and their style accessible, although one chapter contains some simple mathematics.

Noting that economists rarely consider the implications of different types of firm ownership, Vickers and Yarrow argue that monitoring by shareholders, and the possibilities of takeover and bankruptcy, make investor-owned firms more efficient than state-owned enterprises. These advantages are greatest where effective (actual or potential) competition prevails, and so the largest efficiency gains from privatization come from the sale of enterprises subject to competition. On this basis, the authors are skeptical about the decision to privatize the water authorities first, rather than industrial firms like British Coal or British Steel.

Obviously, Vickers and Yarrow's focus is on economics, not politics; but their argument that this is the proper focus when consid-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ering privatization is not convincing. They do not consider the direct social advantages of a smaller state, nor the broad sense of economic participation privatization can create. Surely the sale of public housing—one of Britain's most important privatizations and one the authors completely overlook—can be justified by its social and political effects more than by its improvements in the housing stock.

States and Markets. By Susan Strange. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988. 251 pp. $49.95 ($16.95, paper).

Many factors besides the relations among states affect international relations and Strange, well known as a heterodox thinker, has set out to provide a primer on international relations that gives pride of place to these broader factors. She analyzes four "basic structures"—security, production, finance, and knowledge—and four "secondary structures"—transport, trade, energy, and welfare. The concept is stimulating, and the chapters can be thought-provoking. For instance, the effect on international relations of English's role as the *lingua franca* of science, business, and politics here gets the attention it deserves but rarely receives.

On balance, however, the book's concept is not well carried through. Annoyingly, Strange makes sweeping judgments about the validity of competing theories that she barely explains. If she is serious in her stated intention of encouraging unprejudiced thinking, she would be better advised to present alternative theories fairly and in detail, with citations that allow the interested reader to learn more about each viewpoint. Instead, she presents as matters of unquestionable fact such highly contentious propositions as: All forms of the state—democratic, totalitarian, or monarchical—are equally prone to aggression. Finally, she seems unaware of how extensively her viewpoint reflects the fashions of the contemporary British moderate left.

THE UNITED STATES
by Adam M. Garfinkle

An American Vision. Edited by Edward H. Crane and David Boaz. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1989. 358 pp. $26.95 ($15.95, paper). **Mandate for Leadership III: Policy Strategies for the 1990s**. Edited by Charles L. Heatherly and Burton Yale Pines. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1989. 927 pp. $29.95 ($15.95, paper). **Winning America: Ideas and Leadership for the 1990s**. Edited by Marcus Raskin and Chester Hartman. Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1988. 415 pp. $16.00 (paper).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The libertarian Cato Institute and the conservative Heritage Foundation are America's leading pro-capitalist think tanks. And here, from each, is the think-tank equivalent of a party platform. In their economic planks, the platforms show their common capitalist origins, but in their foreign-policy planks they could hardly be more different.

Thus, the Cato volume calls for an end to containment; a "third-zero" treaty removing tactical nuclear weapons from Europe; a withdrawal of troops from South Korea; and a dissolution of the ANZUS Alliance. The Heritage volume demands containment be upgraded to a "liberation doctrine"; the modernization of tactical nuclear forces in Europe; public acknowledgment of the benefits of U.S. bases from South Korean leaders; and a reinvigoration of ANZUS.

Despite this opposition, each volume rests on a valid principle. Cato's authors insist a free government has no mandate in foreign policy to pursue anything but the national security. Heritage authors insist the USSR is the central threat to America's national security, and that the tentacles of Soviet power are derivative threats. Because right-wing isolationists tend to let the first truth obscure the second, while right-wing crusaders tend to reverse the error, these volumes can serve as excellent mutual correctives.

Very different is *Winning America*, a platform from the radical left-wing Institute for Policy Studies that seems to take as its theme a hostility to all forms of self-seeking: personal, economic, and national. IPS and Cato authors might agree on some concrete U.S. pullbacks, but their philosophies differ radically. IPS, for example, proposes replacing the National Security Council with a body that would "develop a long-range national planning process which integrates economic, social, environmental, and military considerations." Nothing could be further from Cato's vision of a *laissez-faire* government whose sole job is guaranteeing national and domestic security.

Roger Donway

The Anxious Years: America in the Vietnam-Watergate Era. By Kim McQuaid. New York: Basic Books, 1989. 368 pp. $19.95.

The Anxious Years is a sometimes beautifully written muddle in four parts. Clearly, the author has a greater gift for language than for research and analysis. The first two sections—"Things Fall Apart" and "Vietnam, Incorporated"—offer stimulating prose but nothing new or solid either in data or interpretation. Part Three, "The New Left and Afterward," is hackneyed, some parts are wrong (McQuaid underestimates the power of the professional left within the antiwar movement), and others exaggerated. Unfortunately, in these sections, McQuaid's sheer joy in language takes him beyond the vivid into mere pyrotechnics, as when he describes the ideological and orga-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nizational incoherence of the New Left as "that of a cauldron into which somebody had thrown an assortment of boa constrictors, rabbits, mice, wolverines, and camels by way of experiment. In other words, it was a howling, thumping, heaving, sad, silly mess." The book's last part, fully half of it, is about Watergate. It reads well but there are few surprises: Archibald Cox is a hero; Richard Nixon and staff are villains.

McQuaid concludes with a short epilogue—"Learning Lessons, Repeating Mistakes"—in which he tries to explain what Vietnam, the antiwar movement, the counterculture, and Watergate had to do with each other and with the politics of the 1980s. But the overstylized prose prevents McQuaid from getting his point across. *The Anxious Years* has its fine moments, just enough of them, perhaps, to be disappointing.

Baby Boomers. By Paul C. Light. New York: W.W. Norton, 1988. 319 pp. $19.95.

The avalanche of books about the sixties and the Vietnam War and its generation continues unabated. *Baby Boomers*, informative but tedious, strings together political science and survey data concerning the attitudes and habits of Americans born after World War II, mainly between 1946 and 1956. Here and there, the reader's tedium is relieved by improbable speculation, such as Light's attempt to infer the sociopolitical effects of crowding from the behavior of Stickleback fish and other fauna. Nevertheless, the book's conclusion is sensible: baby-boomers are as diverse as other generations, and the sociological effect of their passage through society is likely to be more profound than any near-term political effect.

With regard to foreign policy and security issues, Light finds no basis for concluding that Baby Boomers are either more isolationist or more conservative than any other generation. They are, however, more suspicious of government intentions and capabilities. How this disbelief in the efficacy of government will play itself out is unclear, but it is worth pondering at the very least. Light sets us on the right path to do so.

Men of Zeal: A Candid Inside Story of the Iran-Contra Hearings. By William S. Cohen and George J. Mitchell. New York: Viking, 1988. 350 pp. $19.95.

It is difficult to think of a recent event that damaged the public standing of Congress more than the Iran-Contra hearings. What is often overlooked, however, is that the investigation did finally succeed in its mission—documenting the abuses of Oliver North, John Poindexter, and company. Senators Cohen and Mitchell, who played key roles in the investigation, explain this paradox by providing a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

chronological account of the hearings. They recount the political maneuvering of witnesses, defense attorneys, legislators of both parties, and the White House. They then give a senator's-eye-view of each witness testifying.

The two senators openly acknowledge that Congress suffered as a result of the hearings and analyze why. Looking back, Cohen and Mitchell conclude that the investigators were outmaneuvered by the defense attorneys and failed to appreciate how television would favor North. They also believe that party politics made an effective investigation difficult at best. The senators' account is surprisingly frank for two incumbents—they spare no one, including themselves—and it is extremely well-written. If Congress is ever required to carry out such an investigation in the future, the legislators will have to read this post-mortem. B.B.

1968 in America. By Charles Kaiser. New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988. 306 pp. $19.95.

Kaiser says he wanted to write a book that would read like living in 1968 felt. The pity is that he has succeeded. *1968 in America* gives rock music and the preferred drug of the day about as much attention as assassinations and the Vietnam War. At one point the author spends nearly two pages just listing rock 'n' roll acts from the period.

Kaiser's thinking is also like the era's—disorganized and casual. He effuses the idealistic and radical impulses of 1968, generally without arguing for or against their efficacy or desirability. Judgments are many and easy: for example, he gratuitously concludes that the duck-and-cover drills of the 1950s and the Cuban Missile Crisis hastened the revolt against authority by convincing children that their parents could not protect them from harm and were therefore incompetent.

For most of those older than the "generation of 1968," this book will evoke the emetic reaction that the period did. For those of the generation, it is redundant. For those younger, it will indeed convey the flavor of the times, for better or for worse.

Special Relationships: A Foreign Correspondent's Memoirs from Roosevelt to Reagan. By Henry Brandon. New York: Atheneum, 1989. 436 pp. $24.95.

Henry Brandon was *The Times* Washington correspondent from 1949 until 1983. In that capacity, he probably spent more time with American and foreign heads of state, ministers, and movers and shakers than any other journalist of this century. *Special Relationships* is a hybrid narrative—made up partly of historical and political observations and partly of political portraits, the latter featuring Dean Acheson, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Rich-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan. At times, the two aspects of narrative mix masterfully, as when Brandon describes a luncheon he set up in 1971 during which Henry Kissinger and Isaiah Berlin met for the first time.

Beyond such precious vignettes, *Special Relations* is wise, but not in a showy way. It must be admitted, however, that there is little of Tocqueville's incisiveness from this Czech-born subject of the United Kingdom. Rather, the book's wisdom rests in its accumulation of discrete observations and judgments. To readers without considerable background in postwar politics, Brandon's narrative may thus seem fascinating but splotchy. To closer observers of international politics, the depth of Brandon's experience and his direct style will make *Special Relationships* an unusually informative and enjoyable experience.

EUROPE
by Vladimir Tismaneanu

Autobiography: Exile's Odyssey (Volume II: 1937-1960). By Mircea Eliade. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988. 224 pp. $19.95.

When Eliade died in 1986, in Chicago, he was one of the world's most renowned historians of religion. Few of his readers knew that he had started his career in the 1930s as the *enfant terrible* of the Romanian intelligentsia.

This illuminating collection of reflections and autobiographical details offers information about Eliade's fascination with the social doctrine of the Romanian far right and corrects widespread misconceptions about his involvement in the activities of the Iron Guard. In particular, it shows that Eliade shared with many others of his generation a disgust for the corrupt Romanian parliamentary system, and yearned for new communitarian forms. But Eliade was never a proponent of Romanian fascism, and viscerally opposed anti-Semitism. Undoubtedly, his moral idealism blinded him to the demagogical uses of the Iron Guard's mystical exaltation of the nation. Much later in this autobiography, the author painstakingly tries to come to terms with his own contradictory past. No less instructive are Eliade's notes on the tragedy of East European exiles—their efforts to overcome uprootedness and their refusal to be paralyzed by despair.

Central and Eastern Europe: The Opening Curtain. Edited by William E. Griffith. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989. An East-West Forum Publication. 438 pp. $38.50 ($17.95, paper).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In his seminal introduction to this collection of essays by highly respected scholars of East-Central European issues, Griffith points to the global context of the discussion. Gorbachev's reforms, he believes, will affect the region to a far greater extent than Khrushchev's. If Griffith is right, we can expect major convulsions and fundamental changes in this traditionally trouble-ridden area.

Consequently, Michael Mandelbaum indicates, new opportunities exist for an active U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe. Although he knows the West cannot impose dramatic change, it can influence the growth of Western-style social forms, which have re-emerged in Eastern Europe in recent years. Mark Palmer, U.S. ambassador to Hungary, clearly formulates the objective of Western policy in the region: to enable the East European countries to recover their historical heritage and European identity. Other interesting studies deal with the German question, the revival of civil society in Eastern Europe, the lessons of the Hungarian reformist experiment, and the implications of *perestroika* for the redefinition of power relations in the heart of Europe.

The Jews in Polish Culture. By Aleksander Hertz. Translated by Richard Lourie. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1988. 266 pp. $32.95 ($14.95, paper).

Why are the Jews eternally cast as Europe's scapegoat? For East European societies, Hertz finds the answer in Jewish nonconformism, including the tendency to join idealistic and radical movements opposed to the status quo. For Hertz—a sociologist and an observer of human psychology who left Poland in 1939 and moved to America, where he remained until his death in 1983—relations between Poles and Jews cannot be understood without reference to the special status of the Jewish "caste" in the broader Polish social constellation. Paradoxically, the creation of this caste represented a Jewish integration into—not a withdrawal from—Poland's thoroughly stratified society. Eventually, however, various forms of dissent from caste norms, including assimilationist strategies, worked to weaken the protective shell built up over the centuries. The rise of secular movements and ideologies, especially militant nationalism and revolutionary socialism, accelerated the decline of traditional social bonds and unleashed mob instincts. In an age of collective phobias, Jews—stripped of their special, traditionally tolerated status in Polish society—could be construed as the enemy and the cause of many of the evils that befell the beleaguered Polish community.

Hertz's trail-blazing essay dissolves comfortable stereotypes and insists on the Jewish legacy to Polish culture. Lourie has done a major service in skillfully translating Hertz's classic analysis; students of both

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Polish and Jewish history will benefit greatly from this melancholy sociology.

Prelude to Solidarity: Poland and the Politics of the Gierek Regime. By Keith John Lepak. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. 271 pp. $35.00.

The regime of Edward Gierek (1970-1980) personified pretense, deception, and ineptitude. Gierek's own technocratic euphoria epitomized an attempt to muddle through without altering the political system, ignoring the crisis ahead. It was a short-lived triumph of bureaucratic illusion over democratic common sense.

Lepak thoughtfully investigates Gierek's overly ambitious economic projects, political braggadocio, and social insouciance. He argues convincingly that Gierek's mismanagement of the Polish economy during the 1970s resulted in the emergence of Solidarity. Further, the economic and political errors of that decade engendered a deterioration in the Communist party's authority and in the regime's legitimacy, resulting in the strikes of August 1980, Gierek's ouster, and the historical agreements legalizing Solidarity.

Lepak links the qualities of the Gierek regime to presumed invariants in Polish political culture, including the inadequate handling of modernization processes and statist paternalism. One wonders, however, whether that regime's main shortcoming was not simply its own stubborn belief in tinkering with the system and its failure to articulate a strategy of genuine reforms.

Towards a Radical Democracy: The Political Economy of the Budapest School. By Douglas M. Brown. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988. 226 pp. $39.95.

The Budapest School is a neo-Marxist approach to philosophy whose major exponents have courageously criticized Soviet-type regimes as dictatorial experiments in pseudo-rational social engineering. Because they are engaged in heresy, some of the Budapest theorists have been expelled from Hungary and live in the West. Others have joined the Hungarian democratic opposition and are engaged in political activism.

Brown does not see the Budapest School as homogeneous, but as a group sharing a common approach to the issues of man, society, and the economy. For example, Budapest philosophers tend to favor a mixed economy, characterized by both planning and markets, and by mixed forms of property ownership. In the political realm, they challenge traditional Marxism and advocate radical democracy, although their image of this ideal order remains quite nebulous. Brown's analysis does not clarify what solutions this neo-Marxist ap-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proach would offer for the current ailments of the communist societies.

In recent years, many of the Budapest School's intellectuals have abandoned their Marxist conceptual blinders. Without fully identifying themselves with Western liberalism, they have come to see centrally planned systems as intrinsically inimical to human freedom. Surprisingly, and unfortunately, Brown does not focus on this most gripping part of the Budapest School's intellectual adventure.

With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism. By Ivo Banac. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988. 294 pp. $32.50.

The Cominformists represented the most radically pro-Soviet wing of the Yugoslav Communist party—those for whom Moscow was the Mecca of world communism. Because of their beliefs, they suffered immensely in the wake of Tito's break with Stalin in 1948. Many were executed, tortured, or deported to the notorious Goli Otok concentration camp. Although they were certainly manipulated by Stalin, the Cominformists were nevertheless an organic outgrowth of Yugoslav communist traditions and mentalities.

Relying on excellent documentation and archival research, Banac reveals the powerful intra-party opposition to Tito's break with Moscow. Recently published statistics, he shows, prove the Cominformists were more than a fringe formation; they represented a significant section of the Yugoslav party, perhaps as a much as a fifth of its membership. And to this day Cominformist zealots have not abandoned their dream of seizing power, although they are now a tiny sect with no mass appeal and without international backing. Banac rightly concludes that Gorbachev's *perestroika* in international relations "may sound the death knell of the old cause." *With Stalin against Tito* is a badly needed investigation of an obscure but historically significant episode in the history of East European communism.

THE SOVIET UNION
by Nicolai N. Petro

The Children of the Arbat. By Anatoly Rybakov. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1988. 685 pp. $19.95.

This novel stands out as a fictional biography of Stalin and as a symbol of the Gorbachev era. In the novel, the general secretary resents the Leningrad party boss, Kirov, who possesses an appealing personality and genuine popularity. Indeed, the root of Stalin's hyper-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

suspiciousness is that he feels his power is insecure as long as others can express their views. Thus, the fate of Stalin's underlings—and it seems Kirov was a loyal one—is sealed by the dictator's pathological mistrust of independent thought. *The Children of Arbat* succeeds most convincingly when, in this manner, it attempts to penetrate Stalin's mind, full of resentful fantasies, a painful inferiority complex, and an indomitable lust for absolute power.

Politically, Rybakov is less penetrating. For example, like Gorbachev, he idealizes the "iron phalanx of Old Bolsheviks" and does not see the roots of Stalinism in the totalitarian features of Leninism. Also like Gorbachev, his character Kirov even distinguishes between the good and bad elements of Stalinism: "it was impossible to come out against Stalin. That was the tragedy of it all. His line was correct, but his methods were unacceptable." (This remark anticipates Gorbachev's statements at the seventieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution.)

In sum, while Rybakov's work seems likely to endure as an insightful exploration of Stalin's strange mental universe, as a political document, it represents the limited expression of its day. V.T.

Gorbachev and the Soviet Future. Edited by Lawrence W. Lerner and Donald W. Treadgold. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988. 284 pp. $43.50.

Lerner and Treadgold's volume ventures further into the area of prediction than most studies on the Soviet Union. In the main, contributors to the volume believe that Gorbachev has hung on long enough to become a fixture of Soviet politics, and consequently they tend toward cautious optimism that he will remain and continue to pursue reform. In addition, the editors have devoted considerable attention to the evolution of Soviet foreign policy toward regional issues.

Among many worthwhile chapters, one that stands out is Sergei Zamascikov's provocative argument that the Soviet military establishment, far from being ready to challenge Gorbachev, is actually benefiting from perestroika, and is likely to support it in the future. But the editors are to be especially commended for including two topics often overlooked in such anthologies yet essential to the long-term prospects of restructuring society and social values: religion and literature. The chapters by Dmitrii Pospielovsky and Geoffrey Hosking, respectively, illustrate the deeper socio-ethical tensions in a society pushing for change beyond the constraints of official policy. Not all the conclusions of the authors will stand up to the scrutiny of history, but they provide a useful benchmark for future judgment.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Is Russia Reformable? By Robert V. Daniels. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988. 141 pp. $28.95.

Many are asking whether Gorbachev's reforms constitute a significant change in the Soviet system. The deeper question is whether serious reform is possible. Daniels's thesis is that Gorbachev has indeed embarked upon serious reforms, but that he may be unable to overcome the nation's cultural heritage, which Daniels describes as xenophobic, authoritarian, and backward. What little of value Daniels finds in Russian political culture, he ascribes entirely to Western influences absorbed by the intelligentsia. Thus, the only hope for pluralism, he believes, lies in an alliance between the country's political leadership and its westernized intelligentsia.

While few would dispute the burden of autocratic tradition, Daniels's unrelenting emphasis on it turns his analysis into caricature: a Russian history of "good guys" (modernizers and anything "western," including socialism, which has simply been abused by "backward" Russians) and "bad guys" (those tied to the "nationalistic urges of Russian political culture"). This view leads the author to make exaggerated generalizations about the population's opposition to reforms, and causes him to miss the extent to which the impetus for current reform comes from the population at large, and specifically, from their search for values rooted in history and tradition. His thesis flies in the face of the evidence: the first contested elections in seventy years showed widespread support for more radical reforms than party reformers are now proposing.

The Jews of the Soviet Union: The History of a National Minority. By Benjamin Pinkus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 397 pp. $39.50.

Weaving together the "internal" perspective of the Soviet Jewish community and the "external" perspective of the ruling Soviet majority, Pinkus provides an in-depth chronicle of Soviet Jewry. The author has done yeoman's work in confronting a paucity of reliable sources and ferreting out all that is available. He divides the travail of Soviet Jewry into three periods: years of construction, 1917-1939; years of destruction, 1939-1953; and the post-Stalin period, 1953-1983. Within these eras, he looks at many levels of activity, including politics, law, culture, and the arts. Further, he examines the Jewish question not only as a part of the USSR's nationalities issue in general, but also as a unique case—unique because of the historical Jewish role in Russia's relations to the West; because of the Jewish role in the party; and because of all the USSR's minorities, Jews are the only one intermingled with Russians in the main centers of culture and politics in European Russia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The book does have limitations. It is more a documentary than an interpretive history, and it seems almost an afterthought when Pinkus offers his brief schema for understanding the processes of acculturation, assimilation, absorption, and revival of Soviet Jewry that he takes such pains to describe. The writing and editing also fall short: obscure phrases, missing commas, and misspellings mar the text. Despite such weaknesses, however, this is surely the most scholarly, detailed, authoritative, and valuable treasury of information on its subject ever to appear in English. Perhaps it will establish the foundation for more imaginative successors. A.M.G.

Politics, Society, and Nationality inside Gorbachev's Russia. Edited by Seweryn Bialer. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1989. 255 pp. $25.00.

The contributors to this volume, all noted scholars, assess how perestroika has affected Soviet society in four areas: political institutions, society, political culture, and nationalism. Peter Hauslohner argues persuasively that the groundwork for the current reforms had been prepared before Gorbachev, but places too much responsibility for the lingering aspects of Stalinism on the "personal conservatism" and "idiosyncratic biases" of the Brezhnev generation. Bialer gives a succinct, if somewhat premature, obituary of Boris Yeltsin's political career; and in his concluding essay, the editor dissects the decisions of the XIXth Party Conference, looking at their likely impact on society. Gail Lapidus points to the erosion of public confidence in the party and concludes that, for the first time, Soviet society has emerged as a major actor on the Soviet political stage.

Alexander Motyl and Laurie Salitan address nationalities issues in their two essays. Unfortunately, these do not do justice to the importance of the subject, and contribute little to what is already known. The five essays on political change offer valuable and often highly original interpretations which deserve further elaboration in separate books.

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev. Edited by Martin McCauley. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 247 pp. $39.95 ($14.95, paper). **The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: Prospects for Reform**. Edited by David A. Dyker. London: Croom Helm, 1987. 227 pp. $35.00. **Gorbachev's Reforms: U.S. and Japanese Assessments**. Edited by Peter Juviler et al. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1988. 178 pp. $36.95 ($14.95, paper).

These three books offer the views of leading West European, British, and Japanese scholars (as well as a handful of Americans) on the problems facing Gorbachev and his chances for overcoming them. McCauley's volume offered an early attempt to chart the difficulties

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Gorbachev faced. While the contributions are not up-to-date, they illustrate how perestroika has moved at different rates in different areas. Glasnost has made great strides; legal reforms and personnel changes have given Gorbachev more or less what he wants; and significant initiatives have emerged in foreign policy and the military. By contrast, economic policy, agriculture, and foreign-trade initiatives still seem hopelessly bogged down.

The contributors to Dyker's book are all pessimistic about the prospects for reform. They stress the similarity of new thinking and perestroika with previous initiatives, and note the leadership's unwillingness to challenge fundamental assumptions. This critique is noteworthy because it deals less with the personality of Gorbachev and more with institutional and historical constraints on reform.

The final volume offers a rare glimpse into Japanese scholarship on the Soviet Union. While the contributors are generally cautious about the prospects for reform in economics and foreign policy, they are sanguine about the awakening of intellectual freedom in the Soviet Union.

In all, one is struck by how similar these assessments are to their American counterparts. British authors are generally less optimistic about the prospects for reform, but Archie Brown of Oxford is a dissenter here. It is also striking that foreign analysts place less emphasis on the personality and charisma of Gorbachev than do some of their American colleagues. Rather, the emphasis here tends toward the burden of Soviet history, ideology, and institutions. From this perspective, the prospects for serious reform of the Soviet system do appear considerably bleaker.

THE MIDDLE EAST
by Daniel Pipes

The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa. Edited by Trevor Mostyn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 504 pp. $39.50.

An encyclopedia this is not. The pictures dazzle and the production is lavish, but the fact is, Mostyn and his team of mostly British specialists have compiled what amounts to an introductory volume on the Middle East. The Cambridge Encyclopedia will suit journalists or students in search of quick information; but anyone with a more serious or sustained interest in the area will find the volume too rudimentary.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Perhaps most surprising is the method of presentation, which does not follow standard encyclopedia format (alphabetical listing by topic) but consists of chapters. The result is a narrative, not a reference book, leading to some oddities. The volume includes chapters on chemistry and alchemy, on Israeli theater and cinema, and on solar energy. But Islam is covered in just two chapters and the region's entire 5,000-year history receives just eight. Then, because of the peculiar conceptualization and arrangement, many important matters are simply absent. A search through the index found this random list of topics missing: the Dome of the Rock, Jalal ad-Din Rumi, Marrakesh, Lake Van, Edmund Allenby, King Faysal of Iraq, the Biltmore Program, Nagib Nahfouz, and 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. There are other lacunae too: the listing of "peoples without a country" omits Berbers; tourism does not merit a mention; and so forth.

Obviously, The Cambridge Encyclopedia hardly subsititutes for the massive *Encyclopedia of Islam*, but it also rates poorly when compared with the modest but indispensable 1974 *Political Dictionary of the Middle East in the 20th Century* (edited by Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine).

Colonising Egypt. By Timothy Mitchell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 218 pp. $42.50.

Mitchell, a professor of politics at New York University, has written an astonishing book. He provides an interpretation of the colonial process by drawing on wide readings of nineteenth century observers (including Lord Cromer, Gustave le Bon, Husayn al-Marsafi, and 'Ali Mubarak) and contemporary French theorists (especially Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault). The result is a subtle, almost elusive thesis which boils down to this: the European act of subjugating Egypt entailed the imposition of a similar but wholly alien order on virtually every aspect of Egyptian life—from the reordering of the village house to the philosophy of education. If there was one element common to all these efforts, it was the Europeans' creation of external forms, frames in which to place native life, thereby neutralizing, even ridiculing it, and draining it of power.

Mitchell's effort at a theoretical construct is brilliant and his details are fascinating (especially the specific examples brought to light from the remoteness of a century ago, such as his descriptions of the 1889 Exposition Universelle in Paris and the Lancaster method of teaching). But his effort is deeply wrong-headed, even perverse. Take the matter of Egyptians refusing to adopt the printing press until the nineteenth century. Mitchell dismisses the usual explanation, obscurantism and preservation of power. Instead, he recalls the high Muslim practice of text recitation and explication, then argues that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this tradition made the prospect of uncontrolled publishing anathema to the scholars. Mitchell's is a brave attempt, but he fails on two counts. First, he has done no more than specify the reasons for obscurantism; second, not every piece of writing is a "text" requiring explanation and not all opposition came from scholars; the opposition to printing had far deeper and wider roots than Mitchell allows.

For all its faults (and there are many, including the maddening and wholly unnecessary use of the first-person pronoun once a page), *Colonising Egypt* presents a new approach to the interpretation of modern Middle East history. More importantly it calls for a response.

The Emergence of the South Lebanon Security Belt: Major Saad Haddad and the Ties with Israel, 1975-1978. By Beate Hamizrachi. New York: Praeger, 1988. 211 pp. $42.95.

Following a PLO terrorist attack in 1978, Israeli forces carried out Operation Litani, an invasion of southern Lebanon up to the Litani River. After American pressure forced their withdrawal, the Israelis sustained a force there commanded by their ally in the region, a maverick Lebanese major named Sa'd Haddad. Using Haddad as a symbol of Israel's concerns in Lebanon, Hamizrachi reviews Israeli-Lebanese security relations in detail from the birth of Israel to the dénouement of Operation Litani, and shows how post-1982 border arrangements were presaged by the Israel-Haddad relationship.

Hamizrachi covers this heretofore obscure topic as few could. Over the years, she has specialized in Israeli-Lebanese relations, often focusing on Haddad himself. (He died of cancer in 1984.) Seven of her twenty chapters bring the story to the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975-76; the rest, save the conclusion, chronicle events up through Operation Litani and its immediate aftermath.

But though security relations form Hamizrachi's ostensible narrative, her book is really about Israel's involvement in Lebanese politics and political realities in southern Lebanon before Israel's 1982 invasion. Hamizrachi does not say "I told you so" but, clearly, if the architects of Israel's 1982 war had known half of what she knew about South Lebanon, Israel's pain there might have been avoided. At any rate, from now on, scholars doing serious research on the 1982 Lebanese War cannot pretend to lack a pre-history deserving of attention. A.M.G.

Israel's Fateful Hour. By Yehoshafat Harkabi. Translated by Lenn Schramm. New York: Harper and Row, 1988. 256 pp. $22.50.

Harkabi, a retired Israeli general, launches this cry from the heart with an unusual statement. "I accept the democratic right of the Jews in Israel to commit national suicide and, if that happens, I will be with them. But it is my duty, and the duty of others with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

similar views, to warn them against such a course." And what are those views? That Israeli forces withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in conjunction with Jordan be permitted to take their place.

The author makes a compelling case for military withdrawal. His analysis of demographic trends punctures for all time the wishful thinking that imagines Israel can somehow incorporate the West Bank without major adverse consequence. But the next step, advocating a deal with the PLO, takes Harkabi onto shaky ground. Indeed, he reaches this conclusion through a series of erroneous analyses that are all the more egregious (and consequential) given the author's standing as perhaps the pre-eminent interpreter of Arab attitudes toward Israel.

One mistake stands out—Harkabi's view that the PLO is the one Arab party "directly involved in the conflict." What about the governments of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria? Harkabi gives Jordanian interests in the West Bank short shrift, while Syrian ambitions receive not a mention. Yet the involvement of Arab states cannot be ignored. Israelis cannot simply come to terms with the PLO; they also have to defang the neighboring regimes.

The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement. By Philip Mattar. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. 158 pp. $25.00.

Mattar, executive director of the Institute for Palestine Studies, looks back at Amin al-Husayni (1895-1974), the leading Palestinian politician in 1921-1949, the way a Gorbachev-style Communist looks at Stalin. In each case, the latter-day sophisticate finds much to criticize in the crude efforts of the earlier leader; at the same time, a commonality of purpose softens a tough assessment, rendering the effort fundamentally sympathic. The most egregious instance of this transcendence is the frontispiece, a tender oil painting of Husayni rendered by the author's brother.

This dubious ideological premise notwithstanding, Mattar has done solid research and boiled it down into a readable and informative account. He sees Husayni's career dividing into two distinct phases: the Palestine phase (1917-1936), marked by caution and cooperation with the British authorities; and the exile phase (after 1936), marked by "bitterness, inflexibility, and political alliances of dubious value." Mattar then argues that Husayni was too much the accommodating politician during the first phase, too much the extremist ideologue in the second—and that both these errors "contributed to the ultimate defeat of the Palestinians." Mattar's critical biography suggests that the Palestinian establishment is finally willing publicly to hold its founder to account for getting it on the wrong track. As

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the corresponding Soviet debate about history, this may portend a more honest and realistic policy in the future.

The Palestinian Entity, 1959-1974: Arab Politics and the PLO. By Moshe Shemesh. London: Frank Cass, 1988. 401 pp. $55.00.

Continuing the Israeli tradition of painstaking and thoroughly apolitical scholarship on the Palestinians, Shemesh has written an absorbingly thorough account of the Palestinian issue in Arab politics. He begins with the launching of the issue by Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir (Nasser) at a meeting of the Arab League in March 1959, and concludes with the Rabat summit of Arab leaders in October 1974, when the PLO was recognized as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."

Shemesh's wonderfully detailed account keeps closely to the subject of inter-Arab diplomacy; anything else (the Six-Day War, the role of the United States) is dispatched in a few lines. This approach permits the author to provide a quasi-encyclopedic rendering of the topic. Further, the extensive use of Arabic newspapers and documents (including those captured by the Israelis) gives the account an impressively deep mooring.

While Shemesh abstains from drawing conclusions, the one that fairly leaps from his pages is the degree to which the Palestinian national movement in general and the PLO in particular were creatures of the Arab states. And while both have obviously acquired a momentum of their own over the course of three decades, it remains possible, even likely, that the Arab states will decide one day to take back what they once gave—at which point the Arab-Israeli conflict will lose the communal features of recent years.

The Politics of Provocation: Participation and Protest in Israel. By Gadi Wolfsfeld. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988. 210 pp. $14.95.

Israel's political culture is not as participatory as outsiders often think. For example, because Knesset members do not represent geographic districts, they tend to be less accessible than American congressmen. Israelis are surprisingly cynical about their influence on government—no small danger for a country whose security depends on a sense of community.

Recently, however, an upsurge in extra-parliamentary activities has reasserted the rights of participation. The question is: can Israeli institutions assimilate this upsurge, or will the upsurge weaken the institutions? Wolfsfeld deals with the net trajectory of all this. Relying on attitudinal research, he examines political mobilization in Israel, paying particular attention to the current extra-parliamentary outlets. Unfortunately, he also has rather pedantic academic aims that will

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alienate all but the boldest general reader. Even the boldest may yawn at his two principal conclusions: that individuals develop a more complex and rational strategy of political participation than heretofore assumed; and that the affinity between institutionalized and extra-parliamentary political participation is less sharp than recent theory has suggested. It is a shame such esoterica will put off so many readers, for Wolfsfeld has much of interest and importance to say about Israeli political culture. A.M.G.

The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years. By Efraim Karsh. Chatham House Papers. New York: Routledge, 1988. 127 pp. $14.95.

Karsh notes the mistrust that characterized Soviet-Syrian relations when Hafiz al-Asad first came to power in November 1970, then asks how the two states went on to develop what has been the USSR's "most enduring and uninterrupted tie" in the Middle East. The not-very-surprising answer lies in a network of "mutually beneficial strategic interdependence" between the two states.

The strength of Karsh's effort lies in his precise and excellent account of that interdependence and how it changed over a period of nearly two decades. He sees Sadat's trip to Jerusalem as a decisive event: before November 1977, Asad had the stronger hand; thereafter the Soviets did. The weakness of his book lies in a very fundamental and surprising misreading of Soviet interests in the Middle East. Against all evidence, Karsh assumes that Moscow seeks "the attainment and preservation of stability" in that region. He reaches this conclusion by supposing that the Soviets want in the Middle East what they have attained in Eastern Europe, "a stable and safe frontier in order to minimize potential threats." But this premise errs in two ways: neither Syria nor any other Arab country has ever posed a threat to Russia, as have France and Germany, nor are they likely to. And, being separated from Soviet territory by Turkey and Iran, they are far from being contiguous. Had Karsh assumed more aggressive Soviet intentions, he would have been on much safer ground analytically, and his fine study would have achieved its potential.

AFRICA
by Michael Radu

Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda. By Mzala. London: Zed Books, 1988. 240 pp. $49.95 ($15.00, paper).

Chief Buthelezi is a major hope for all those who want South Africa to become a multi-racial democracy and to avoid a racial war. Conversely, Buthelezi is an obstacle for those such as the pseudon-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ymous "Mzala" who pursue violent social change, for he is a leader of both the most numerous black people in the country (the Zulus) and the largest non-Marxist, non-violent, anti-apartheid organization (Inkatha).

A radical young ideologue from the African National Congress (ANC), Mzala tries to discredit Buthelezi and what he stands for. Mzala rejects, erroneously, the Buthelezi clan's claim to be principal advisers of the (nominal) Zulu kings. Predictably, he also overlooks the deep resentment many Zulus feel toward the Xhosa-controlled ANC. In fact, Mzala even tries to prove that Inkatha owes its existence to the ANC.

Most of the book contains what one expects from the pen of a Marxist-Leninist propagandist. Buthelezi's attempt to empower blacks through economic means is excoriated as a plot to maintain "the system," and non-violence as a sell-out of black interests. Inkatha's attempts to reach a power-sharing accord in Natal are rejected as class betrayal. In sum, this book provides a far clearer picture of Mzala's—and the ANC's—totalitarian, anti-capitalist, and anti-democratic mentality, than it does of Chief Buthelezi.

The National Question in South Africa. Edited by Maria van Diepen. London: Zed Books, 1988. 154 pp. $49.95 ($15.00, paper).

Leading ideologues from the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist party (SACP) have combined to provide a glimpse of South Africa as it might appear under ANC rule. Viewed from this perspective, the chapters by ANC leaders such as Pallo Jordan, Francis Melli, "Comrade Mzala" (a pseudonym), and Esop Pahad, and by SACP chairman Joe Slovo, are enlightening indeed. As used by these writers, "the national question" refers to the role of ethnicity and race in South Africa's predicament; it is highly revealing that the ANC should choose a Marxist-Leninist vocabulary and framework to address this crucial issue.

The contributors' analyses of "the national question" eerily echo the thought of Lenin—and, less openly, of Stalin. For example, Mzala adopts the Stalinist thesis that only a revolution led by the working class can end the present national and racial divisions in South Africa. Francis Melli, publisher of the ANC's journal *Sechaba*, distinguishes between the "democratic" nationalism of the blacks of South Africa, and the "reactionary" variety of the Afrikaners, then rejects any form of power-sharing with the present regime or with the ANC's black competitors, since both are "racists." Fine scholastic distinctions aside, the contributors' opinions are all attempts to rejuvenate the old Stalinist line on the "nationality question." The Soviets, by contrast, are now more willing to allow that nationalism is not necessarily "reactionary"; the ideologues of the ANC are not willing to make such a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concession. The results of those old debates could best be described by Ukrainians, Tartars, Balts, and other Soviet minorities.

Psychoses of Power: African Personal Dictatorships. By Samuel Decalo. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989. 222 pp. $29.95.

Though less notorious than Stalin, Hitler, or Pol Pot, Equatorial Guinea's Macias Nguema, the Central African Empire's Jean-Bedel Bokassa, and Uganda's Idi Amin Dada have earned their places in the canon of homicidal chiefs of state. In fact, on a per capita basis, Nguema's reign (1969-1979) may have been the most savage of our violent century: half of his country's population was killed or forced into exile. Bokassa and Amin Dada both engaged in ritualistic cannibalism.

Such facts, as well as insights into the morbid mentality of these three leaders, provide the main topic of Decalo's excellent volume. The author contends, however, that explanations for such monsters should be sought in the dark wells of personal background, rather than in traditional African political culture. But consider: Macias Nguema could only be executed by a Moroccan firing squad, because the people of Equatorial Guinea did not believe bullets could kill such a powerful voodoo magician. Similarly, neither Bokassa nor Amin were overthrown by their own citizens; their removal from power required foreign arms (French and Tanzanian, respectively). Moreover, many other African dictators are guilty of murder and social destruction, including Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, who has killed many more than Macias Nguema and Amin together. Important as Decalo's volume is, therefore, it makes too much of the personal backgrounds of these three killers, and too little of the political culture in which they operated and which ultimately made them possible.

The Red Orchestra: The Case of Africa. Edited by Dennis Bark. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1988. 231 pp. $15.95 ($12.95, paper).

Soviet policy toward sub-Saharan Africa has changed in recent years, as power projection has given way to economic retrenchment and diplomatic accommodation. These developments make Bark's volume especially welcome, for it offers real insight into Gorbachev's perspectives on Africa. Beware, however: this collection is for the specialist, and anyone seeking an introductory overview should turn elsewhere.

Red Orchestra treats most aspects of Soviet-African relations in depth, with a few exceptions—notably Soviet aid, trade, and United Nations diplomacy. And while some of the topics dealt with are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

treated no less effectively elsewhere, others (such as Soviet-Zairian relations) represent entries into virgin territory.

Nonetheless, a few minor errors must be mentioned. First, the four co-authors of the introduction incorrectly assert that the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms agreement of 1955 was Moscow's first use of proxies in the Third World. What of Czechoslovakia's arms shipments to Israel in 1948? Second, William Pascoe's account of the Cuban military role in Angola includes a confused chronology and unreliable statistics, (although these are corrected in a chapter by Alexander Alexiev). Finally, Colin Legum's commentary on the South African Communist party misidentifies Joe Slovo's leadership posts.

Arthur Jay Klinghoffer

Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic. By Edmond J. Keller. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. 307 pp. $35.00.

Developments in Ethiopia since the "creeping coup" of 1974 show striking similarities to developments in post-1917 Russia. In both cases, the setting was a multinational empire with boundaries set by centuries of conquest, not by national identification. In both cases, the revolution employed terror and state-engineered famine, quasi-genocidal treatment of ethnic minorities, and the destruction of the Christian Church as a symbol of national identity and tradition.

Though better than many books on Ethiopia, Keller's fails to examine these phenomena sufficiently. He does acknowledge that the "socialist" revolution in Addis Ababa was introduced not only "from above" but also "through the back door" (initially under nationalist disguises), and that neither the famine nor the drought of 1984-86 was an accident of nature. On the other hand, he treats the regime's policies of "villagization" and resettlement as if they were economically motivated, when they were actually driven by political needs.

Keller's most important insight is that the massive use of state-sponsored terror in Ethiopia results from the regime's lack of institutionalization, legitimacy, or popular support. Unfortunately, this is never explicitly stated, only implied. Worse, the author thinks the regime's failure to collectivize the countryside is to be regretted, overlooking the economic and moral evils of such policies. While in some ways useful for those acquainted with post-1974 Ethiopia, this book is more likely to confuse or mislead readers without such knowledge.

Southern Africa in Crisis: Regional and International Responses. International Peace Academy Report. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988. 235 pp. $12.00 (paper).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When members of the International Peace Academy and other Western academics join representatives of the Tanzanian regime to talk about South Africa, the outcome is wearisomely predictable. Perhaps this volume qualifies as scholarship in service of a cause (formerly known as propaganda), but it does not qualify as serious scholarship.

Thus, Sam Nolutshungu of Dartmouth remarks that the role of Zulu and Inkatha leader Gatsha Buthelezi during the Soweto uprising is "well-known." It may be, but he tells us nothing about what Buthelezi did—other than to offend Sam Nolutshungu. Victoria Brittain of *Third World Review* detects a conspiracy based in Washington to downplay the magnitude of Pretoria's repression and involving, of course, all the major Western media.

Robert Jaster and Kurt Campbell, the only legitimate scholars included here, make slightly more serious contributions. Jaster implicitly accepts the notion that Pretoria has a grand plan for "destabilizing" its neighboring states—as if the South African regime needed to aid tribal and factional conflicts in destabilizing those so-called states. Campbell constructs a straw man, calls it the conservative Western strategic understanding, and then attacks it. Thus, he attributes to the conservatives a wildly exaggerated opinion on the importance of the Cape sea lanes and the importance of Soviet military power in the region. But his model is rejected by most important conservative scholars, as well as by the U.S. Defense and State departments, all of whom have a far more sophisticated and realistic understanding of southern Africa's importance than Campbell gives them credit for.

EAST ASIA
by Arthur Waldron

The China Consuls: British Consular Officers, 1843-1943. By P. D. Coates. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 631 pp. $36.00.

As late as the 1920s, new recruits into the British consular service in China were told upon their arrival in Peking that, of every four, one would die young, one would go mad, one would take to drink, and only the last would survive to take charge of a British consulate. If Coates's book offered nothing else, its wealth of such anecdotes would make it worthwhile indeed, for the vignettes are usually telling as well as amusing. Coates relates the story of an official who, among other quirky habits, was known for making his dinner guests hold cockroach races on the table. Not surprisingly, he was considered

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mad; as a result, his prescient evaluation of the communist movement was disregarded.

But Coates's book offers much more than anecdotes. It offers a detailed history of the British consular service in China, and, through that perspective, much of the story of China in the century before the Second World War. Until recently, many observers dismissed that period as no more than a chaotic interregnum which lost all relevance with the advent in 1949 of a New China. But anyone who knows China today will recognize its continuity with the one that Coates's consuls knew. By capturing this memory, he has provided powerful historical perspective on the present.

Edgar Snow: A Biography. By John Maxwell Hamilton. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. 345 pp. $25.00.

It used to be that reading Edgar Snow prompted questions about American policy: why was it, given the fundamentally benign purposes of the Chinese Communists, that U.S. diplomacy never met them even halfway? Times have changed. Reading Hamilton's carefully researched biography of Snow raises questions not about America, but about Snow himself—how did such a gifted journalist manage to get so much so wrong?

This is not because Hamilton directly poses such questions. To the last page, he holds to his conviction that Snow was a man who "saw more" than his contemporaries. Hamilton considers the views of many scholars who now maintain that the Yenan in *Red Star Over China* was in fact a tight little police state, and the cheery land of *The Other Side of the River* a site of mass starvation. But the author never permits doubt to undermine his basic favorable judgment: Snow (who was factually wrong) had "the long perspective"; others (who got things right) are given short shrift.

This approach robs the book of even the possibility of depth. Unwilling to pose the big question—what was the origin of Snow's monumental self-delusion? —Hamilton can attempt no big answer. Thus, his book can do no more than fill the long-felt need for solid biographical information, which it does very satisfactorily. But the deeper dimensions of Edgar Snow's life remain an enigma: when penetrated and understood, they will yield a great biography.

Fiji: Opportunity from Adversity? By Wolfgang Kasper, Jeff Bennett, and Richard Blandy. St. Leonards, New South Wales: The Centre for Independent Studies, 1988. 192 pp. $16.95 (paper).

Fiji suffered two military coups in 1987, prompted by the fears of indigenous Fijians (who make up 44 percent of the population) that their traditional rights were being lost to the country's Indian population (50 percent of the population). As a result of the turmoil

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

following the coups, Fiji's political and economic prospects seemingly took a decisive turn for the worse. Yet in this informative and thought-provoking work, Kasper, Bennett, and Blandy argue the counterintuitive proposition that, properly used, the present crisis could provide an opportunity for economic reform and advancement.

Admittedly, the authors say, without major shifts in direction, the next twenty-five years will witness further economic impoverishment and political tension in Fiji. At the same time, they insist, wide-ranging economic reforms, speedily implemented, could put Fiji solidly on the road to rapid economic development. Their prescriptions include a good deal of free-market medicine: guaranteed economic rights for all, elimination of price controls and monopolies, privatization of everything from Nadi airport to the University of the South Pacific, and so on.

But will free-market solutions not simply enable the already-sophisticated Indians to enhance their wealth at the expense of indigenous Fijians? The authors convincingly dispatch this objection by proposing changes in the leasing of lands (83 percent of Fiji's territory is held in government trust) so as to give rural Fijians a better return. Then, to promote savings and entrepreneurship, they call for new patterns of economic organization in the villages.

If Everybody Bought One Shoe: American Capitalism in Communist China. By Graeme Browning. New York: Hill and Wang, 1989. 304 pp. $18.95.

A seasoned business reporter, Graeme Browning probes the origins of the current infatuation with the China market, and examines the vicissitudes of U.S.-China business interactions to date. She includes portraits of both the largest U.S.-China joint venture, Armand Hammer's An Tai Bao open pit mine, and the small-scale sales operation of Tulsa-based Centrifugal Casting Company. Other chapters deal with Beatrice's operations in South China, AMC's Beijing Jeep venture, and the travails of Western lawyers, bankers, and accountants practicing in China. In the end, Browning makes clear, the jury is still out on whether the enormous, speculative investments in China will prove one of the U.S. business community's shrewdest gambles or one of its greatest follies.

Although the inevitable culture clash is certainly a major source of difficulties, Browning argues that it cannot explain the enormity of the problems. Her entertaining, instructive descriptions of monumental misunderstandings, frustrating negotiations, and daily life in China will probably convince the general reader she is right. Browning portrays a world where a rigorously selected American office representative quits after ten days, and another complains, "Our joint-venture partner hasn't lived up to one single promise yet." It

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is a world where workers sleep on the machinery and where knowing the law depends on having friends in superior positions who can tell you what is allowed.

If Everybody Bought One Shoe will make most readers glad the problems of doing business in China are not their own. It will prove indispensable to anyone resolved to enter a market where many major companies feel they cannot afford *not* to maintain a presence. Judith Shapiro

Last Chance in Manchuria: The Diary of Chang Kia-ngau. Edited by Donald G. Gillin and Ramon H. Myers. Translated by Dolores Zen. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1989. 352 pp. $36.95.

Trying to recover Manchuria after the defeat of the Japanese turned out to be a fatal blunder for Chiang Kai-shek. Initially, the Soviets obstructed the entry of his troops; then, when the troops finally arrived, the Communists encircled and defeated them. Ultimately, Manchuria cost Chiang the Civil War.

The document presented here suggests it need not have. For six critical months, from August of 1945 until April of 1946, Chang Kia-ngau was Chiang's representative in talks with the Soviets about the fate of the industrial plant the Japanese had left behind. His diary suggests that, had the Chinese been willing to concede economic preponderance in Manchuria to the Soviets, a deal excluding Mao and his forces might have been cut. The Chinese Nationalists, however, resisted such a Soviet role. Nevertheless, in 1946 they attempted to recapture Manchuria anyway, and were well on the way to doing so—thus forcing the Soviets to compromise—when the United States imposed an arms embargo.

The text of the diary is well translated (although one wishes more care had been devoted to identifying foreign names—many are simply presented in Chinese transliteration), and a helpful introduction is provided. Chang Kia-ngau's words vividly convey a new and authoritative picture of the players—both Chinese parties and the Americans, but above all the Soviet Union—as well as the possibilities in 1945.

The Marcos Dynasty. By Sterling Seagrave. New York: Harper and Row, 1988. 493 pp. $22.50.

After the commercial success of *The Soong Dynasty*, it is not surprising that Seagrave, a long-time Asia hand, would turn to the Marcoses and write a book which is, if anything, even more absorbing as reading—and more resistant to scholarly assessment. No summary can do justice to all the dirt Seagrave claims to have uncovered, from Imelda's shopping habits and sexual preferences to Ferdinand's illicit

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gold dealings to a plot to "unhorse" Jimmy Carter when he brought too much pressure to bear on issues of human rights.

The problem is that only another insider can judge the contents of such a book; and this reviewer has no access to CIA cables, only a modest grasp of the ways of the international gold market, and no contacts in the Japanese underworld. Perhaps it is sufficient here merely to voice doubts about Seagrave's scholarship (*The Soong Dynasty* does not stand up to close scrutiny), and to note that history does not usually resemble anything found in writings of what might be called the Sterling Seagrave/Ian Fleming genre. This is a great book to read on a flight to Manila, but take along plenty of salt.

The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness. By Peter N. Dale. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 233 pp. $29.95.

By now, word has got out about the peculiar notion that the Japanese are different from the rest of the world—that their intestines are thirty feet longer than other people's, their brains work differently, and that they can communicate with each other without recourse to words. Stated baldly, these ideas (in Japanese, *nihonjinron*) appear so outlandish that they could not have much significance. Nonetheless, they are common currency in Japan, even in the most sober-headed and high-level circles, and watered-down versions invariably seep into the discussions of foreigners too.

Dale exposes two aspects of the *nihonjinron* fantasy. First, he shows what utter nonsense it is—and not just the long intestines, but also the more plausible aspects. Second, he shows that the claim of Japanese uniqueness is no mere foolish indulgence, but is an integral part of the Japanese self-image that presents an ongoing political challenge to the Japanese body politic. The roots of this concept lie in Japanese fascism, and beyond that in the depths of German nationalism.

Dale has written a wonderful book—witty, elegantly phrased, tough-minded, and highly insightful into Japanese thinking. He is remarkably well read in a variety of subject areas—including literature, psychology, and history—and he draws on these to turn what could be a minor topic into a minor classic. D.P.

Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes. By Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988. 461 pp. $39.95.

Lieberthal and Oksenberg have produced something close to a masterpiece of the contemporary China-watcher's art. Focusing on two case studies—the development of the petroleum industry and the building of a huge dam at the Three Gorges on the upper Yangtze River—they illustrate the manner in which complex decisions are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

now made in the People's Republic. As in the Soviet Union, there is no longer a single dictator or monolithic party that makes all the key decisions. Instead, as the authors show, there are structures, interest groups, and bargaining processes. The interaction of these many elements often leads to unexpected outcomes. For example, those officials most closely identified with the nascent petroleum industry in the late 1960s became acutely aware of the limits of Chinese autarky, and this caused them to weigh in on the side of a more open foreign policy.

Lieberthal and Oksenberg argue that bargaining processes are growing more important as localities and interest groups gain strength at the expense of the center. Indeed, the authors conclude that China's decentralization will in the future obstruct any sweeping perestroika-style reform of the Chinese system as a whole.

LATIN AMERICA
by Michael Radu

Castro's America Department: Coordinating Cuba's Support for Marxist-Leninist Violence in the Americas. By Rex A. Hudson. Washington, D.C.: The Cuban American National Foundation, 1988. 73 pp. $5.00 (paper).

The Cuban Communist Party Central Committee's America Department (DA) is the only institution in the communist world today that remotely compares with Stalin's Comintern in scope and effectiveness. Led by a Columbia University graduate, Manuel Pieiro Losada, the DA is the nerve center of revolutionary violence from Guatemala to Chile. Unlike the Soviets' present International Department, which lacks both clout with the KGB and active support of the party leader, the DA works closely with Cuban intelligence and is consistently reinforced by Fidel Castro's personal involvement. Not surprisingly, the Sandinistas painstakingly copied the Cuban model when establishing their International Relations Directorate (DRI). That process was facilitated by the presence of Cuban personnel at the highest levels of the DRI.

Hudson's monograph fills an important gap in our knowledge concerning the institutional structure of Cuba's support for revolutionary causes. Although most of the material presented here was previously known, this is the single most detailed and coherent overview of Castro's DA to date.

Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru. By Edmundo Morales. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1989. 229 pp. $24.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Morales has travelled to the coca-growing areas of the Upper Huallaga Valley and produced a well-researched, first-hand report on that end of the drug trade. Nevertheless, his book does no more than prove the obvious: coca growing in that region is a vital industry upon which innumerable Peruvian peasants depend for their livelihood.

Morales is quite justified in repeating that the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency's efforts to stop coca growing are both wrong and deluded. On the other hand, he is wrong to conclude that attacks on supplies of coca are ultimately irrelevant. The supply of cocaine has a strong impact upon prices and demand, thus playing a role in controlling use. And his resort to blaming the *yanquis* alone for the strong demand should be ignored as an indulgence in rhetorical overkill. Colombian suppliers have both a stake and a major role in increasing demand.

Morales is even more mistaken in his portrait of the chief protector of the coca growers, the guerrillas of Peru's allegedly Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). They do not, as he would have it, draw much support from the peasants in the Upper Huallaga Valley. As Morales himself shows, the social base of Sendero is about one-third teachers and one-third university students; the "taxes" on cocaine traffickers are its main source of funds. In sum, Morales must be read for his many nuggets of information, but with wariness for his ideological bias.

El Salvador at War: An Oral History. Edited by Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988. 500 pp. $16.00 (paper).

El Salvador's civil war has often brought that country to the front page since the end of 1979, and it has become the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid in the Western hemisphere. Yet few have troubled to learn about El Salvador and its conflict. This precious volume fills an enormous gap; there can no longer be any excuse for ignorance.

The editors have assembled only primary sources: captured guerrilla documents, defectors' tales, statements by Salvadoran and American figures. With the possible exception of some works on Vietnam and Guatemala, this could well be the most complete source book ever assembled on a modern country experiencing a Marxist-Leninist insurgency.

One complaint: insurgent documents are not easy to come by, and it looks as if the editors have occasionally used the most available FMLN statements (those already published in Latin America) rather than digging for the most important, such as the devastating testimony of Communist party cadre Marco Antonio Grande Rivera, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the even more important statements by the higher-ranking "Alejandro Montenegro" of the People's Revolutionary Army. Nevertheless, such objections are minor when compared to this volume's extraordinary value.

La Prensa: The Republic of Paper. By Jaime Chamorro Cardenal. New York: Freedom House, 1988. 189 pp. $22.95 ($9.95, paper).

Few cases better symbolize the struggle between freedom and repression than the case of the Nicaraguan newspaper, *La Prensa*. Under the Somozas, *La Prensa* was accused of communism, its staff often jailed and intimidated. Today, the same newspaper, largely run by the same people and espousing the same ideas, is accused by a communist regime of being run by the CIA.

Chamorro's monograph thoroughly examines the newspaper's history and should be essential reading for members of the Western media, who have shown shamefully little sympathy for their beleaguered Nicaraguan colleagues. Included here are some purely Orwellian and flagrantly revealing statements on Sandinista censorship, such as the assertion by secret police censor Nelba Blandón that *La Prensa* lies about the existence of censorship in Nicaragua and cannot be allowed to publish such lies. A fascinating justification for rewriting history came from the same source: statements regarding pre-Sandinista events should be censored, she said, because they "no longer apply in today's Nicaragua."

Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvaliers. By James Ferguson. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989. 216 pp. $16.95 ($9.95, paper).

The Haiti of the Duvaliers (1957-1986) offers a depressing example of national decay and the process of de-modernization. The roots of this experience lie both in the peculiar career of François ("Papa Doc") Duvalier, and in Haiti's own history, politics, and culture. Ferguson tells this story well, but when it comes to drawing conclusions his wishful thinking too often obscures his considerable knowledge of Haitian history and society.

Thus, Ferguson admits Haiti never had a democratic government, and that Papa Doc drew support from the land-owning black peasants and the adepts of voodoo. Yet he fails to recognize that, as a result, there was no serious support for democratic government in Haiti. The elder Duvalier had pre-empted democratic movements by ably exploiting such popular attitudes as a tradition of worshipping strongmen, primitive religious beliefs, a deeply rooted racism, a history of mob violence, Haitian nationalism, and xenophobia. To Ferguson, however, only U.S. toleration can explain the endurance of the Duvaliers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ferguson also seems to believe that a popular revolt toppled Jean-Claude Duvalier (when in fact it was a unique conjunction of U.S., French, and Catholic Church pressures), that there is a tremendous thirst for democracy among ordinary Haitians, and that prominent Haitian politicians are today democratic—further examples of his wishful thinking. Ferguson's hopes for Haiti will probably be disappointed only too soon.

What are We Afraid Of? An Assessment of the "Communist Threat" in Central America. By John Lamperti. A National Action/Research on the Military-Industrial Complex, and American Friends Service Committee Study. Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1988. 109 pp. $25.00 ($8.00, paper).

Lamperti, professor of mathematics and statistics at Dartmouth, has written an account in which the facts, almost without exception, are false, twisted, or incomplete. For instance, Lamperti says of the five guerrilla groups comprising the FMLN in El Salvador: "The leaders of the left naturally saw the need to coordinate their struggle." In fact, they had a long history of enthusiastically murdering each other, and whatever unity they have achieved since 1980 has been imposed on them by Fidel Castro and the Sandinistas. Lamperti may deny that the Sandinistas armed the FMLN—but even Daniel Ortega no longer bothers to mouth this lie. Lamperti seems more dedicated to whitewashing his heroes than they are themselves.

As for evidence, the author never mentions—or shows signs of having seen—the substantial body of primary sources, ranging from defectors' statements to captured documents, that contradicts his diatribe. Likewise, his secondary sources are all from within the left itself, an incestuous approach remote from real scholarship. Finally, it is not clear how Lamperti answers the question of his title. He insists there is no need to fear communism, since it will be for the good of Central America. Yet he goes to excessive lengths to argue that neither the Sandinistas nor the FMLN are, in fact, communists. Coming from a mathematician, this inability to pursue a single line of argument is particularly disheartening.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

transaction



THE LONG SHADOW
CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Daniel Pipes

This is a book about politics by a historian, about a region where the past casts a long shadow on the present. Written by Daniel Pipes, director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and editor of Orbis, the essays in this volume cover five broad topics: Islam, the Persian Gulf, the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism, and U.S. policy in the Middle East. From Soviet Muslims to suicidal terrorists, from Kuwaiti oil wealth to Louis Farrakhan, Mr. Pipes ties together recent developments and the enduring truths of the Middle East.
ISBN: 0-887382-207 (cloth) 320 pp. **$32.95**

A Foreign Policy Research Institute Book



VIOLENCE AND THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES

Michael Radu, editor

In a fresh departure from most literature on revolution in Latin America--which tends to focus on social injustice or U.S. interests--this volume deals with flesh-and-bone revolutionary cadres. It raises the question of how well the leaders actually represent the people they claim to speak for and casts doubt on the "progressive" character of revolutionary movements. Includes contributions by Ernst Halperin, Paul Hollander, Irving Louis Horowitz, Douglas Payne, Michael Radu, William Ratliff, Vladimir Tismaneanu, and Antonio Ybarra-Rojas.
ISBN: 0-88738-195-2 (cloth) 246 pp. **$24.95**

A Foreign Policy Research Institute Book

Order from your bookstore or
direct from the publisher.
Major credit cards accepted.
(201) 932-2280

transaction publishers
Department PIR 1
Rutgers–The State University
New Brunswick, N.J. 08903

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"WORLD POLICY IS TRYING TO CONSTRUCT. . .

. . .a new foreign policy that matches reality—that challenges the deeper premises of the Cold War and proposes a new set of answers."
—William Greider, national affairs columnist, **Rolling Stone**


WORLD POLICY JOURNAL
Spring 1989 $3.25
AMERICAN PRIORITIES IN A NEW WORLD ERA
Richard J. Barnet, Lester R. Brown, Robert S. Browne, Hodding Carter III, Stephen F. Cohen, Jeff Faux, Randall Forsberg, Archibald L. Gillies, Stanley B. Greenberg, Ann F. Lewis, Robert B. Reich, Carl Sagan, Ronald Steel
NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY
Ralph Cavanagh, Chris Calwell, David Goldstein, Robert Watson
From Costly Chaos to Least-Cost Planning
ASSESSING PERESTROIKA
Richard Parker
Half Full or Half Empty?
TEN YEARS OF THATCHERISM
Kent Worcester
The "Enterprise Culture" and the Democratic Alternative
EL SALVADOR: THE FMLN PERSPECTIVE
Salvador Samayoa
Interview by Terry Karl
ISRAEL'S FATEFUL HOUR
Yehoshafat Harkabi
Interview by Robert I. Friedman
WORLD POLICY COMMENT
Elmar Schmähling
German Security Policy Beyond American Hegemony

- *WORLD POLICY* has established itself as the leading progressive international affairs quarterly in the United States.
- *WORLD POLICY* provides in-depth policy articles, voices from abroad, special reports from crisis areas, and interviews with national and international leaders.
- *WORLD POLICY*'s coverage includes U.S.-Soviet relations, U.S. security policy, international trade and economic policy, the United Nations, transatlantic and transpacific relations, and developments in Latin America, Asia and Africa.
- *WORLD POLICY* is for public officials, national leaders and opinion-makers, educators and scholars, and political activists and concerned citizens.

- *START YOUR SUBSCRIPTION* with the current issue and take advantage of this special introductory rate. . . just $15.75 for four quarterly issues. Save 25% off the cover price!

YES Send me four quarterly issues of *WORLD POLICY*
I have enclosed $15.75

Name _____

Address _____

City, State, Zip, Country _____

Foreign Orders: Add $4.00 for surface or $10.00 for airmail delivery. All orders must be paid in U.S. dollars, drawn on a U.S. bank.

WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • 777 U.N. Plaza • NY NY 10017 USA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"High priority reading for anyone interested in international economic development..."

Murray Weidenbaum
Distinguished Scholar, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers

+

"One of the finest magazines on the subject of international economic growth and entrepreneurial capitalism..."

Former Representative Jack Kemp

=

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

"...a first rate publication."
Senator Phil Gramm

"...the most important economic magazine in the world."
George Gilder
author, *Wealth and Poverty*

Published quarterly in English, Spanish and French, the *Journal of Economic Growth* is the only magazine which offers free market/limited government solutions to problems of worldwide economic growth. The *Journal* fills a real gap in the development literature by addressing relevant issues in the international economic arena in a provocative and readable manner. Join the thousands of international readers to benefit from the *Journal*'s sound analysis of important issues confronting the developing world.

AUTHORS & CONTRIBUTORS:

Peter T. Bauer, London School of Economics
Tom Bethell, Contributing Editor, *National Review*; Washington Correspondent, *The American Spectator*
Hernando de Soto, Institute for Liberty and Democracy; author, *The Other Path*
Millicent Fenwick, Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, FAO
Mario Vargas Llosa, Latin American author and poet
Alvin Rabushka, Hoover Institution



JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

Name_____
Organization_____
Address_____
City_____State_____Zip_____Country_____

___Annual Individual Subscription US$25 ___Two-Year Individual Subscription US$45
___Annual Institutional Subscription US$40 ___Two-Year Institutional Subscription US$75

___New ___Renewal ___Bill me ___Payment Enclosed

Make checks payable to National Chamber Foundation.
Mail to: **Journal of Economic Growth**, 1615 H Street, Washington, DC 20062, USA. (202) 463-5620

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What is there to say about the Drug Issue? Plenty.

JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

SPECIAL ISSUE

Volume 30; Numbers 2 & 3 — Summer / Fall 1988

ASSESSING THE AMERICAS' WAR ON DRUGS
Bruce Michael Bagley, Guest Editor

FOREWORD

THE US STATE DEPARTMENT'S NARCOTICS CONTROL POLICY IN THE AMERICAS
James W. Van Wert

THE US CONGRESS, INTERNATIONAL DRUG POLICY, AND THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1988
Raphael Francis Perl

THE US MILITARY AND THE WAR ON DRUGS IN LATIN AMERICA
Donald Mabry

THE DRUG WAR: GOING AFTER SUPPLY — A commentary
Kenneth E. Sharpe

DIMENSIONS OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN COCAINE INDUSTRY
Rensselaer Lee III

COCA, THE STATE, AND THE PEASANTRY IN BOLIVIA, 1982-1988
Kevin Healy

THE WAR ON DRUGS: THE PERUVIAN CASE
Cynthia McClintock

NARCOS AND POLITICOS: THE POLITICS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING IN HONDURAS
Mark B. Rosenberg

LAUNDERING DRUG PROFITS: MIAMI AND CARIBBEAN TAX HAVENS
Anthony P. Maingot

US FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WAR ON DRUGS: ANALYSIS OF A POLICY FAILURE
Bruce Michael Bagley

The current issue of the *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* addresses one of the most volatile social and political issues of our times. Start your subscription now and you'll begin receiving **the** leading journal in the field of Interamerican relations. Published quarterly.

Subscriptions: Institutions $52.00 annually; individuals $26.00. Add $US4.00 for areas outside the US, Canada and Mexico. Surcharge for airmail available upon request.
Single copies of this special double issue are available for $13.00.

To charge your subscription order by phone, call: (305) 284-6866 (Mercy Vega).

Mail coupon to:

UNIVERSITY OF Miami

Institute of Interamerican Studies
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs
P.O. Box 248123
Coral Gables, FL 33124

____ Yes, begin my subscription to the *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* with this special issue.
____ Please send me ____ copies of the *Journal's* special issue (Vol. 30, Nos. 2 & 3) at $13.00 each.
___ Institution ___ Individual ___ Student ___ Check enclosed Amount $_____
Name _____ Charge to ____American Express ____MC/Visa
Address _____ Acct. # _____
_____ Exp. Date_____
_____ Acct. Name _____
City_____State____Zip_____Country _____ Signature _____
o

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Philadelphia Papers

A Tale of Two Policies:

U.S. Relations with the Argentine Junta, 1976-83

by Mark Falcoff

A Tale of Two Policies is a case study of one of the oldest policy dilemmas for the United States in the Third World — how to fashion policy towards non-democratic regimes that is both effective and morally satisfying. In the Argentine case, Mark Falcoff surprisingly concludes that, different as were the approaches of the Carter and Reagan people towards this problem, both administrations pursued policies irrelevant to the developments in that country. The analysis, grounded in a mastery of the political cultures of Argentina and two U.S. administrations, is a product of FPRI's three-year project on Friendly Tyrants, a comparative study of U.S. relations with pro-American regimes in the postwar era.

Mr. Falcoff is Resident Scholar in Foreign Policy at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., and author of *Modern Chile, 1970-1989* (Transaction).

$8.00

ISBN 0-910191-10-7
ISSN 1041-9039

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

3615 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(215) 382-0685

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New From Princeton

Perestroika in Perspective

The Design and Dilemmas of Soviet Reform

Padma Desai

"Gorbachev's struggle to open up the Soviet society and restructure its economy—akin to Hercules trying to clean the Augean stables—is the number-one drama of our time. Padma Desai's *Perestroika in Perspective* is the definitive account for us nonexperts—accurate, and yet fast-moving."

—Paul A. Samuelson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Cloth: $14.95 ISBN 0-691-04243-8

Not available in the British Commonwealth.

Moscow's Third World Strategy

Alvin Z. Rubinstein

"Professor Rubinstein's book is a timely reminder of continuity in Soviet strategy when so much attention is being paid to changes in Soviet tactics. A western policy to deal with Mikhail Gorbachev's 'new thinking' must also exhibit the 'cold-eyed realism' that Rubinstein detects in Moscow's approach to the Third World. Well written, well balanced, well researched." *—Alexander M. Haig, Jr.*

Cloth: $29.95 ISBN 0-691-07790-8

AT YOUR BOOKSTORE OR

Princeton University Press

41 WILLIAM ST. • PRINCETON, NJ 08540 • (609) 452-4900

ORDERS 800-PRS-ISBN (777-4726)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED